

In Place of Displacement: Commemorating Deportations in Lviv after 1991

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In my paper I would like to address the place and forms of recent commemorations of the deportations during and after the Second World War in the cityscape of Lviv, a city that represents particularly well the changes and challenges in the politics of memory in the border region. Lviv, a city in Ukraine situated just beyond the EU's eastern border, is an important site for all-Ukrainian politics of memory and, at the same time, occupies a special place in Polish-Ukrainian relationships.

There are many possibilities to commemorate deportation in this city, as the topic is of particular importance to it. Between 1939 and the late 1940s, Lviv went through war, several fundamental changes of political regime, violent destruction of its Jewish community and large-scale deportation of its Polish inhabitants, and finally the establishment of a new and unprecedented socialist-communist government. In this context, Lviv occupies a special place, as more than one hundred thousands Poles were de facto expelled from Lviv between the end of 1944 and the end of 1946. Many of them would resettle in Poland. In addition, Lviv is a city where Ukrainians, expelled from Poland at the same time, or their descendents came to settle down. Jews, who constituted the second largest part of the city's population before the war, were persecuted and murdered during the Holocaust. Yanivska Camp, a site where thousands of Jews and POW were murdered, is located at the outskirts of the city and several of Lviv's railway stations served to deport the Jews of the city to the Belzec death camp.

The cityscape of Lviv was a central site of post-war official policies which aimed at integrating the city into new symbolic systems of national and political belonging and power of Soviet Ukraine. Upon the collapse of the Communist system, the formal and external constraints of defining the image and memory of the city. This has opened the possibility of reassessing and publicly commemorating events that were either taboo or heavily censored and distorted during the Communist period. Deportations and the tragic experiences of civilian populations during and after the Second World War, though in selective way, were among the first topics to be memorialized in the cityscape of post-Communist Lviv. Currently, preparations for a memorial for deported Ukrainians are underway. Thus, in this paper for the Danyliw Seminar I will focus on a number of cityscape elements, mainly monuments and sites, and the debates surrounding completed and incomplete projects linked to the topic of deportations in the region in the 1940s, in order to describe and explain some general tendencies in decision and opinion making in Lviv but also on state level in Kyiv.

In my paper, I would like to draw attention to two completed and three projects that are under way. The completed project is a monument in Lviv dedicated to perhaps the single most prominent individual deported during Akcja Wisła – the primitivist painter Nykyfor. In my analysis, I will draw parallels with the monument to Nykyfor in Krynica, a town in south eastern Poland. Implicitly related to the topic of deportation, I will show in my paper how the problem of defining his identity within strictly national terms highlights more generally the challenges and dangers of shaping the memory of Akcja, in particular, and deportation, in general, and their victims within exclusively national narratives. One of the earliest monuments in Lviv commemorating victims of repressions, including deportations, was the Monument for Victims of Political Repressions. It is located near so-called “transitional prison” [*peresylochnaya tiurma*] at Zamarstyniv, from where, in post-war years, arrested people were sent to Gulag camps.

Currently, in Lviv, three projects aimed at commemoration of deportations are under way. Two are museums and one is a monument. Thus, there is an idea of unveiling a monument of deported Ukrainians from Poland on a site already marked by a commemorative stone. At the same time, an ambitious project of establishing the Museum of Resettled Ukrainians in the town of Vynnyky near Lviv is being developed. The latter will embrace several topics, including an exposition on the history and daily life in the territories from which Ukrainians were deported in 1944-46; Lemkivshchyna, Nadsiania, Pidliashshia, and Kholmshchyna. These projects are dealing explicitly with the topic of deportations. One more ambitious project, a Memorial Museum of Victims of Occupation Regimes, to which I will refer as Museum of Occupations is discussed right at this moment. The competition for the architectural project was announced in the summer and the decision will be made by the end of the year. The idea of the museum is implicitly dealing with the deportations as a part of complex repressive practices of the states. Thus I will analyze it together with the Museum of Deported Ukrainians, in attempting to see how the shift to exhibitions as commemorative forms can open up

new perspectives or possibilities for commemorating the past in the city. As these are the projects in progress, the analysis is based on the premises as well as preliminary ideas of how the museums will form their exhibition materials and spaces.

Separately, I will look at two monuments, one in Lviv and one in Krynica, dedicated to perhaps the single most prominent individual deported during post-war Akcja Wisła – the primitivist painter Nykyfor. These two projects, also indirectly linked to the issue of deportation, have illustrated the problem of defining his identity within strictly national terms and highlighted more generally the challenges and dangers of shaping the memory of Akcja and its victims within exclusively national narratives. This question is relevant for the ways deportations are presented and commemorated generally in the city and the region.

Before moving to the analysis of these five commemorative projects dealing with deportations either exclusively or in part, I will present a short outline of how deportations during and after the Second World War have changed the city and damaged the lives of its Polish, Jewish, and Ukrainian inhabitants. In order to understand the challenges faced by the authorities and broader public of post-Communist Lviv in commemorating Soviet and Nazi crimes during and after the Second World War, it is necessary, among other things, to look at the basic facts on forced resettlements in the city and the region from 1939 through the late 1940s.

Place of Displacement: An Outline of the Deportations in the City

The city's population changed radically throughout less than seven years. Between 1939 and 1941, the period of the first Soviet occupation, new authorities implemented deportations as a means of pacifying and transforming urban society. For the German occupation regime, deportations were part of a larger plan to exterminate the Jewish population of the city and to fight the resistance of local population. After July 1944, when Lviv fell once again under Soviet authority, deportations were used in a large-scale project that brought the end to Polish Lwów. Families of members of Ukrainian guerilla underground, i.e. OUN and UPA, were deported to the Soviet east.¹ People accused of being linked to Polish underground were deported there as well. Generally Poles were forced to resettle to what was designed in Yalta, Teheran and finally in Potsdam as post-war Poland. This was a country stripped of almost half of its pre-war territory, but given a significant part of pre-war German territories, including such large cities as Wrocław/Breslau, Szczecin/Stettin.

1. I will use term Ukrainian guerrilla following main study on the topic by Grzegorz Motyka who is using term "Ukrainska partyzanka." I translated the term "partyzanka" as "guerrilla" to distinguish from accepted term partisans describing Soviet underground.

Together with other violent policies, deportations were directed against the population of what would later (after September 1939) be known as western Ukraine. These policies were part of a Sovietization project aiming at incorporating and transforming the region into a Soviet polity.² Lviv was to become the unofficial center of the entire region and officially the administrative center for Lviv oblast.

Deportations primarily targeted civilians. Many of the deportations, especially between 1939 and 1941 as well as after 1944, were executed under allegations of supporting anti-Soviet activities, “enemies of the people.” These included women, children, and elderly people. In both time periods, following the pattern of Soviet repressions, males of working age, heads of households, and most active members of communities were imprisoned and shot.³ Since deportations were euphemistically labeled “resettlement”, entire families, whether Polish or Ukrainian were displaced. Thus, the commemoration of different deportations is about the commemorating of civilians.

Deportations were part of the repressive measures undertaken by successive Soviet and Nazi authorities. Imprisonments, executions, the stripping of property, banishment from work or the stripping of civil privileges were employed by both regimes, in the aim of radically changing Lviv and the entire region in the years following September 1939. Deportations targeted large numbers of the city’s population. Applied successively by both the Soviet and Nazi regime, they were crucial for making the city a homogeneous entity that could fit into a new social and political context. The result was most obvious by the end of the 1940s, when the demographic profile of the city and the region differed dramatically from that of pre-1939. Deportations, called “resettlements” in Soviet official discourse, were perceived an efficient means for securing the state border region and advancing Soviet social engineering policies. Therefore, depending on its aims, the state selected groups designated for deportations, employing ethnic, class and previous record criteria.⁴ As a result, deportees were composed of people of different ethnic and social origins, including Polish intelligentsia, army officers, landlords, *osadniki*,⁵ Ukrainian peasants and relatives of guerrilla fighters, as well as many Jews, partly refugees from the Nazi-occupied Polish territory and from towns and cities in Western Ukraine.⁶

2. See an excellent analysis of Soviet policies in Western Ukraine and Belorussia in Jan T. Gross, *Revolution from Abroad, The Soviet Conquest of Poland’s Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia*, expanded edition, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2002. Entire chapter six is dedicated to deportations in this study.

3. Gross, *Revolution from Abroad*, p. 187.

4. Alexander Statiev, “Motivations and Goals of Soviet Deportations in the Western Borderlands,” *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, vol. 28, nr. 6, December 2005, pp. 977-1003, p. 979

5. *Osadiniki* (literary translation from Polish “settlers”) is used to describe people from central parts of the Polish state, who received lands in the eastern territories of the Second Polish Republic enhancing presence of ethnic Poles in the borderland. They were in majority farmers, often veterans of the Soviet-Polish War of 1919-20 settled in Eastern Provinces of inter-war Polish state as part of state-run project of modernization and Polonization multiethnic borderland areas. On the case of Volyn, challenges, complications, and different option see study about Volyn governor Henryk Józewski by Timothy Snyder, *Sketches from a Secret War: A Polish Artist’s Mission to Liberate Soviet Ukraine*, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2005, especially chapter 3 “Theaters of Politics.”

6. Soviet authorities deported 58,852 Jewish refugees from Nazi occupied Polish provinces. This number comes from study by Nikolai Bugai, “20-50-e gody: pereselenia i deportatsyi evreiskogo naselenia v SSSR,” *Otechestven-*

Therefore, not only were deportees divided into different groups but the deportation of one group could be accompanied at least by some approval from another group. Thus, many Ukrainians and Belarusians approved the exile of Poles.⁷ This could be partly explained by a rivalry between these national groups as well as by social reasons, as Poles occupied higher social positions in the region. Local perception of how people were categorized enhanced existing tensions between different groups within the multiethnic inhabitants of the region. One of the first and cruel manifestations of this came in July 1941 when a series of pogroms swept the cities, towns and villages of what was Soviet “western borderland” between 1939 and 1941.⁸

There are different estimates about how many people were deported, arrested, and murdered under the first Soviet occupation.⁹ Though there were different groups, ethnic and social, these people are often referred in academic literature as Polish citizens.¹⁰ It is difficult to estimate the numbers. According to Gross, the largest estimates of people repressed would include also people who “went into the USSR willingly... were drafted into the red Army, were kept as POW.” Thus, in recent literature we have estimates of about 500,000 refugees in the area of Eastern Poland (Western Ukraine and Belarus). One can also estimate that about 500,000 Polish citizens, i.e. Poles, Ukrainians, Jews, and Byelorussians were deported to the Soviet interior either as prisoners, or as “special settlers” [*spetspereselentsy/spetspereselentsi*].¹¹ These are two different groups but they also overlap. In both cases, we talk about a phenomenon that touched almost each family personally in the region.

