

The Ukraine List (UKL) #446
compiled by Dominique Arel
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The Danyliw Seminar Proposal Deadline is tomorrow, June 15!

- 1-Biblio: Mykhenko & Swain, Trochev, *Statutes & Decisions, Osteuropa*
- 2-Press: Kiev: French Embassy Media Digest (8-14 June) [UKL Translation]
- 3-Beyondbrics: Russia Lends Ukraine \$2bn: What Does It Want In Return?
- 4-Kyiv Post: Will Ritter, Ukraine's Feudal Democracy
- 5-Window on Eurasia: Yanukovich Shelves Plans to Federalize Ukraine for Now

- 6-Chair of Ukrainian Studies Blog: Dominique Arel, On Holodomor Denial
- 7-Sydney Morning Herald: Steve Komarnyckyj: Tim Snyder and the Dance of Death (re: "Springtime for Stalin")
- 8-Winnipeg Free Press: Holodomor Documentary Stone Mill Screens in Winnipeg
- 9-Jurij Dobczansky: Holodomor Collection at Library of Congress

- **re: OUN-Bandera, the 1948 War in Israel, and Open Debate**
- 10-Borys Potapenko: On the Accusations Regarding the Pogroms
- 11-Stephen Velychenko: With Whom an Open Debate Can and Cannot Take Place
- 12-New Issue of Krytyka: Special Section "Bandera as a Problem"

- 13-Danyliw 2010 Seminar on Contemporary Ukraine: Deadline Reminder, 15 June 2010
- 14-National Symposium on Internment Operations Being Held at Queen's University
- 15-Kyiv Mohyla U: German-Ukrainian Conference on Public Broadcasting
- 16-Conference on Religion, Nation and Secularism, Munich, 25-26 June 2010

- 17-Ira Straus: Ukraine Between Russia and NATO: New Misunderstandings for Old

- **Thanks to Jurij Dobczansky, Steve Komarnyckyj, Oleh Kotsyuba, Lubomyr Luciuk, Borys Potapenko, Ira Straus, Frank Sysyn, Andreas Umland, Stephen Velychenko and Roman Zurba**

#1

Recent Publications on Ukraine:

Mykhnenko, Vlad and Adam Swain. 2010. "Ukraine's Diverging Space-Economy: The Orange Revolution, Post-Soviet Development Models and Regional Trajectories," *European Urban and Regional Studies*, Vol. 17, No. 2, pp. 141-65.

Trochev, Alexei. 2010. "Meddling with Justice: Competitive Politics, Impunity, and Distrusted Courts in Post-Orange Ukraine," *Demokratizatsiya*, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Spring), pp. 122-147.

Trochev has edited five 2009 issues of the journal *Statutes & Decisions: The Laws of the USSR and Its Successor States* (M. E. Sharpe), offering translations of important rulings and dissenting opinions from the Constitutional Court of Ukraine.

Osteuropa has published a triple issue (Nos. 2-4, 2010), containing 34 articles, on "Schichtwechsel. Politische Metamorphosen in der Ukraine". English-language abstracts can be accessed at <http://www.eurozine.com/pdf/2010-04-22-osteuropa-en.pdf>.

#2

Presse Kiev

Media Digest, French Embassy in Ukraine
[excerpts translated by Dominique Arel for UKL]

Radio Svoboda: "The income of Ukrainian billionaires has doubled in the past year, according to the ranking of Ukraine's wealthiest men published by Korrespondent magazine and "Dragon Capital". Rinat Akhmetov tops the list for the third consecutive year. The five wealthiest men are Akhmetov (17.8 B USD), I. Kolomoyskiy (6.5 B), G. Bogoliubov (6.3 B), V. Pinchuk (3.1 B) and K. Jevago (2.4 B). The wealthiest political force remains the Party of Regions — 17 Regionals are on the list, compared to 12 for ByuT. The head of special services (V. Khorochkovskiy) is on the list — an unprecedented case in the history of these rankings, according to the magazine expert. For the BBC, the sensation of the year is the appearance of a billionaire who made his fortune in the agrobusiness who, according to experts, could become a driving force of the Ukrainian Economy (O. Vadaturskiy with his agroholding Nibulon, with an estimated worth of 1 B)(14 June)