To begin with, the entire strip of the new Soviet-German border was to be depopulated to create an empty strip of up to 1 km along it. Because of this measure, many people had to abandon their place of residence. Among large cities only Przemyśl was targeted as a part of the city was emptied of residents.¹² Moreover, large urban centres were particularly hit, as a number of people were denied the right to live in urban centres and forced to move to places at least 100 km away from the larger cities.¹³ As new authorities

naia istoria, nr. 4, 1992, p. 179.

7. Statiev, “Motivations and Goals of Soviet Deportations,” p. 982.
8. See Dieter Pohl, *Nationalsozialistische Judenverfolgung in Ostgalizien 1941 - 1944: Organisation und Durchführung eines staatlichen Massenverbrechens*, München: Oldenbourg, 1996, p. 348. Asle on Lviv pogrom see Christoph Mick, “Ethnische Gewalt und Pogrome in Lemberg 1914 und 1941,” *Osteuropa* 53, no. 12, 2003, 1810-1827. More in footnote 30 in this text later.
9. Among first estimations, the number 1,25 million people was voiced by the émigré Polish government. These estimations were widely used and as we will see appear at one of Lviv monuments. These estimations were covering the entire western borderland of the Soviet Union (the territories constituting before September 1939 eastern provinces of the Polish state). Gross, *Revolution from Abroad*, p. 192. Such figure was a result of calculations of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in London presented on March 15, 1944 in the report “The Computation of the Polish Population Deported to the USSR Between 1939 and 1941.” See Gross, *Revolution from Abroad*, p. 193-194.
10. For example Gross, *Revolution from Abroad*, chapter 6 “Deportations.”
11. See Grzegorz Hryciuk, *Przemiany narodowosciowe i ludnosciowe w Galicji Wschodniej i na Wołyniu w latach 1931-1948*, Torun: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, 2005, especially p. 166.
12. Gross, *Revolution from Abroad*, p. 188.
13. Gross, *Revolution from Abroad*, p. 188-89.

were providing accommodation for people from the pre-1939 Soviet territories arriving to Lviv/Lvov, many Lvivians were forced to leave their homes. Redistribution of living space, particularly for arriving Soviet cadres meant expulsion of tenants from their apartments. Other cities of the region also went through large-scale expulsions of dwellers in order to vacate living space, usually with all equipment, for arriving Soviet cadres. These were continuous actions which led to arrests, deportations, or “voluntary” emigration for work in the eastern regions of Soviet Ukraine.¹⁴

For the period between September 1939 and June 1941 researchers distinguish four waves of mass deportations from the territory of Western Belarus and Western Ukraine. The first one was on the night of February 10, 1940; the second on April 13, 1940; the third on the last week of June 1940; the fourth and the last one took place in the second half of June 1941.¹⁵ From the report prepared in 1943 by the Polish Embassy in Moscow, each of the four waves of deportation had a social as well as an ethnic profile. Thus, in towns, in February 1940, mostly civil servants, local government officials, judges and policemen were targeted. These were mainly ethnic Poles. Many of them were specially targeted as “colonists” [*osadniki*]. A major share of deportees were from the countryside, where forest workers, settlers and small farmers were selected, part of them were Poles and part were Ukrainians.¹⁶ In Lviv the share of deported was relatively “small.” While more than 18 000 families were targeted with more than 95 000 people, in Lviv “only” 142 families were deported.¹⁷ In April 1940, families of previously arrested, missing or escaped persons, tradesmen, mainly of Jewish descent, as well as farm labourers and small farmers of all nationalities were deported. It is important to note that as April deportations hit mainly urban areas, shares of Poles and Jews survived. From Lviv, about 10,000 people were deported.¹⁸ Among these deported, a dominant majority - 73,5% - were Poles, while 22,32% were Ukrainians, and 3,44% were Jews.¹⁹ This reflected

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14. As Jan Gross pointed out while officially this was wrapped in phrases like “assignment apartments for workers’ families,” on practice “the tens of thousands of Soviet administration, police, and military officials [were] coming to live and work in the newly occupied territories.” Gross, *Revolution from Abroad*, p. 189-190. As a result some people were forced by such circumstances to “volunteer” to go to the Soviet rear regions, especially Donbas in search of employment and shelter. Many could not return. These were policies that caused resettlement and suffering of many individuals, yet they were not planned deportations
 15. See Gross, *Revolution from Abroad*, p. 194, Hryciuk, *Polacy we Lwowie*, Grzegorz Hryciuk, *Przemiany narodowosciowe i ludnoscowe w Galicji Wschodniej i na Wołyniu w latach 1931-1948*, Torun: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, 2005, 424p.
 16. Gross, *Revolution from Abroad*, p. 197. Special decrees from Moscow NKVD office paid special attention to *osadniki*, who were classified as “special re-settlers” or “spetspereselentsy,” and were to be resettled in north-eastern region of the Soviet state. More see in Bilas, *Systema*, vol. 1, 129f and 139f and Grzegorz Hryciuk, *Polacy we Lwowie 1939-1944. Zycie codzienne* Warsaw, Ksiazka i Wiedza, 2000, p. 37.
 17. Ivan Bilas, *Represivno-karalna systema v Ukraini 1917-1953. Suspilno-politychny ta istoryko-pravovy analiz y dvokh knyhakh. Knyha persha*, Kyiv, 1994, p. 139 and Hryciuk, *Polacy*, 37. There are higher estimates for this first wave of deportations. Thus Grünberg and Sprengel estimates that 21,000 families with at least 100,000 persons were deported from former eastern Poland, including more than 68,000 deportees from Easter Galicia, see, Karol Grünberg and Bolesław Sprengel, *Trudne Sasiedztwo. Stosunki polsko-ukrainskie w X-XX wieku*, Warsaw: Ksiazka i Wiedza, 2005, p. 548.
 18. Hryciuk, *Przemiany*, p. 183
 19. Hryciuk, *Przemiany*, p. 183

the demographic structure of the region, where the Poles constituted the vast majority in cities and towns and Ukrainians were major group in the countryside. As in April 1940, families were especially targeted. There were many women and children, as well as elderly at deportation transports.²⁰ In June 1940, refugees from the Nazi-occupied Polish territory, urban professionals as well as merchants, doctors, engineers, lawyers, artists, academics, and teachers were arrested. Again, the proportion of Poles was predominant. During this deportation, the greatest number of Jews was deported. The fourth deportation operation took place in June 1941 covering all categories of people who evaded previous waves of the deportations.

It is difficult to draw precise calculations of how many people were deported from different ethnic groups. It is also difficult to provide final numbers of how many people were deported. As the goal of Soviet government was the pacification of the entire western borderland and the imposition of Soviet rules, different repressive methods were employed and local societies were targeted both by social, ethnic, and political criteria.²¹ Similarly, when dividing deportees along ethnic categories one has to keep in mind that these are estimate number. Yet, both of them are important as they provide using Gross's words, "the scale of these undertakings." As far as ethnic and social divisions, Soviet authorities imposed and reaffirmed them on society, employing these categories for targeting specific groups. Thus, personal identification of inhabitants of the region could be either strengthened, or depending on the circumstances shaken, hidden, or in conflict by responding to the possibilities and experience of being deported. Moreover, ethnic tensions and hostility were employed during the deportation pitting Ukrainians against Poles, first of all.²² From the collection of 120,000 files, the following estimates were established for Western Ukraine and Western Belarus: 52% were Poles, 30% were Jews, and 18% were Ukrainians and Belarusians. Another sample of personal file for 265,501 people shows that 35% were male, 36% women, and 29% were children.²³

From this survey of 1940-41 deportations, it is important to keep in mind that deportees were of different ethnic origins with a Polish majority and a substantial part of Jewish and Ukrainian people. Secondly, that the majority of deportees were not only civilians, but also women and children.

Deportation became an experience of many families and people, encompassing a wide range of acts at different stages. Thus, the act of breaking in and searching the houses often lead to arrests, and was often accompanied by robbery and always caused humiliation, both moral and physical, reinforced often by the brutality of the execution-

20. Gross, *Revolution from Abroad*, p. 198

21. See Alexander Statiev, "Motivation and Goals of Soviet Deportations in the Western Borderlands," *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, vol. 28, no. 6, p. 997

22. See about qualifying procedures for deportations introduced by the Soviet authorities, especially in villages, when Ukrainian and Byelorussian peasants were induced to expel their Polish neighbors. See Gross, *Revolution from Abroad*, p. 202

23. Gross, *Revolution from Abroad*, p. 199

ers and always by the little time given for packing.²⁴ Deportations caused the destruction of private lives, families, and entire communities. Exhaustion, stress, crying, screaming, pain, and horror accompanied them from the very beginning. In fully packed cars, suffering drastically increased due to lack of space, and inhumane conditions of transportation in cars were causing physical damage, and in many cases led to death. Numerous accounts can be found in memoirs written in Polish about this period.²⁵ Mortality was especially high for children and elderly, especially in transports in February 1940.²⁶ Surviving in the train transport was a “substance of the experience” to use Gross’s description. On the basis of personal accounts, he lists such possible causes of death: “cold, excessive heat, hunger, thirst, lice infestation, foul air, dirt, and diarrhoea.”²⁷ The volume and magnitude of sufferings is another aspect we have to keep in mind constantly when trying to look into commemorations.

Transport and sealed cars are universal images of deportations and repressions carried out by the Soviet regime in this region. Another image is that of prisons, especially torture and executions, which are related to deportations, but stands on their own. Imprisonment was a separate form of repression, but linked with deportations, which could occur either before or after it. From 25 000 to 50 000 people were imprisoned in Western Ukraine between the end of 1939 and June 1941.²⁸ Some were executed, some stayed in local prisons, and some were deported to be placed in Kazakhstan and Soviet Russia. Prisons in Lviv and other towns of the region were sites of torture, death, spreading images of terror through local society.²⁹ In late June 1941, in the face of the rapid advance of the German army, the NKVD executed inmates. The pictures of exhumed bodies, as well as organized witnessing of bodies were circulated and instrumentalized by arriving Nazi authorities in late June and July 1941. Definitely not the major reason for the July pogroms, they were yet “successfully” used in mobilizing part of the local population, largely influenced by anti-Semitic prejudices to engage in mass violence against Jewish neighbours.³⁰

24. See part “House Search” from Chapter 6 in Gross, *Revolution from Abroad*, p. 207f. On time limits see Gross, *Revolution from Abroad*, p. 211

25. See Gross, *Revolution from Abroad*, p. 217-224, Katherine R. Jolluck, *Exile and Identity: Polish Women in the Soviet Union during World War II*, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2002. For memoirs see for example, collections of memoirs *Tak było ... Sybiriacy*, Tom 1-3, Kraków, 1997, Edward Jaworski, *Lwów. Losy mieszkanców i żołnierzy Armii Krajowej w latach 1939-1956*, Pruszków, 1999.

26. Gross, *Revolution from Abroad*, p. 218

27. Gross, *Revolution from Abroad*, p. 219f.

28. The lower estimate of 25,000 comes from the NKVD figures and high estimate of 50,000 is from the Polish underground, see Grünberg and Sprengel, *Sasiedztwo*, 548

29. Memoirs of Poles provides a good source of how terrifying the image of imprisonment was for local communities, enforcing existing animosity and anxiety between Polish, Jewish, and Ukrainian community. Suspicion of treason, conspiracy, and cooperation with the new Soviet authorities were corrupting already tense relations. See for example, Kott, Jan, *Still Alive* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), p. 35f.

30. The first pogroms in Lviv started as German troops entered the city. German propaganda has used crimes committed by the NKVD in Lviv prisons and accused Jewish population of Lviv in alleged collaboration with Soviet power. This propaganda pretext was used to mobilized local population in “revenge” and launch pogroms, known as “the prison pogroms”. Many, though not majority from local population, i.e. Ukrainians and Poles, did take

Deportations in 1940-41 became part of Polish martyrology and memory, first circulated through private memoirs and in emigration, and introduced into public commemorations in the 1980s. They are also integrated into the Ukrainian national narrative of suffering. In both cases, albeit to a different degree, there were and still are difficulties with integrating experiences of different ethnic groups in order to present an integral picture of the losses of civilians in the region and the city.

1941-1944: Deportations as Part of Nazi Occupation Policy

As virtually everywhere else in the German area of occupation, their genocide project fundamentally changed the life of Lviv. Suffering was enormous. The sequence of discrimination, deportation and mass murder operations launched by the German occupation authorities put an end to the city's Jewish community. There are different estimates for the number of Jews in Lviv before German occupation and after Soviet take-over of Lviv in June 1944. The highest estimate for the period just before German occupation is around 160 000.³¹ There are other estimates, for the period after the first pogroms and mass killings in summer 1941 and just before the peak of the Holocaust in 1941. Thus, Grzegorz Hryciuk estimates that in October 1941 there were at least 111 000 Jews in Lviv.³² A higher minimum of 119,000 Jews in the city is provided by Frank Golczewski³³ on the basis of the Lwów *Judenrat's* data. Before the war in 1939 there were from about 100 000 to 104 000 Jews in Lviv, which made them one third of the entire population of Lwów.³⁴ There are several estimations about how many Jews survived the Holocaust in Lviv. Thus, according to Philip Friedman only 823 Jews were in Lviv at the point when the Red Army entered the city and later there were about 2000 Jews returning from areas

part in summer pogroms. Seven thousands Jews were killed in Lviv in these first days of the occupation. For all of Western Ukraine, Dieter Pohl has estimated that pogroms alone killed 24,000 Jews. See Dieter, Pohl, *Nationalsozialistische Judenverfolgung in Ostgalizien 1941 - 1944: Organisation und Durchführung eines staatlichen Massenverbrechens*, München: Oldenbourg, 1996, p. 348. Asle on Lviv pogrom see Christoph Mick, "Ethnische Gewalt und Pogrome in Lemberg 1914 und 1941," *Osteuropa* 53, no. 12, 2003, 1810-1827; Per Anders Rudling, "Bogdan Musial and the question of Jewish responsibility for the pogroms in Lviv in the summer of 1941," *East European Jewish Affairs*, vol. 35, no. 1, June 2005, pp. 69-89; on pogroms in other regions in summer 1941 see Jürgen Matthäus, "Pogroms and Collaboration," in Christopher R. Browning, *The Origins of Final Solution: The Evolution of Nazi Jewish Policy, September 1939-March 1942*, Lincoln, University of Nebraska Press and Yad Vashem, Jerusalem, published by Arrow Press, 2005, pp. 268-277; Jan T. Gross, *Neighbours: The Destruction of Jewish Community in Jedwabne, Poland*, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 2001, especially chapters "Preparations," "Who Murdered the Jews of Jedwabne?" and "The Murder," pp. 72-104; Alexander B. Rossino, "Polish 'Neighbores' and German Invaders: Contextualizing Anti-Jewish Violence in the Białystok District during the Opening Weeks of Operation Barbarossa," *Polin. Studies in Polish Jewry*, vol. 16, London, 2003. Pp. 431-452.

31 Eliyahu Jones, *Zydzi Lwowa w okresie okupacji, 1939-1945*. Łódź, 1999, 123.

32 Hryciuk *Polacy*, 50.

33 Frank Golczewski „Polen“ in Wolfgang Benz (ed), *Die Dimension des Völkermords. Die Zahl der jüdischen Opfer des Nationalsozialismus*, München: Oldenbourg, 1991, p. 445.

34. Thomas Held, „Vom Pogrom zum Massenmord. Die Vernichtung der jüdischen Bevölkerung Lembergs im Zweiten Weltkrieg“, in Peter Fässler, Thomas Held, and Dirk Sawitzki, eds., *Lemberg, Lwów, Lviv. Eine Stadt im Schnittpunkt europäischer Kulturen*, Cologne, 1993, p.114.

around Lviv where they were hiding.³⁵ Grzegorz Hryciuk estimates that there were 1 300 Jews in Lviv in August 1944.³⁶ This was the end of pre-war Jewish community in Lviv. Less than one percent of the Jewish population before the German occupation has survived the Holocaust and almost all of them left with the deportation of the Polish population in 1944-1946. Deportations were part of the extermination policy against Jews. Creation of the ghetto was accompanied with the forced resettlement of Jews living throughout the city.³⁷ Lviv Jews were deported from their places of living to ghettos, concentration camps in the city and its vicinity, and to the death camp of Belzec, where a majority of Lviv Jews were murdered. More than 200,000 of Galician Jews were not killed in or close to their places of residence but were deported to death camps.³⁸ The deportations were affirmed as part of exterminations.

Population of the occupied territories, gentile and Jewish, was targeted with different types and degrees of persecution, including deportations. The non-Jewish population was also drafted as forced labour and had to leave their place of residence. From 1942 to 1943, peasants coming to Lviv with their goods to sell were in danger of being expelled for labour deportation to the Reich. Gentile witnesses could learn that the Nazi regime had launched an extermination policy, and that deportations were a constituting part of it.

1944 -1950: Making the city and the region Soviet and Ukrainian. Deportations of Poles, Jews and Ukrainians

After July 1944, when Lviv was once again under Soviet authority, deportations started again.³⁹ Thus, based on an agreement between the Soviet and Polish Communist governments, Poles and Jews who were Polish citizens before 1939 were to be expelled, or what was officially and euphemistically called “repatriated.” Similarly, Ukrainians living on the territory of Communist Poland were also expelled and deported to Soviet Ukraine. Thus, the borderland was cleansed of ethnic minorities and homogenized. This meant the end to Polish Lwów. In autumn 1944, there were more than 100 000 Poles (very approximate number) in Lviv. In January 1946, a wave of arrests and deportations targeted Polish intelligentsia and Poles suspected of belonging to the Home Army. About 17 000 people were arrested and deported to the Soviet east. From May 1945 to the end of 1946, a large-scale deportation of Poles and of surviving Jews of Polish citizenship to Communist Poland was organized. Polish inhabitants were terrorized and forced to leave the city. There are different estimates from both Polish and Ukrainian historians, which

35. Held, „Vom Pogrom zum Massenmord,“ p.114.

36. Hryciuk, *Polacy*, 50.

37. The resettlement into it started in October 1941. One of the first houses, which Jews were forced to leave was located at 22 Sykstuska Street. Janina Masłowska, „Pamiętniki Żydów”, Żydowski Instytut Historyczny, 302/182, p.5.

38. Pohl, Dieter, “Schlachtfeld zweier totalitärer Diktaturen – die Ukraine im Zweiten Weltkrieg,” *Österreichische Osthefte*, Jahrgang 42 (2000), Heft 3-4, p. 360.

39. Hryciuk, Grzegorz, “Ciezkie Dni Lwowa. Akcja masowych aresztowań we Lwowie w styczniu 1945 r.” in *Studia z historii najnowszej* (Wrocław, 1999).

place the number of Poles expelled from Lwów at about 100,000 to 140,000 Poles and the number of Jews expelled at about 3,000. Only about 12 000 Poles stayed in Lviv.