Glavcom: "The court ruling on the withdrawal of supplementary frequencies to TVi and 5 Kanal affects mostly the latter. According to its license, 5 Kanal needs supplementary frequencies in order to respect the conditions of the license, calling for a division into two projects, one on information and the other on entertainment. The ruling could have the effect of having Kanal 5 lose its status as an information channel. Petro Poroshenko, the Kanal 5 owner, wants to contest the decision in Ukrainian, if not European, court." According to Otar Dovzhenko, a journalist specializing in the media, "it is only about the project of launching an entertainment channel. It is regrettable, of course, mais freedom of expression is not affected and it is premature to say that the existence of Kanal 5 is threatened." For the journalist, "the situation with TVi is more serious. Its owner, the Russian businessman Konstantin Kagalovsky, wanted to develop the channel and transform it

into an island of information and of quality political information in a censored media space." (9 June)

Den. "The press conference by Yanukovych was a test for the freedom of the press. Yet only journalists from the national media dared asked sensitive questions, particularly on press freedom. The regional press limited itself to political correct questions" (8 June)

Radio Svoboda "Will the parliamentary majority become constitutional? The parliamentary coalition is slowly getting larger and only needs 50 more voices in order to freely change the Constitution. [300 votes, two-thirds of the total, are necessary for a constitutional amendment–UKL]. Some opposition members believe that the coalition could soon become constitutional. The Regionals say that they have no intention of increasing the coalition and that it is too soon to talk about 300 votes" (8 June)

#3

Russia Lends Ukraine \$2bn: What Does It Want In Return?

by Roman Olearchyk
Beyondbricks Blog, FT.com, 11 June 2010

Now that the west seems to fear to tread very far into Ukraine, Russia is more than happy to step into the breach. A state-controlled Russian bank appears to have granted cash-strapped Kiev a \$2bn bridge loan to plug a budget deficit gap after delays in Ukraine's bid for fresh financial support from the International Monetary Fund.

While details of the deal have yet to emerge, it seems that the Russian bank has agreed to shore up the public finances for six months. The short-term benefits to Kiev are obvious: but the long-term implications of the dramatic increase in Russian influence that has followed president Viktor Yanukovich's election have yet to become clear.

Asked today at a Kiev press conference if he could confirm the loan, Mikhail Zurabov, the Russian ambassador, said: "I can envision it, as such talks were held in the most recent time period. And the funds which appeared most recently in Ukraine could be, in their own right, a sort of bridge loan given by one of the [Russian] commercial banks to the government of Ukraine for six months at a pretty good interest rate, of say 6.7%."

A Ukrainian official told Reuters that Ukraine had "borrowed from Russia" and financial analysts said the funds showed up this week on central bank accounts. Ukrainian news services indentified the Russian lender as Vneshtorgbank, though this could not be confirmed.

The news emerged as Ukrainian officials held talks with an IMF mission visiting Kiev this week. The coalition backing Yanukovich seeks a two-year IMF aid package of \$15-19bn, and hopes for a decision soon after a mission returns to Kiev on June 21. But negotiations have been tougher than the Ukrainian leadership expected, with the IMF insisting on reforms that Kiev is loathe to promise.

Cash-strapped Ukraine has a limited financing options. Anastasia Golovach, analyst at Renaissance Capital in Kiev, told the FT: "Negotiations with the IMF have been delayed. The Ukrainian government was also planning to tap external capital markets with a new Eurobond issue in May, but the process was postponed due to the turbulence in the global markets."

Some \$11bn in aid provided by the IMF kept Kiev financially afloat during last year's recession, when gross domestic product plunging 15 per cent. But further assistance from a \$16.4bn programme was frozen late last year ahead of a hotly-contest presidential election after rivalries torpedoed reform efforts.

For Kiev's political opposition, the Russia loan is another sign of how Ukraine has tilted further into Moscow's orbit four months into the presidency of Yanukovich who replaced the pro-west Viktor Yushchenko.

Whether out of desperation or choice, Ukraine now seems ready to go to Moscow for help when international lenders bargain tough. Kiev also hopes soon to ink a \$4-5bn loan from Russia to finance new nuclear power blocs.

It seems clear Russia's leadership plans to bring Kiev further under its political wing and grab ownership of key Ukrainian assets, such as the gas pipeline and steel mills. Russian groups have recently discreetly moved to acquire two Ukrainian steel mills.