The threat of deportation posed a very difficult challenge for many families. Thus, in the first half of 1945, the Soviet party-state provided a choice either to turn in missing guerrilla relatives and be offered amnesty or to be deported. In Lviv 6718 families were warned and 87% of them took this offer.⁴⁰ This was, of course, only a minor part of people who were spared of deportations. In the summer and autumn 1947, about 14,500 people were deported under accusations of guerrilla fighting.⁴¹ Most of those deported under the allegations of taking part or supporting guerrillas were peasants, with a preponderance of poor peasants.⁴² It is difficult to assess the death rate for post-war deportations, but as Alexandr Statiev puts it, according to Soviet records 14,435 Ukrainians deported for support of nationalist guerrilla died between 1944 and 1950.⁴³

Post-war deportations were equally complex and targeted several different groups as the ones during the Soviet occupation period between 1939 and 1941. Deportations started immediately after the return of Soviet authorities and targeted groups considered as “enemies,” especially Ukrainian nationalist underground and people viewed as obstacles for collectivization of rural areas. Once again, a majority of deported were women, children, and elderly, as families were selected to both frighten and punish any possible resistance. The Soviet decree “Intensification of the Struggle against the Ukrainian-German Nationalists” from January 10, 1945 solidified both the planning and the execution of deportations.⁴⁴

Deportations of families of members of Ukrainian guerilla underground, i.e. OUN and UPA,⁴⁵ Greek-Catholic activists as well as peasants accused of sabotaging collectivization and their families reached about 500,000 people in Western Ukraine. The years 1944-5 were the peak years of OUN-B and UPA activity in the Soviet Union. In 1947, the Polish Communist government launched Akcja Wisla 1947, where more than 76 000 Ukrainians (but also part of the Lemkos, not identifying themselves as Ukrainians) were forced to leave their homes and deported to western Polish regions. Though this deportation campaign did not take place in Western Ukraine, its memory became increasingly important in the 2000s. Therefore it is mentioned here.

Combined with the previous description of how different groups were targeted along ethnic and social lines, deportations entered different national narratives, be they

40. In other cities the percentage varied, in Rovno it was smallest counting to 32.2%, with such cities like Drohobych (46.7%), Ternopil (51.3%), Stanislav (later Ivano-Frankivsk – 60.9%), Volyn (80.6%) were in the middle and the Chernivtsi had the highest one – 99.7%. In Lviv the number of families warned was the highest. See Statiev, “Motivations and Goals of Soviet Deportations,” p. 985

41. Statiev, “Motivations and Goals of Soviet Deportations,” p. 986

42. Statiev, “Motivations and Goals of Soviet Deportations,” p. 989

43. Statiev, “Motivations and Goals of Soviet Deportations,” p. 996

44. See extract from the decree in Statiev, “Motivations and Goals of Soviet Deportations,” p. 984

45. I will use term Ukrainian guerilla following main study on the topic by Grzegorz Motyka who is using term “Ukrainska partyzanka.” I translated the term “partyzanka” as “guerilla” to distinguish from accepted

Polish, Jewish, or Ukrainian. In case of Lviv/Lwów, deportations and repressions were stirring and strengthening interethnic tensions and suspicions, further imprinting divisions among ethnic communities. While experiences and suffering targeted all three groups and only by looking at them together can we assess the real impact and damage on the urban society of Lviv/Lwów, commemorations in the post-war and also to a large degree in post-Soviet period were about maintaining ethnic divisions, replicating, in a way, policies of both Soviet and Nazi occupation regimes, which put an end to the multiethnic city of Lwów/Lviv.

Let us move to the 1990s and 2000s and see how deportations were commemorated and what challenges, problems, difficulties, and questions appeared and still appear, as well as what choices and decisions were made in conceptualizing this tragic experience that altered the region and the city of Lviv. Issue of deportations started receiving public coverage at the end of the Soviet period and received more extensive coverage from the early 1990s on, when several publications appeared as separate volumes or as articles in academic periodicals.⁴⁶ It was part of a larger process embracing the other Soviet republic and post-Soviet states. Deportations and the tragic experiences of civilian populations during and after the Second World War were among the first topics to be commemorated in the cityscape after 1991. Yet, while they uncovered atrocities of Soviet regime, they downplayed or left in oblivion, following the Soviet pattern, repressions of non-Ukrainian inhabitants of the regions, Poles and Jews. While experiences and suffering targeted all three groups, it is only by looking at them together that can we assess the real impact and damage on the urban society of Lviv/Lwów.

To Commemorate Suffering: Adopting Monumental Forms and Shifts from Monumentality

In many cities of East Central Europe during the post-Communist period, one could observe a suspicion towards monumental grandiosity.⁴⁷ In Prague, the project of the Metronom and not of the church named after the 13th century saint St. Agnes won for the site occupied briefly by the largest Stalin monument.⁴⁸ According to Svetlana Boym this was in part the “European nostalgia of ‘urban individuals’,” manifested in resisting

46. Bondarenko G.V., Savych R.V., “Vplyv Druhoi svitovoi vijny na naselennia prykordonnykh terytorii Ukrainy i Polshchi,” in *Druba svitova viina i Ukraina: Materialy naukovoï konferentsii 27-28 kvitnia 1996*, Kyiv: Instytut istorii NAN Ukrainy, 1996, pp. 213—220; Kopchak S., Romanyuk M., “Deportacia naselennia Polshchi i Zakhidnoi Ukrainy u povoiennyi period, (1945-1947),” in *Ukrainsko-polski vidnosyny u Galychyni u XX st.: Materialy naukovopraktychnoi konferentsii (21-22 lystopada 1996)*, Ivano-Frankivsk, Plai, 1997, pp. 39-42; Kulchytskyi S. “Pershi deportatsii polskogo naselennia URSSR u svitli stalinskoï natsionalnoi polityky,” in *Deportatsii ukraintsviv i poliakiv: kinets 1939-pochatok 50-tykh rokiv: (Do 50-rychcia operatsii “Visla”)* uporiadnyk Yurii Slyvka, Lviv: Instytut ukrainoznavstva im. I. Krypiakevycha NAN Ukrainy, 1998, pp. 13-18. Nikolai Bugai, “20-50-e gody: pereselenia i deportatsyi evreiskogo naselenia v SSSR,” *Otechestvennaia istoria*, nr. 4, 1992, p. 179

47. Boym, *The Future of Nostalgia*, p. 167.

48. Boym, *The Future of Nostalgia*, p. 232.

precisely the grandiose monumentality of Soviet architecture and in preferring minor urban forms. Not only small-size, often ironic monuments appeared in Prague, Krakow, Ljubljana and Wroclaw, as well as other cities, but the restoration of courtyards, opening of cafes were part of this shift.⁴⁹ Yet in Lviv, as generally in Ukraine, we can find both a similar tendency as well as a reintroduction of large-scale monumental projects in the city's downtown. For example, the Nykyfor monument we will later discuss is an attempt to create a monument with minimal intervention to the existing cityscape. On the other hand, the size of the recent Stepan Bandera monument provoked radically different reactions, including a comment from the city head that "even the Communists did not allow themselves to erect such high monuments."⁵⁰ In Lviv we can see a combination of both minimal and grandiose projects, something that can also be found in other cities of the former Soviet western borderland.⁵¹

Finding an appropriate commemorative form and language to reflect on the different aspects of the past was and remains one of the challenges for the post-1991 Lviv community. Several factors can be listed here as influential. Lviv's cityscape is brought constantly into discussion, with the issue of how to integrate style and size of new objects into the city centre with its coherent historically- built environment formed throughout the 16th and the 19th centuries being at the forefront. The questions are: Should form be monumental and should monuments be erected in a traditional way or do other forms of reflecting on this experience exist? To begin, let us note that, in 1991-92, Lviv's commemorative and monumental cityscape went through a radical shift, when monuments were disassembled, torn down, and destroyed. These were monuments erected during the Soviet period. In the following years, new monuments were erected, some of them large in size. As mentioned above, the monument of Stepan Bandera, the leader of the Ukrainian nationalist organization through the 1940s to 1950s, in its completed form will be the largest monumental complex ever built in the city centre of Lviv.

When discussing the topic of deportations, we see similar situations when different styles, sizes, and ideas are used for different commemorative projects. While all of them more or less prominently stress the experience of only one ethnic group, the Ukrainians; one can see that in discussions about forms and shapes and to some degree about the content there is a possibility for extending such narrow commemorative frameworks in order to include other groups. Thus, first I will have a look at three monuments, two of them already in place and one only planned as a site marked by a stone. These projects were the first of their kind in Lviv. In the last few years, the idea of establishing museums as memorial projects has opened new grounds for discussions, as well as offered a new

49. On Prague and Ljubljana see chapter "Europa's Eros" in Boym, *The Future of Nostalgia*.

50. Oksana Keryk, Lidia Melnyk, "Kamin spotykanntia pid triumfalnoiu arkoyu," *Lvivska gazeta*, March 7, 2007, <http://mynews-in.net/news/politics/2007/03/07/1124793.html> accessed April 3, 2007. Though the mayor Andriy Sadovyi later clarified that his words were taken from the context, the fund from the city budget were not used for the monument as demanded by initiative group for erecting the monument, only surrounding areas, i.e. pavements, were repaired as part of ordering public space.

51. On Petersburg see Boym, *The Future of Nostalgia*, p. 163f.

form for commemoration. As both projects are still under way, I will look at the conceptual foundations, which will show that to a large degree the emphasis on Ukrainian experience still dominates. Yet, looking at the way in which the work of commissions for these museums is organized, I will try to assess to what extent there is a possibility for a more inclusive representation of the city's past, in this case through a specific topic of deportations, in the future.

Firstly, I would like to look at the two completed projects dealing with the topic of deportation and the idea of unveiling a monument to Ukrainians deported from Poland in 1945-1946 on a site already marked by a commemorative stone. The two completed projects will be discussed first as they show an attempt to look for new forms for monuments. I will discuss both of them very briefly as they deal with deportation only in part or implicitly.