Economists say the relatively expensive Russian loan could, in itself, further complicate talks with the IMF. The Fund has expressed concern over the nation's budget deficit and swiftly increasing foreign debt. It doubled in the past year to 40 per cent of GDP.

So, both financially and politically, Kiev is stuck between a rock and a hard place - Russia and the markets.

#4

Despite Progress, Ukraine is Still a Mess, not Democracy

by Will Ritter

Kyiv Post, 9 June 2010

Will Ritter is a former managing editor of the Kyiv-based IntelNews information agency. He can be reached at writter404@yahoo.com

The good news regarding Ukrainian democracy so far in 2010 is that after yet another tightly-contested presidential election and smooth transfer of power, Ukraine has now built an impressive two-decade tradition of free and fair national elections following the Soviet breakup.

The Central Election Commission has received high marks in Western capitals for its professionalism and impartiality, and is arguably today one of the most trusted institutions in Ukrainian public life. To its credit, the CEC has become boring. The rule of law governs the campaigning and vote-counting process with an orderliness that continues to be lacking in many other areas of Ukrainian society. The drama in Ukraine's national elections is now - as in Western countries - simply about who gets the most votes, rather than in disruptions and technicalities of the election process.

The bad news is that in terms of both local government and the country's convoluted political party structures, Ukraine is still a mess. Local politicians are not accountable to the voters of the city or town which they purportedly serve, but rather to their national political organizations. Local budget revenues are practically non-existent; ex-presidential candidate and prominent oppositionist Anatoliy Hrytsenko recently estimated that 90 percent of local budget income is dependent on subsidies from the national budget, meaning that bureaucrats in the capital are micro-managing public development projects in every corner of Ukraine.

As if the central bureaucracy in Kyiv were not enough, local governing councils are also constantly in conflict with oblast (provincial) power structures, including un-elected oblast "governors" appointed by presidential decree. The national parties routinely shuffle candidates geographically, meaning that members of local and oblast governing councils are generally not even residents of the localities they are assigned to. According to another opposition leader, Arseniy Yatseniuk, other un-elected officials such as local prosecutors, tax inspection officials, and the police run the show in most communities, wielding far greater powers than elected local government heads.

One of the main reasons for Ukraine's failure to evolve effective local government is that the country's political parties continue to lag far behind their counterparts in Western liberal democracies in terms of local structure. All the major Ukrainian parties are still centralized, top-down vehicles that serve the political and financial interests of their own elite, rather than grass-roots based organizations where local rank-and-file party members have a say in choosing who represents them on party tickets.

Case in point: following the recent British parliamentary election, Gordon Brown resigned as leader of the Labor Party immediately when it became clear that he had lost the prime minister's job. Brown's party performed poorly, and he had to take personal responsibility for the consequences.

Contrast this with Viktor Yushchenko's actions after he won just 5.5 percent of the vote in Ukraine's presidential election. Yushchenko took a party which, as recently as three years ago, was a formidable political force uniting nationally conscious Ukrainians, and ran it straight into the ground. Our Ukraine claimed some 15 percent support in the 2007 parliamentary vote. Polls today put its support at less than two percent.

Yet only a few days after one of the most embarrassing re-election bids of any national leader anywhere, Yushchenko held a press conference to announce that he intends stay active in politics and lead Our Ukraine into the next parliamentary and local elections. There was apparently not even a rustle of debate or discussion inside Our Ukraine about whether, after such a crushing defeat, Yushchenko is the right man to head the movement.

Yulia Tymoshenko's eponymous bloc BYuT, though it commands a far higher level of support (currently estimated at some 12-15 percent) than Our Ukraine, is no better in terms of top-down structure. In both cases, we are talking about fossilized hierarchies where the party serves the leader, rather than the other way around. Indeed, Tymoshenko's personal control over BYuT was estimated by most Ukrainian analysts to be even tighter than Viktor Yanukovich's control over his Regions Party -

itself beholden to wealthy business interests and hardly a beacon of grass-roots people power - throughout the presidential campaign.

With at least four other parties now claiming to lead the opposition to Yanukovich's regime, BYuT is struggling to stay in the game. In order to make her political force more competitive and bring it into line with a European format, Tymoshenko would be wise to democratize BYuT internally, and also to re-name the movement to reflect its center-left, nationally-conscious ideology. Without a major rebranding, the odds of BYuT reclaiming the popularity of its heyday following the Orange Revolution (2005-2007) appear slim to none.

Even the newer and relatively more progressive political forces of Yatseniuk and Sergiy Tigipko - the Front for Change and Strong Ukraine, respectively - are little more than star vehicles for the two young politicians. With the possible exception of the Rukh Party in the 1990s, independent Ukraine has yet to see a political movement with enough ideological traction to transcend its leadership.

All five of the Ukrainian political factions currently in Parliament - Our Ukraine, BYuT, the Party of Regions, the Lytvyn Bloc, and the Communists - operate as secretive clans that lack any type of transparent primaries or caucuses to choose the people who represent their parties in elections. In the absence of such mechanisms, major party players simply impose appointments from the top down.

It has long been assumed, though never proven, that these appointments to the party lists are generally based on cash payments. While reports that would-be MPs pay central party organizations as much as \$ 5 million each for seats in parliament may be an exaggeration of Ukrainian political mythology, there is little doubt that seats have been sold for impressive sums.

However, simply changing the electoral system of party lists and straight proportional voting - which is so convenient for selling seats - to a majority system of geographic districts would not necessarily solve the problem. Even in the latter system, absent a network of local primaries/caucuses, the central party leadership would still be able to use its control over the nominating process to hand-pick which candidates are elected.

Lawyer and parliament member Mykola Katerynychuk, a top Tymoshenko ally, noted in a recent television appearance that in a single-mandate election system, intra-party competition for nominations would simply be settled by which candidate offers the party leadership the most money for assignments to favorable geographic districts. This situation would arise because Ukraine's geographic political polarization would make most single-mandate district contests non-competitive.

In fact, Ukraine employed such a system in the 1990s, when half of parliament (225 deputies) was elected from single-mandate districts. The result was wide-scale geographic reshuffling of candidates by the major parties, and parliament members who ended up representing regions of Ukraine that many of them had never so much as set foot in before the start of the campaign.

The centralization of political parties continues to undermine local self-government in Ukraine. Add this to the fact that many local matters of critical economic importance are decided by un-elected officials who answer to Kyiv rather than to local voters, and you have a system whereby largely impoverished local populations are deprived

of any real levers of influence over their governments. Such a system of government can only be described as modern-day feudalism.

Real democracy is about more than just high-profile national elections, however much international acclaim these elections may receive for fairness and transparency. At bottom, democracy is about giving people the right to choose their own representatives and the means to run their own affairs, and in this respect, the Ukrainian political system has a very long way to go.

#5

Yanukovich Shelves Plans to Federalize Ukraine for Now

by Paul Goble

Window on Eurasia, 13 June 2010

Staunton, June 13 – Viktor Tikhonov, Ukraine's new vice premier for regional policy, announced last week that Ukraine will remain a unitary state because the federalization of the country would be too expensive and problematic, thus putting off a change that many had thought President Viktor Yanukovich planned to make a centerpiece of his policy.

Indeed, since Yanukovich came to power, people in various parts of Ukraine and commentators in Moscow had argued that only federalization of that country could cope with the enormous divides among its regions, clearly on the assumption that the new pro-Moscow Ukrainian leader would move in that direction.

But Tikhonov's declaration suggests that any moves away from Ukraine's unitary state will not take place anytime soon, a possible indication that Yanukovich fears such changes could get out of hand or a recognition by the Ukrainian president that federalization could end by costing him and his Party of the Regions real power. In an essay posted on Materik web site, Igor Lesev suggests that Tikhonov's views are authoritative and reflect two basic conclusions that the powers that be in Kyiv have reached: moving toward federalism now would be expensive and, what is more, "culturally, Ukrainians are still not prepared for this".

Given that Tikhonov is one of the most "consistent supporters of the thorough-going federalization of Ukraine," Lesev argues, it is clear that his statement that for the moment at least, Ukraine will remain a unitary state, reflects the position of the Yanukovich regime rather than any change of heart on Tikhonov's part.

Any moves toward the federalization of that country would be long and difficult, Lesev notes. They would require "a complete change in the form of the entire system of power of Ukraine, and "what is most important, presuppose a cardinal change in the constitution of the country."