In Lviv, there are several post-1991 monuments referring to experiences of the Second World War. Among those that do already exist is a monument to the victims of the Communist crimes of 1939-1941, which has no explicit mention of different groups of victims, for instance by nationality – Jews, Poles, or Ukrainians. This monument was unveiled in 1997 and stands in front of a former NKWD/Gestapo prison. There also is a memorial to the Holocaust which was erected on the initiative of Leon Plager, a Holocaust survivor from Lviv, and unveiled in 1992.⁵²

One of the first monuments to Soviet repressions, including deportations, was a monument placed on a site of the “transitional prison [peresylochnaya tiurma]”, from which, during the post-war years, arrested people were sent to Gulag camps. This is a very particular monument, one as it includes a wall that bears the names of victims shot by the NKVD in 1941 in one of Lviv's prison at Zamarstyniv. It refers to Soviet repressions generally and is called the “Monument for Victims of Political Repressions.” This memorial shows us an attempt to find a form to express the repression experienced under the Soviet regime. Initiated and supervised by the local Memorial Society, it was meant as a site of memory and grievance.⁵³ Yet, as its form and consequently its message were

52. On post-1991 commemoration, memory and erasure of memory of the Holocaust in Lviv see Omer Bartov, *Erased. Vanishing Traces of Jewish Galicia in Present-Day Ukraine*, Princeton and Oxford, Princeton University Press, 2007, p. 28f.

53. Memorial Society was established in Soviet Ukraine in Kyiv at the meeting held on March 4, 1989. In Lviv the society was formally shaped at the meeting on May 27, 1989. 830 people took part. While the main aim was formulated as to support «Renaissance of spiritual culture of Ukrainian people and all national minorities living on the territory of Ukraine as well as of Ukrainians living outside of Soviet Ukraine,” one of the major activities was directed to investigate repressions of the Soviet state, commemorate them and help the victims. See *Statut Lvivskoi regionalnoi istoriko-prosvitnytskoi organizatsii ‘Memorial,’* Lviv, 1989, 16p., p. 5, and in “Resolutsia konferentsii Lvivskoi regionalnoi istoriko-prosvitnytskoi organizatsii ‘Memorial,’” *Poklyk sumlinnia*, 1989, nr. 1, pp. 2-3. For details about organizational phase of Memorial and other associations of the late 1980s, see also article Olha Gorbachova “Vidobrazhennia chynnykiv konsolidatsii ukrainskoi natsii v statutnyh dokumentah gromadskyyh organizatsii (90-ti roky XX st.),” *Ukrainoznavstvo*, 2006, nr. 4 <http://www.ualogos.kiev.ua/text.html?id=639&number=61&category=5> accessed October 2, 2008

changing over years, tracing them allows us to see the challenges and difficulties as well as the dynamic of remembrance of repressions, including deportations in post-1991 Lviv. The wall is constantly expanding as new names are added, beginning from the early 1990s, when the Lviv Memorial Society initiated the excavations work at the site of the prison. We can read:

From September 1939 to June 1941 in prisons of Western Ukraine 49,867 people were destroyed, 1,738 256 were deported to Siberia and during 6 days in 1941 in Lviv region 7348 prisoners were shot: Ukrainians, Poles, and Jews. Innocent Victims Ask for Prayer and Memory

With later additions, the site is becoming a site of the memory of Ukrainian suffering. So in the later addition we read:

The colonial regimes of Austria, Poland, Germany and Russia used this building as a torture chamber of the Ukrainian people... Museum will be opened in this site

Moreover, it is also framed as a part of a century-long oppression of Ukrainians by colonial regimes and their dominance over people and territory.

As of 2004, the idea to erect the monument specifically commemorating the deportations gained public and official support. It is not yet clear what shape the monument to deported Ukrainians in Lviv will take. Considering that the idea has been proposed by the Organization of Ukrainians Deported from Lemkivshchyna, Nadsiania, Kholmshchyna, and Pidlyashshia in 2005 and revitalized by a recent decision of the Ukrainian government within the framework of Akcja Wisła commemorations, a grand scale monument is likely.⁵⁴ In general, the idea of a memorial to the “victims of deportations,” that is of ethnic Ukrainians victims, has gained special attention in Lviv as the official commemorations of Akcja Wisła deportations of Ukrainians in post-war Poland were organized in 2007.

As we see, mentioned projects in Lviv are bringing up the question of how deportations are and can be commemorated. Commemorative projects have embodied difficulties, arising out of the reciprocal denial or marginalization of experiences of the other side. Existing commemorative practices or ideas about planned commemorative projects in the Lviv cityscape can provoke unease or negative reactions from parts of the Ukrainian society but also from Polish society. Existing projects refer mainly exclusively to one national perspective – Ukrainian – leaving no reference or place for the memory of the experience of the other groups in the city, such as the deportation of ethnic Poles from Lwów, as well as the terrible end of the Jewish community. As noted previously, Lviv occupies a special place, as more than one hundred thousands Poles were de facto

54. Bohdan Yurochko, “Pamiat pro deportaciu”, *Lvivska gazeta*, 23 August 2005, No. 150, <http://www.gazeta.lviv.ua/articles/2005/08/23/8190/> accessed April 14, 2007, „Prezydent zoboviazav LODA sporudyty u Lvovi pamiatnyk zheravam operacii “Wisla”. U Polshchi postane Monument prymyrennia”, *Zachidno-ukrainska Informaciyna Agen- cia*, http://www.zik.com.ua/index.php?news_id=79342 accessed April 12, 2007

expelled from Lviv between the end of 1944 and the end of 1946. Moreover, a large part of its Jewish inhabitants were deported to concentration and death camps and murdered there, while others were murdered in the city and surrounding areas. Lviv is a city where Ukrainians, expelled from Poland after the war, or their descendents came to settle down. There are many possibilities to commemorate deportations in this city as the topic is of great importance for its past. One can say it is a “place of displacement.” The difficulties of finding ways to express recognition and compassion for the suffering of the “others,” are a daunting task. They should neither be accepted uncritically nor caricatured but rather understood as stemming from the experience or sufferings of “one’s own” as well as a long political repression. This has been noted for commemorations in Polish-German relations and is similar and, arguably, even more complicated for Polish-Ukrainian relations. For decades there was no place in Soviet Ukraine to commemorate the experience of those deported by Soviet authorities as well as those who were fighting in the western regions of Soviet Ukraine against the Soviet regime, first of all in the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, the UPA. The Soviet suppression of this resistance involved massive state terror, collective responsibility, and the systematic destruction of the local social fabric through the establishment of informant networks, local militias and, once again, large-scale deportation. It is important to understand that these truly traumatic experiences, while no longer simply off-limits in independent Ukraine, are still far from attaining any sort of memory closure. This, in turn, is not due to any special quality of Ukrainians, or, for that matter, western Ukrainians, but rather to the fact that there has been little time to address these issues in a reasonably free and open public space.

One of the main challenges to emphatically national commemorative practices is that these are the topics where it is hard to draw clear lines, delimiting one national group from another. This becomes even more complicated when part of the commemorated victims cannot be encompassed unambiguously or uncontentionally under one national identity. The danger of simplifying and labelling them, nonetheless, as part of commemorative practices increases when we take into consideration the fact that labelling was part of the deportations themselves. While two monuments mentioned before show how the suffering of the two other ethnic groups in the city was left out, the next examples, two monuments, one from Lviv and another from Polish town Krynica, will illustrate how difficult and distorting the attempt to fit personal experiences into clearly defined and separated national frameworks can be.

Nikifor/Nykyfor and the Commemoration of Akcja Wisła: Ukrainian and Polish Dimensions

April 28th has been declared, by the Lviv regional council, the Day of memory for the Ukrainian victims of the forced resettlement from the ethnic territories of Lemkivshchyna,

Nadsiannia, Pidliashshia, and Kholmshchyna during “Akcja Wisła” of 1947.⁵⁵ Yet, both Ukrainians and Lemkos were deported during these operations. Moreover, there were also ethnically mixed families amongst the victims. Looking at the personal experience of those with either multiple or, by our standards, unclear identities, raises even more questions.

For instance, the now famous painter Nikifor/Nykyfor from Krynycia/Krynica, was deported two times and returned to his city three times after 1947. For some, he is the most known Lemko and for many more he certainly is the most known individual deported during Akcja Wisła. In the post-1991 period, disputes about his identity and consequently about national claims over his artistic heritage became an important part of Polish-Ukrainian discussions. Looking at two monuments to Nikifor – one in Lviv and another in Krynica in Poland – unveiled in 2005, we can see how the commemoration of Nykyfor both in Lviv and Krynica, though in many ways marked by elements of rivalry, also has inherently produced common grounds and fresh spaces for broadening more inclusive commemorative narratives.

Claims turning Nykyfor either exclusively into a Lemko-and-Ukrainian or a Lemko-but-not-Ukrainian are signs of simplification of the historical record of a complex as well as a very difficult biography. In both the Polish or Ukrainian cases, such claims can be evaluated as an “appropriation by a dominant culture,” in the words of a Lemko public activist, referring, in this case, to the habit of calling Nikifor a Polish artist.⁵⁶ At the same time, the deportations of Nikifor as well as his returns to Lemkivshchyna are becoming an integral part of his public memory in Poland as well as Ukraine. Recent publications as well as the monuments in Lviv and Krynycia popularize him as an artist, as well as draw attention to his personal loss and more generally to the expulsions. At the same time, they tend to simplify the painter’s identity as well as impose unity on those deported in 1947. Thus, in the latest article dedicated to Akcja Wisła in a Ukrainian newspaper by the vice-head of “Nadsiannia” Association – a society uniting Ukrainians deported from post-war Poland during and after the war – the story of the “famous painter-primitivist Lemko” Nykyfor Epifanii Drovniak serves as the key illustration of the “Akcja” and his persistent returns to his homeland are presented as a symbol of the general tragedy of people who were forced to leave their homes. The way in which this article uses the image of “home,” however, also indicates the very specific place it occupies in this particular narrative about deportation.