Any such change, therefore, would require some kind of agreement with the Ukrainian opposition, something not currently on offer. But the real reason for the regime's change of heart and Tikhonov's statement, Lesev argues, is not an assessment of how the opposition would react but rather of how Yanukovich's Party of the Regions sees the future.

Unlike his predecessors who either viewed it as "an absolute value" (Leonid Kuchma) or something that would prevent "independent movements in the regions" (Viktor

Yushchenko), Yanukovich, Lesev says, was quite prepared to support the idea of federalization until it came to power but is now opposed to such a move because of its own calculation of self-interest.

Enjoying virtually unlimited power in the current centralized state, Yanukovich and his Party of the Regions want to "leave everything as it is" lest any shift reduce their control. On the one hand, federalization would lead to the rise of elites the current president's party might not be in a position to control.

And on the other, local and regional elections could work against it even if the Party of the Regions were to win. That is because the regional candidates of the ruling party would have to appeal to groups that would tend to undermine Yanukovich's control even if those who won proclaimed their loyalty to him.

Consequently, the Party of the Regions is prepared to let things ride, assuming that it has "sufficient time" to move toward the federalization that it has always supported. But this is "a mistake" on their part, Lesev says, because any result of the elections that are now scheduled will make it more difficult for Kyiv to move toward federalization.

"Success by the Party of the Regions will be a signal that the party is on the true path and that there is the chance to use unlimited government resources and that there is no sense in delegating power to the regions," Lesev argues.

At the same time, the analyst continues, "success by the opposition will also make the process of the federalization of Ukraine more complicated since there will arise a powerful protest group in the regions and in the parliament."

"In other words, if the regionals genuinely and not in words want to see the economic and in part political independence of regions, then they must conduct the reforms already now," something Tikhonov's words suggest they have decided against, because if they don't, then "the process will be either impossible or become undesirable for the 'Donetsk' elite."

#6

On Holodomor Denial

by Dominique Arel

Chair of Ukrainian Studies Blog, 2 June 2010

<http://chairukrstudies.wordpress.com/>

In the recent issue of *Holodomor Studies*, librarian Jurij Dobczansky, in an article reproduced with permission in UKL445 (7 June 2010), writes that the Library of Congress has introduced, last Fall, the new categories of *Holodomor denial literature* ("for works that diminish the scale and significance of the Ukrainian Famine of 1932-1933 or assert that it did not occur") and *Holodomor denial* ("for works that discuss the diminution of the scale and significance of the Ukrainian Famine of 1932-1933 or the assertion that it did not occur").

It seems to me that the category of "Holodomor denial" conflates two distinct strands in the charged debate over the Holodomor—that of "Famine-as-Mass-Murder" denial and that of "Famine-as-Genocide" denial.

The classic case of Holodomor denial was the official Soviet policy, until 1987, of denying that a famine occurred in Ukraine (or elsewhere) in 1932-1933. Anyone using the word "famine" was denounced as a stooge of hostile foreign interests bent on defaming the Soviet Union. The ideological rationale was simple: collectivization was meant to demonstrate the superiority of the Soviet economic system and an admission that it killed millions of people would delegitimize the Soviet project. In 1937, Stalin had the organizers of the Soviet census shot for having produced an accurate population count that showed that millions of people were missing in Ukraine.

The Soviet denial of the famine is on the same plane as the so-called Holocaust "revisionist" literature that denies that gas chambers existed and is beyond the pale of academic debate. (In Germany and France, Holocaust denial is also illegal, but this is another issue altogether). This does not mean, however, that this brand of denial literature should not be researched as an artefact of political and social discourse. Arguing that the Ukrainian Famine, or the Holocaust, or other incontrovertibly documented cases of mass violence against civilians, did not happen is morally contemptible and scientifically fraudulent. Yet seeking to understand why and how agents of state power, or socially meaningful social actors and organizations, engage in denial 101 is central to the scholarly enterprise.