The notion of “homeland” is here used to introduce a principal difference between ethnic Poles deported from now Ukrainian territory and ethnic Ukrainians, together with Lemkos deported from now Polish territory. Thus, this article uses the

55. Decision of Lviv regional council from October 31, 2006 „Pro vidznachennia 60-oi richnytsi Puchatku prymusovoho vyseleennia ukraintsiv z etnichnyh zemel Lemkivshchyny, nadsiannia, Pidliashshia ta Kholmshchyny, a takozh pid chas operatsii ‘Visla’”, <http://hazard.net/forum/read.php.?f=1&i=7385&t=7385> accessed April 12, 2007

56. Maciej Kwasniewski, „Malarz i zebak”, *Gazeta Krakowska*, 28 April, 2003, www.lemko.org/lemko/nikifor/nik8.html accessed April 14, 2007.

notion of “ancient” homelands to show that Poles were moving to their “historic motherland,” while Ukrainians were “expelled from their native homeland [*ridni prabatkivski zemli*].” Arguably, this formula, occurring in other texts as well, unconsciously and selectively continues Soviet conventions since the official interpretation of the deportations, in Soviet Ukraine as well as in Communist Poland was that they were an “exchange of populations,” based on the notion of a “return to historic territories.”⁵⁷

The respective locations of Nykyfor’s identity were among the main reasons why Lviv has been chosen as a place for his monument, while Krynica was the first option for a supporter from Germany, who is himself a Lemko. The failure of erecting the monument that now stands in Lviv in Nikifor’s native town of Krynica, as initially planned, is linked, at least partly, to the inscription on the monument.⁵⁸ The plaque on Lviv’s monument from 2005 describes Nykyfor as a “Ukrainian painter of Lemkivshchyna.” The monument erected in Krynica in the same year bears an inscription in Polish and Lemko but not Ukrainian: “Nikifor – Никыфор Епифаніusz Drowniak.”

The Ukrainian community as well as a part of the Lemko community of Ukrainian orientation felt disappointed by the opening ceremony in Krynica. There was no Ukrainian part in the official speeches and the Lemko origins of Nikifor were mentioned only once. This received special comment as the whole project of a monument to Nykyfor in Krynica was thought of by the Lemko-Ukrainian community as part of a “struggle to return his [real] identity to the painter and to return him to the Lemko community in Poland and Ukraine.”⁵⁹

On the other hand, the monument in Krynitsia also came to demonstrate common ground. It has received high-level official attention, being unveiled in the presence of the Polish and Lithuanian presidents, while the President of Ukraine was absent only because of the crisis over the end of the Tymoshenko government. Even those distrusting this reason should note the significance of no other excuse being given. Thus, while the second part of the Krynica unveiling ceremony, organized by the Ukrainian and Lemko-Ukrainian communities, was indeed without high official representatives from Ukraine, the latter had at least shown interest in principle. While the official part focused on the cultural heritage of the painter, the post-official ceremony commemorated the “painter and thousands of people who were deported and expelled from here [Lemkivshchyna] ... [and] could not return home.” Despite some tensions before the unveiling of the Krynica monument, the final perception of it has contributed to shaping a more inclusive image of this borderland region and of the fate of the people who were deported from it.

57. Volodymyr Badyak, „Ne tilky operaciya ‘Visla’”, *Ukraina moloda*, 11 September 2004, <http://observer.sd.org.ua/news.php?id=4775> accessed April 14, 2007.

58. „Nykyfor otrymaye etiudy ta penzel. Siohodni zavershat vstanovlennia pamiatnyka khudozhnyku”, <http://www.lwr.com.ua/news/2006/5/11> accessed April 14, 2007

59. Natalia Kravchuk, “Vzhe ne vyzhenut lemka Nykyfora”, *Nasze slowo*, no. 40, 2 zhovtnia 2005, http://nslowo.free.ngo.pl/podija/wzhe_ne_wyzenut_lemka_nykyfora.htm accessed April 14, 2007.

The story of the construction of the monument to Nykyfor that now stands in Lviv can also be read as one of Polish-Ukrainian cooperation on the ground. Thus, the Ukrainian artist Serhiy Oleshko had been working on a sculpture of Nykyfor in Krakow as a fellow of the program “Gaude Polonia.” The project, supported by the Polish Ministry of Culture, has resulted in a monument in Lviv – the only city in Ukraine which Nikifor conceivably could have visited. Lviv is also an important centre of Ukrainians and Lemkos expelled from post-war Poland in 1944-1946. At the same time, the monument in Krynica, though criticized by some Lemko organizations, came to symbolize, in the words of the head of the Association of Ukrainians in Poland, “Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation, understanding, acceptance and tolerance ... in building a civilized and tolerant Europe.”⁶⁰

On the Polish side, a planned exhibition in Krynica for the European Days of Culture in 2006, was to be dedicated to the “Paintings of Nikifor - The common Carpathian cultural heritage of Poles, Lemkos, and Ukrainians,”⁶¹ while the Nykyfor of the Lviv monument also literally carries a very specific message, which its Ukrainian sculptor has called “the philosophy of a wise man.” Based on motifs from Nykyfor’s paintings, the picture, which the painter holds in his hands, depicts a Polish church with a Polish flag in one corner, a Ukrainian church in another and Nykfor himself sitting on the top of a tower above both of them, smoking a not quite respectful cigarette. In the end, this monument has become a well-integrated part of the Lviv cityscape and, arguably, one of the best examples of post-1991 monument building in the city. Despite, or perhaps because of, the way in which its inscription stresses the Ukrainian component of his identity, the monument could open the way to a more inclusive, more personal and complex way to commemorate the sites of Lviv’s multi-national history. The commemoration of one person may come, in the end, to embody the memory of deportations as well as the multi-national past they destroyed.

Shift to Museums as Commemorative Practices: More Flexible in Form and [Possibly] More Inclusive in Content?

Keeping in mind the way in which monuments are commemorating deportations let us look at two projects of museums in Lviv. Both of them are still under way. The more advanced of the two is directly, but not exclusively, linked with the topic of forced resettlements in the end and after the war. Its full official name is both very long and very descriptive – “Museum Complex of History, Culture and Everyday Life of Ethnic Ukrainians of Nadsyannia, Kholmshchyna, Lemkivshchyna and Pidlyashshia with a Sector of Ukrainian Emigration.”⁶² In some texts it is also referred to as the Museum

60. Kravchuk, “Vzhe ne vyzhenut lemka Nykyfora”.

61. See <http://www.kobidz.pl/app/site.php.5/Show/862.html> accessed April 18, 2007.

62. The Decree of the President of Ukraine Nr 1330/2005 “About activities commemorating the 60th anniversary of forces resettlement of ethnic Ukrainians from Polish territory,” see the text of the decree at http://www.loga.gov.ua/netcat_files/Image/upu1330.rtf accessed September 10, 2008.

of History of Resettlers or the Museum of Deported Ukrainians.⁶³ In this paper, I will refer to it as the Museum of Deported Ukrainians. It is a very ambitious project of creating a completely new museum, combining indoor and open-air exhibition spaces, with a variety of educational and entertainment functions employing modern technologies. Spanning 6 000 square meters with 12 exhibition halls, not including space for other facilities and temporary exhibitions, it is now the largest project for a new historical museum in Ukraine, competing only with the Art Museum “Mystetskyi Arsenal” in Kyiv. The Museum of Deported Ukrainians will be located in the town of Vynnyky, which administratively is now part of Lviv. It garners support from both local and central state institutions, as well as from the Ukrainian Diaspora. Moreover, there are attempts at obtaining EU funding as well.⁶⁴

The other museum currently under way is only partly connected to the deportations. It addresses a larger topic - repressions during and after the Second World War. Very recently, in June of this year, the idea of a Museum Commemorating Victims of Communist Terror was institutionalized and adopted by the City Council. It will be built on Stepan Bandera Street, formerly Myra [Piece] Street and Stalin Street, or the names by which it was widely known as in the inter-war period – Ł ckiego Street. The site was previously a prison, and served as an investigation isolator for the Soviet security forces during the Soviet period. It is still used in this function but, according to recent information, a part of the prison will be turned into a museum and with a newly constructed building at adjusted territory will be a memorial complex.⁶⁵ The Museum will be placed in the building of the prison currently belonging to the Security Service of Ukraine (before 1991 – KGB of Soviet Ukraine). Moreover, in the courtyard and the adjusted plot, a new building is planned (competition is already announced). It is interesting to note that previously there was a plan to build an apartment building for officials of the Security Service in the same location. As human bones were unearthed, however, the idea was dropped under the pressure of the local Memorial. At this point, there is a preliminary concept for a museum that will bear the name of the Memorial Complex of Victims of Occupation Regimes in Lviv. Hereafter, I will refer to it as the Museum of Occupations. Unlike the previously mentioned museum, it will be located in the city center in a building, which in itself is a site of memory for Poles, Jews, and Ukrainians.

Referring to the documents on the establishment of both museums, announcement of competition for the buildings, as well as from so-called “Historic Note,” a document preceding official competitions, I have distinguished key ideas and agendas of both projects.

63. See http://mcun.org.ua/index.php?action_all=detal&id=1832 accessed August 25, 2008 and <http://www.vynnyky.com/images/konc.htm> accessed August 25, 2008

64. See “Nepohytna istoria,” at http://mcun.org.ua/index.php?action_all=detal&id=1832 accessed August 25, 2008

65. “Program and conditions of international open architectural competition for the best concept of realization the idea of Memorial complex in memory of victims of occupation regimes in Lviv” adopted at the Lviv City Council on July 18, 2008, available at <http://www.city-adm.lviv.ua/content/view/2608/334/> accessed September 8, 2008.