In a recent debate (UKL441, 16 February 2010, items 9-13), John Paul Himka, of the University of Alberta, was pilloried for having included Doug Tottle's 1987 infamous screed *Fraud, Famine and Fascism: The Ukrainian Genocide Myth from Hitler to Harvard* on the syllabus of the course "The Great Famine of 1932-33 in Soviet Ukraine in History and Memory", which he taught in Winter 2009. Tottle was a member of the Communist Party of Canada, but we know from archival research done by Ukrainian historian Liudmyla Hrynevych (2007 conference paper at the University of Toronto) that his book had been "reviewed" by three institutes of the Ukrainian SSR before publication. In essentially presenting the official state position of the time, however indefensible, on the famine, Tottle is worth studying as an item of the politics of memory (denial and omission being key dimensions of any politics of memory), the same way that the Soviet postwar policy of omission towards the Holocaust on Soviet occupied territory has been the subject of a growing body of historical literature. As a contribution to our understanding of what happened in 1932-33, the Tottle book, it goes without saying, like other famine-denial ones, is worthless.

The outright denial about the existence of the famine appears to be over. In Dobczansky's review of Holodomor denial literature, recent authors – from Russia and Ukraine – have kept the hysterical polemical tone of lore (Ukrainian nationalists being fascists and Nazis, having invented the Holodomor to hide their crimes etc.), but they no longer deny that a famine took place. This is in line with the official Russian position, actually going back to 1987, that famines, in the plural form, resulted from Stalinist excesses. (The recent Famine Resolution of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe [PACE], supported by the Russian Federation delegation, says that "mass starvation" was "caused by cruel and deliberate actions and policies of the Soviet regime.")

This literature, however, is weak on agency. Its authors tend to emphasize that these were tragic times, that collectivization was unpredictable, that the Soviet Union was isolated, and so forth. The general drift being that, the PACE resolution

notwithstanding, the extent to which the decisions and actions that led to the famine were deliberate and, crucially, avoidable, is left ambiguous. This is also in line with the current Russian ambivalence towards the 1930s, an ambivalence that generally privileges the achievements of Stalinism (making the Soviet Union a great power) over its human costs, such as the Famine.

This, to me, justifies placing this literature alongside the old Soviet denial discourse as types of "Famine-as-Mass-Murder" denial. Mass violence perpetrated against civilians, including the mass violence of modern famines, results from the purposive ("deliberate") actions of political (state or non-state) actors. This is actually the meaning of the Ukrainian coinage *Holodomor*: to "kill" (*moryty*) by "hunger". A famine is when people "die" by hunger. A Holodomor is when the deaths by hunger are caused by political agency. People are *killed*. The famine in Ukraine, and the famines in the RSFSR and Kazakhstan, resulted from political decisions (in insurance parlance, they were not "Acts of God"). As a matter of fact, the comparative study of famines tells us that all modern famines, since the 1850s, are *Holodomory* to different degrees.

The dividing line is agency. On one side are those who deny the Holodomor, the politically-induced ("man-made") famine, either outright (no famine) or through ambivalence, obfuscation, omission, or, to paraphrase Dobczansky, by diminishing the scale and significance of the political factor in the causality chain. On the other are those who question, based on historiographical findings and/or theoretical debates, whether the Holodomor constituted a genocide. This literature includes those who deny outright that the concept of genocide applies and those whose position is more agnostic, or ambivalent. The work of the Russian historian Viktor Kondrashin certainly belongs to the former. Kondrashin has been making wild and, to my knowledge, unsubstantiated claims on the demographics of the Famine lately (that more people died of hunger in the RSFSR – Kazakhstan excluded – than in Ukraine in 1932-33, a claim uncritically reproduced in article 7 of the PACE resolution, contradicting the earlier claim, in Article 5, that Ukraine "suffered the most"), but he is a serious historian that actually has an article in the same latest issue of *Holodomor Studies*. (The Editor, Roman Serbyn, must be commended for his commitment to open debate).

Denying, or questioning, whether the Holodomor is genocide does not necessarily mean denying or questioning whether the Holodomor is mass murder. "Deliberate" mass killing actually captures three different processes. Political actors can deliberately choose to target an entire population on a given area for eradication (by means of extermination or deportation, a.k.a. ethnic cleansing). Or they can deliberately choose to exert violence to terrorize an entire population (by killing many). Or they can deliberately choose not to be bothered with the lethal consequences of their policies, consequences that any reasonable mind can anticipate. The various meanings of deliberate actions and their historical, political, legal and ethical implications, is what we need to seriously debate. The starting point, as Oleksandr Melnyk and Tim Snyder put it recently, is that these people did not need to die. The Holodomor was tragic not because leaders faced an impossible choice. It was tragic because millions of civilians were victimized by a cruel regime.

#7

Tim Snyder and the Dance of Death

by Steve Komarnyckyj

In the blog "Springtime for Stalin" (NYR Blog, 26 May 2010), published in UKL444 (1 June 2010), Tim Snyder stated that "Stalin made deliberate decisions about grain requisitions and livestock seizures that brought death to three million people in Ukraine who did not have to die." This sentence unfortunately reflects a common misconception about the Holodomor, that the excess deaths were caused by a ruthless policy of requisitioning, rather than deliberately inflicted. The cause of the excessive mortality in Ukraine was not, in fact, the requisitioning of either grain or livestock but the confiscation and destruction of all edible material. The aim of the policy of mass starvation was to exterminate as much of the Ukrainian peasantry as possible prior and replace them with people from other regions of the USSR. The chain of events is well documented but perhaps is worth outlining here as a corrective to the inadvertent misinformation in Snyder's article.

The first systematic analysis of the Holodomor as a genocidal crime was undertaken by Raphael Lemkin who, as Professor Roman Serbyn notes, spoke of:

- a) the decimation of the Ukrainian national elites,
- b) the destruction of the Orthodox Church,
- c) the starvation of the Ukrainian farming population, and
- d) its replacement with non-Ukrainian population from the RSFSR as integral components of the same genocidal process.

The revisionist case, which argues that the Holodomor was not part of a genocidal attack on Ukraine, presupposes that the mass executions and purges of Ukraine's national and spiritual elite and the public attacks on Ukrainian nationalism by Soviet functionaries during this period have no link to the situation of enforced famine in rural Ukraine. Equally, however, it ignores a well documented chain of events, and a massive volume of eyewitness testimony, which I refer to below, documented by Kulchystsky and other researchers.

In a letter of 11th August 1932 to Kaganovich, Stalin wrote that he believed that Ukrainian nationalists working together with Polish spies were preparing to sever Ukraine from the Soviet Union and that the Ukrainian party was becoming a "caricature of a parliament." He stated bluntly that "Unless we begin to straighten out the situation in Ukraine, we may lose Ukraine." The letter initiated the installation of Vsevolod Balytsky to head up the GPU (Secret Police) in Ukraine, and conduct a wave of executions and arrests, which acted as a blanket under which the Holodomor was perpetrated.

It is however the secret Central Committee resolution of 14 December 1932, regarding grain requisitions in Ukraine, the North Caucasus and Western Oblasts, which reveals the link between the requisitioning of food and the attack on Ukrainian nationalism. Under this resolution the campaign of food requisitioning was to be strengthened while the party in these regions would be purged of counter revolutionary elements and in particular the "bourgeois nationalists" in the Ukrainian Communist Party. The decree also required the Russification of education and publications in the Kuban.

The final round of searches were launched by the New Year Telegram sent by Stalin on 1 January 1933. It was sent to the communist chiefs of Ukraine on 1st January 1933 and required them to make everyone in the collective farms aware that

- if people gave up bread that they had been hiding they would not be repressed.
- If they continued to hide bread they would face the severest methods of punishment detailed in the Law of 7 August 1932, the "Law of Five Ears" (*Zakon pro p'iat' koloskiv*), that is, they would be shot.

This may be the most lethal telegram in history. The first point shows that all bread would be taken from Ukraine. However, the second point was addressed to those peasants who did not give up their bread, which in effect meant the vast majority. How would you find out if people were hiding grain or bread? The only way was to search. If bread was found during the course of a search, you would be shot. But what would happen if nothing was found?

Most of the villagers in Ukraine knew that, as of November 1932, if no bread was found during a search, other food would be confiscated, the official term for this was natural fines, and the law talked of confiscating meat and potatoes. However, the evidence is that everything edible was stripped using this law in 1933. The telegram had initiated the mass theft from Ukrainian peasants of all their food. The vast number of eyewitness testimonies collected from Ukrainians who lived through the Holodomor prove that a policy of deliberate starvation by the confiscation of all food was inflicted on Ukraine early in 1933. Hanna Yermolenko, who was born in 1915, remembers that her village, Katerynka near Kirovograd, ceased to exist after the Holodomor. She recollects the activists in early 1933 going from house to house and removing everything edible.