The Museum of Deported Ukrainians: Virtual Reconstruction of Deportees' Homeland

Firstly, let us address the issue of the Museum of Deported Ukrainians: This is an ambitious plan for a virtual reconstruction of the deportees' homeland. I would like to point to the rather paradoxical attempt to recreate a history and material world of the territories from where Ukrainians were expelled in a town from which Poles were deported and where Jews were killed or deported to be killed elsewhere. It is important to note that in the justification of the location of the museum it is stated that about 60% of the town's population were deportees from post-war Polish territory. Indeed, between 1944 and 1947, 2739 deported Ukrainians came to live in Vynnyky. Also, pre-war Vynnyky, similarly to other cities and towns of the region, was a multiethnic city with Polish, Ukrainian, and Jewish communities. Thus, in 1925, out of about 5000 inhabitants, 3300 were Poles, 2150 were Ukrainians, 350 were Jews, and 200 Germans. Between 1939 and 1940, some Jews from Lviv moved to Vynnyky to avoid Soviet repression and some refugees from the Nazi occupied territory settled there as well. Thus, before the Nazi invasion in June 1941, the number of Jews in the town grew to almost 500.⁶⁶ Unlike many other cities, including Lwów, in Vynnyky/Vinniki Ukrainians constituted the second largest group.⁶⁷ As post-war deportations were enacted on an ethnic basis, the Polish community in Vynnyky was diminished to only a few percentage points of the total population. The proportion of Ukrainians grew, firstly, because of the influx of a large number of people deported from post-war Poland because of their Ukrainian ethnicity. Many Ukrainians came from the Soviet Ukraine of pre-1939 borders.⁶⁸ Generally, we can say that while in post-war Vynnyky there were many pre-war inhabitants, due to a large share of Ukrainians in pre-1939 period, the city almost completely lost its Polish, Jewish, and German inhabitants. In the post-war decades the tendency was even stronger and in the 1990s, 78% inhabitants were of Ukrainian nationality, 12% were Russians and 6% were Poles.⁶⁹ Both the story of Polish inhabitants of Vynnyky forced to leave their home town and the loss of Jewish inhabitants who were killed in the city or deported to the places of murder are left outside of the museum's narrative.

With this short survey of the town's demography, let us have a look at the concept of the museum generally and how the topic of deportation is dealt with within it. The

66. *Pinkas Hakebillot Polin: Encyclopedia of Jewish Communities, Poland*, Volume II, pp. 188-189, Jerusalem: Yad Vashem available at http://www.jewishgen.org/yizkor/pinkas_poland/pol2_00188.html accessed September 11, 2008.

67. Marian Orłowicz, *Ilustrowany przewodnik po Lwowie. Wydanie drugie rozszerzone*. Lwów-Warszawa: Zjednoczone zakłady kartogr. i wydawnicze tow. naucz.szkol sredn. i wyz.s.a., 1925. p. 242

68. In 1945 18% of city inhabitants were people arriving from the "East" – territories of the Soviet Union within pre-September 1939 border, Zoriana Komarynska, *Etno-socialnyi rozvytok mista Vynnyky z chasu druboi svitovoi vijny do nashyh dniv (1944-1999), avtoreferat dysertacii kandydata istorychnyh nauk*, Lviv: NAN Ukrainy, Instytut Ukrainoznavstva im. I. Krypiakewycha, 2001, p. 6. See also Zoriana Komarynska, "Zminy v etnichnomu skladi naseleння Lvivshchyny v rezultati ugody pro obmin naseleńniem u 1944 r. (na prykladi m. Vynnyky)," *Visnyk Lvivskogo Universytetu, Seria: Mizhnarodni vidnosyny*, Lviv: LNU imeni Ivana Franka, 1999, vyp.1, pp. 112-115.

69. See Komarynska, *Etno-socialnyi rozvytok mista Vynnyky*, p. 14.

agenda of the museum is declared as “to become a part of the state politics of Ukrainian government” and a “key element of historic, cultural, educational, academic life of contemporary state.”⁷⁰ In addition to this emphasis on the state function, it is noted that “museums indicate development of civic society”. But the definition of “civic society”, as understood in this particular situation, is only mentioned once. However, from the recurrent use of the word “state,” one can draw a conclusion that the museum’s team sees itself as realizing the “priorities of state politics.” Here the question is: with what means can these priorities be achieved in the case of the Museum? The concept gives a general but clearly formulated answer about the museum’s mission:

through activities and exhibitions to show „uninterrupted pace of historic development of Lemkivshchyna, Pidlyashshia, Nadsyannia and Kholmshchyna [as] Ukrainian ethnic territories from the remotest time [spokonvichni], now parts of Poland.”⁷¹

Such a perspective defines how the topic of our interests, the deportations, is going to be represented and interpreted accordingly. This perspective without a doubt is clearly defined by “ethnicity.” In a borderland region, this means that a large part of the past will be left out and the general picture will be heavily misinterpreted according to an ethnic bias. To go directly to the issue of deportations let us look at the description of how they will be dealt with within the museum. While there is no word indication deportation or forced resettlement in the museum’s name, two out of four blocs will deal with deportations of Ukrainians. Thus, the second section of the exhibition is planned about “a tragedy of forced resettlement of Ukrainians in 1944-47” and the third part is to show the “life of resettlers in their second homeland in the second half of the 20th century.”⁷² This central part of the museum on deportees will be framed with an introduction showing the “uninterrupted historic development of Ukrainian people on their ethnic territories from first centuries of AD until the first half of the 20th century,” i.e. until the deportation took place; the ending part of the exhibition is dedicated to the topic of Ukrainian emigration in the end of the 19th century through the beginning of the 20th century.⁷³ While there is no visualized project for the exhibition, I would like to focus on how the deportation of Ukrainians is described and what notions are used.

To begin with the latter: In the conceptual outline of the museum, available on the website of the museum as well as in the media coverage, several notions are used to describe what happened to Ukrainians living on Polish territory in the post-war borders. We find the notions of “resettlers,” “deportees,” “forced resettlement,” and ethnocide.⁷⁴ Generally, Ukrainians are treated exclusively as an ethnic group and only this ethnic

70. Natalia Bilas, Ihor Tymets, “Konceptia muzeinogo kompleksu istorii, kultury ta pobutu etnichnyh ukrainciv nadsyannia, Lemkivshchyny, Kholmshchyny, Pidliashshia,” unpublished with some parts available at <http://www.vynnyky.com/images/konc.htm> , p.1.

71. Bilas and Tymets, “Konceptia muzeinogo kompleksu,” p. 1.

72. Bilas and Tymets, “Konceptia muzeinogo kompleksu,” p. 3.

73. Bilas and Tymets, “Konceptia muzeinogo kompleksu,” p. 2-3.

74. See *Konceptia muzeinogo kompleksu istorii, kultury ta pobutu etnichnyh ukrainciv nadsyannia, Lemkivshchyny, Kholmshchyny, Pidliashshia* <http://www.vynnyky.com/images/konc.htm> accessed September 11, 2008.

group is represented in the museum. This perspective is enhanced by the description of the territories from which Ukrainians were expelled as “ethnic Ukrainian territories in Poland,” or in short “ethnic territories.”⁷⁵ Broader context of these territories is missing and a notion such as “borderland” does not appear.

Such a narrow and exclusive perspective can be explained through several factors. First, the local initiative was under strong influence from the Organization of Ukrainians Deported from Lemkivshchyna, Nadsianina, Kholmshchyna, and Pidlyashshia, an association of Ukrainian deportees and their relatives’ descendants living now in Ukraine, mainly in its western regions. This is an umbrella organization which encompasses several associations of deportees, which were established at the turn of 1980s and 1990s.⁷⁶ This initiative went together with activities of a local historical museum where, in 1998, the department of deported Ukrainians was opened. This department was called to gather materials linked to the life and experience of deported Ukrainians, mainly documents, pictures, published materials, objects of everyday life, and art objects. Research was conducted with the help and in cooperation with organizations mentioned above.⁷⁷ Secondly, it is important to take into account the Ukrainian context as well as the context of Polish-Ukrainian relations. While the idea of the Museum existed on a local level, it was put into motion by the Presidential Decree on commemorative activities dedicated to the 60th anniversary of forced resettlement of Ukrainians, which followed a very difficult discussion about ethnic cleansing in Volyn in 1943 where perpetrators have mostly been Ukrainians and victims were Poles.

Framing the Story of Deportations

The exhibition of the local historical museum extends chronologically from the first archaeological artefacts found in the area of the town. Yet it is still quite remarkable that the deportation of Ukrainians is framed as a dramatic and tragic turning point of a long history, encompassing more than one thousand years. It is precisely here that the notion of “land of grand-fathers,” “ethnic Ukrainian territories from the remotest times” emerges. Thus, the materials for future exhibitions include archaeological objects “testifying about eastern Slavic tribes [living there]” as well as objects from the time of Slavic principalities of the 10th-14th century. In a similar manner, the description of the period after the mid-14th century is summarized as “decay,” due to the fact that all three regions – Lemkivshchyna, Kholmshchyna, and from the late 16th century Pidlyashshia became part of Polish Kingdom and of later Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.⁷⁸ From

75. *Koncepcia muzeinogo kompleksu* <http://www.vynnyky.com/images/konc.htm>, p. 4-5.

76. Interview with Volodymyr Sereda, the head of regional Association of Deported Ukrainians from Zakerzonnia, “U ES mozhe i ne vidomo pro 540 tysiach deportovanyh iz Polshchi Ukrainciv,” *Lvivska Gazeta*, February 12, 2008, nr. 19, p. 2 <http://www.gazeta.lviv.ua/articles/2008/02/12/29256/> accessed September 12, 2008.

77. *Koncepcia muzeinogo kompleksu* <http://www.vynnyky.com/images/konc.htm>, p. 2.

78. *Koncepcia muzeinogo kompleksu* <http://www.vynnyky.com/images/konc.htm>, p. 1.

the late 18th century, these regions became part of Austrian and Russian empires and the museum narrative distinguishes collapse of empires at the end of the First World War and emphasizes the “disaster” in the failure to establish a Ukrainian state which led to the incorporation of “eternal Ukrainian territories” by Polish state. As we see, the narrative is constructed as a one-sided story and there is no place for the fact that these were borderlands and, in the modern period, they became contested terrain for two national movements, Ukrainian and Polish. The culmination of the narrative and of the future exhibition is the period when Ukrainians were deported from their homes. It is clear that forced resettlements are the key point of the narrative, yet it seems that there is no consistent way of how to qualify these deportations. For example, the Soviet-Communist Polish agreement is referred to in using Soviet official description as “mutual exchange of population in borderland regions,” with no explanation in the terminology or quotation marks. At the same time, the next sentence for the description of Akcja Wisla of 1947 shows a completely different attitude. Thus, the decision of the Polish government to deport Ukrainians living in south-eastern Poland to western region of Polish state is not referred to with Polish official terminology but is qualified as an “act of ethnocide against Ukrainian population” committed by the Polish government.⁷⁹

„Not Our History” - Topics Left behind the Brackets

As we have seen from the agenda of the museum discussed above, the framing of its exhibition is strictly ethnic. This angle is already declared in the name of the museum. Deportees here are only of Ukrainian origins. There is no attempt to see and incorporate experiences of other deported groups. Polish inhabitants of Vynnyky lost their homeland and for Vynnyky Jews deportation was a part of organized murder, which took place in the nearby area of Piasky. During the German occupation, a part of Vynnyky’s Jews, mainly men, was marched to Piasky and shot. In the town, a ghetto and a work camp were established. The ghetto was liquidated during the first months of 1942 and the camp endured the same fate in the summer of 1943. Ukrainian auxiliary police participated in both operations, as well as in acts of persecution.⁸⁰ It is not clear from the description of the permanent exhibition if and how the period of the German occupation will be represented. In the museum located in Vynnyky, with its focus on demographic shifts caused by the war in this borderland area, the fate of all inhabitants is crucial for presenting the past of the region. Such omission is very problematic and indicative of an attempt at radical selection and biased representation.

While the exhibition is still a work in progress, on the basis of what is publicly announced we can talk about a selective and biased approach with a strong emphasis on national Ukrainian narrative. Conversely, the final version of the exposition is not yet

79. *Koncepcja muzeinogo kompleksu* <http://www.vynnyky.com/images/konc.htm>, p. 1.

80. See *Pinkas Hakebillot Polin: Encyclopedia of Jewish Communities, Poland*, Volume II, pp. 188-189.

settled. Moreover, the cooperation with the Lublin region administration in Poland in efforts to get funding from the European Union indicates the museum's readiness to go beyond a national framework in setting up a network of cooperation. Taking into account the inherent feature of the museum to change and adapt presented materials, there is a possibility of change in this indeed pioneering attempt to deal with the local history of the region where deportations defined losses of hundreds thousands of people.

The Museum of Occupations: Exclusiveness of Suffering

In a somewhat different way, the ethnic perspective is pursued in the project for the Museum of Occupations. While this building is now represented as a major site of suffering and victimization of Ukrainians, it is an important site of memory for Polish and Jewish people. Here are three short examples. There are numerous testimonies about the NKVD and Gestapo prison, know as "wiezienie na Łackiego" - prison at Łackiego Street from Polish sources. As Poles constituted the largest group of repressed people during the Soviet occupation in 1939-1941, the Łackiego prison is a major site for Polish memory of the war. Thus, for example, the biographical novel of hockey player Czesław Skoraczynski opens with his arrest and five month imprisonment at Łackiego in September 1942.⁸¹ The prison at the Łackiego Street was one of the destinations to which the victims of the second pogrom in Lviv in July 1941, known as Petlura Days, were marched and shot. It was also a site where several Polish professors, from the group executed in Wuletski hills in August 1941 as a part of the Nazi campaign aimed at destroying Polish inteligentsia, were killed. Also in 1944-45, many Poles were arrested and imprisoned at Łackiego prison. In the memoirs of Maria Kulczynska, a wife of the last rector of Jan Kazimierz Lwów University and the first rector of Wroclaw University, one can find a long description of her being imprisoned there at the beginning of January 1945.⁸² Many of those suspected as members of the Ukrainian nationalist underground and of underground Greek-Catholic Church, especially priests, were imprisoned in the late 1940s and the 1950s in this prison. One of the most known was priest Roman Lysko, who was arrested on September 9, 1949 and who died more than a month after that in the prison.⁸³

The idea of the museum exists only on paper and in a decree of the Lviv city council announcing the international competition for the architectural solution for the future Museum. The idea has received support from the Security Service of Ukraine, as major parts of documents were written by or under supervision of historian Volodymyr Viatrovykh who holds the position of chief advisor of the head of the Service for academic and research work.⁸⁴ The support of the

81. Czesław Skoraczynski, *Zywe numery*, Kraków: KAW, 1984, p. 2f, 176 p.

82. See Maria Kulczynska Lwów – Donbas, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo „Epoka,”1988, part “Wiezienia – Wywóz.”

83. See “Meczennicy Ukraińskiego Kościoła Greckokatolickiego,” biograpms of the priests repressed by the Soviet authorities after 1944 who were declared martyrs, http://www.voxdomini.com.pl/sw/sw_ukraina.htm accessed September 10, 2008.

84. Volodymyr Viatrovykh is described at the main page of the “Short history of ‘Prison at Lonskogo’” as Head of Scholarly Board of the Centre of Liberation Movement Research, advisor of the Head of the Security Service

Lviv City Council comes through organizing and financing the competition for architectural projects for the future Museum.

At this point, let us have a look at two aspects defining the future museum: one is about framing the history of repressions through the history of the building, another is what agenda is posed as the outcome to which the Museum has to contribute significantly. Both elements are discussed on the basis of a historic survey “Short history of ‘Prison at Lonskogo’” serving as a basis for architectural development. Another document is the outline for the international conference placed on the official website of the Lviv city council. Both documents were not produced by the city council. Written by members of the Center for Studying of Liberation Struggle, including historian Volodymyr Viatrovych, it nevertheless was accepted as a departure point for proceedings linked to the establishment of the Museum. Keeping this in mind, let us go through declared aims, ideas, principles and messages for the future museum. Thus, the aim is “to promote deep understanding of the past, to support education of patriotism and national dignity.” For achieving this aim, four leading messages were incorporated into the concept of the future museum. The first is to show “triumph of good over evil to honour victims in the name of freedom and independence.” The second is to send the message about the “greatness of spirit of fight and sacrifice for independence of Ukraine.” The third is to indicate that “apart from Ukrainians, other nations were suffering, [but that] Ukrainians won independence for themselves and others.” The fourth, and the final, has to say that “one cannot kill aspiration for freedom through physical destruction.”⁸⁵

In terms of historic representation, the site is thus framed as the “prison was used by different occupational regimes: Polish, German, Soviet” where “crimes against humanity were committed” and thus can be a site “linking the tragedy of Western Ukraine and the rest of Ukraine in the period of occupations and between tragedies of other nations and countries under totalitarian rule.” To summarize, there are two messages the future museum is called to deliver: one about the “tragedy of occupation regimes: Polish, German, and Soviet” and another about the “greatness of struggle for Independence of Ukraine.”

From this general outline we can see that it is a very problematic and disturbing concept, to put it mildly. Simplification of events and experiences and large erasures and omissions produce, in this case, a highly distorted picture of what happened in Lviv during the war. To mention only a few moments: Through 11 pages on the “Short History” of the inter-war period, Lviv’s location as part of the Polish republic is referred to almost exclusively as “Polish occupation,” which despite political repressions against Ukrainian nationalist and Communists, and cultural discrimination of Ukrainian and Jewish minor-

of Ukraine on Scholarly and Research Work, Head of Archive Division of the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory. See document available at <http://www.city-adm.lviv.ua/content/view/2608/334/> accessed 29 September 2008.

85. See, Ihor Derevianyi, Volodymyr Viatrovych, and Ruslan Zabilyi, *Viaznytsia ‘Na Lontskogo.’ Istorychna dovidka.* Lviv, 2008, p. 3

ities can hardly qualify under such a category. The very fact of appearance of the prison is linked to the nature of the Polish inter-war state, as “during Austrian rule [here] there was no prison and no plans to make it.”⁸⁶

Without going into a detailed description, due to limitations in terms of the scope and length of this paper, it is important to pay attention to what such project can tell us about changes and situation with the memory politics in Lviv. First of all, the national bias remains a dominant perspective in the majority of official projects commemorating the deportations and the World War Two period in Lviv. This perspective is downplaying or completely erasing the experience and suffering of Poles and Jews, who were the two largest city communities in Lviv before the war. At the same time, when looking at the way this project of the Museum of Occupations is now planned, it is not very clear how the final result will look like. This is mainly due to the fact that the project is not yet developed and is not kept in a *milieu* of people sharing similar ideological views. While it is true that initial documents were elaborated by one institution with clearly defined ideological agenda, it is important to note that the City Council organized a call for an international competition which bears a possibility to bring a challenge to such a perspective. Moreover, the committee called for deciding on the architectural projects submitted by the end of the year includes people with very different backgrounds, not only from Lviv or Ukraine, but also from Lithuania, the USA, and Germany, some of them know to have different opinions on the history of the city in the 20th century. This is where the project is now. On the basis of the facts compiled through the realized monumental project as well as the museum projects at their early stage, one can draw some preliminary conclusions about the commemorative landscape of Lviv.

The post-1991 period in the Lviv cityscape has thus been characterized by the commemoration of events and experiences that had been tabooed or distorted during the Communist period. Commemorative practices have been focused on the victims of one’s “own” group, understood in national terms. Such a narrow perspective on commemorative practices, together with the legacies of Second World War conflicts, embodied in completed as well as incomplete monuments and museums can hardly be regarded as a step towards understanding and a lasting reflection on the region’s past. So there may be, at this point, a principal contradiction between the fact that Ukrainian society is now going through a transitory stage of memory recovery and, on the other side, the fact that it builds monuments, which, by definition, are not transitory but lasting. In this respect the fact that in recent years there is a clear shift towards memorial museums as they presume research and also, in their form, incorporate more extensively and reflect changes in the commemorative culture of the region. This can open some perspectives and spaces for extending and hopefully integrating the suffering of others.

86. Derevianyi, Viatrovych, and Zabilyi, *Viaznytsia ‘Na Lontskogo.’* p. 1 <http://www.city-adm.lviv.ua/content/view/2608/334/> accessed 29 September 2008.