The directive of the Communist Party and the Soviet government prohibiting the departure of starving peasants from Ukraine and the Kuban, issued on 22 January 1933, meant that Ukrainian peasants were sealed into ghettos of starvation.

A final point about Snyder's statement is the demography. Three million is lower than any estimate I have read—the very lowest is 3.2 million—and these estimates are based on excess mortality and exclude the Ukrainian population outside Ukraine and factor in mechanical migration, which is a point of some dispute. Furthermore, there was continuous pressure on demographers in this period to inflate population figures and conceal population losses. The figures need therefore to be treated with some caution.

#8

Holodomor Survivors Tell the Sad Truth

by Randall King

Winnipeg Free Press, 10 June 2010

THE Ukraine famine of 1932-33 claimed as many as four million lives and is widely considered a deliberate genocide by Soviet dictator Josef Stalin.

Almost 80 years later, Stalin's active role in creating the famine is still debatable, even among Ukraine presidents. (According to recent story in the Times of London, former president Viktor Yushchenko termed the event Ukrainians call the Holodomor

as a genocide perpetrated by Stalin's regime while Ukraine's new President Viktor Yanukovich is more inclined to describe the famine as a tragedy suffered by people across the Soviet Union.)

To get the viewpoint that matters most, Ukrainian documentary filmmaker Anna Gin went right to the source in her documentary *Stone Mill*, which screens in the Muriel Richardson Auditorium of the Winnipeg Art Gallery Sunday afternoon.

Gin, 36, interviewed many now-elderly survivors of the famine from every corner of Ukraine's Kharkiv region, which experienced the highest death toll and is where she is from.

On the ground level of the actual events, there can be no doubt that farmers in the Ukraine produced crops in 1932, only to watch helplessly as apparatchiks and party goons raided every granary, barn, cupboard and attic in the region. The searchers sometimes employed long steel rods to dig through the hiding places, looking for hidden caches of grain or produce. In most cases, they left no food whatsoever to the families whose toil produced it.

The sad testimonies of the survivors are punctuated with records of official meetings and correspondence that suggest that whatever Stalin's intentions towards the people of Ukraine, the result was a virtual genocide.

"I'm a journalist and I consider it my task to work with the facts," says Gin, speaking through a translator. "I didn't consciously make any attempt to reach conclusions that summarize this (event). That was not my purpose. A thinking person should be able to reach their own conclusion.

"(The Holodomor) is often spoken about by politicians, but the old people who lived through it never speak about it. They're not looking for a guilty party.

"I deliberately wanted to show this tragedy from the point of view of the children who lived through it, and to avoid any kind of superimposed overview either by politicians, historians or theologians."

Gin says that many of her interview subjects have died since the film was made "and in three or four years, probably none of them will be alive."

The documentary screened in Winnipeg last year. This time, the film comes with English subtitles produced here in Winnipeg, says one of the organizers, Myroslav Shkandrij, professor of Slavic Studies in the department of German and Slavic studies at the University of Manitoba.

"The reaction to the screening last year was very powerful, and that was one reason I decided to do the subtitles," Shkandrij says. "We thought this film should be made available to a wider audience."

Shkandrij will moderate a discussion following the documentary. Proceeds from the screening will be used to support Gin's visit to Winnipeg.

#9

From Jurij Dobczansky:

Readers interested in learning about the Holodomor collection of the Library of Congress are encouraged to visit <http://catalog.loc.gov>. Publications of significance that are not yet in the collection may be sent to: East Central Europe Section, Germanic and Slavic Division, Library of Congress, 101 Independence Avenue, S.E., Washington, DC 20540.

#10

From: borys potapenko <bpotapenko@wowway.com>

Date: Tuesday, June 8, 2010 10:07 AM

With reference to: OUN-Bandera, the 1948 War in Israel, and the Utility of Open Debate by Dominique Arel Chair of Ukrainian Studies Blog, 2 June 2010 Dr. Arel makes the following concluding statement: At the same time, the Ukrainian standard nationalist narrative, like all nationalist narratives, should be questioned openly and democratically. This will strengthen Ukraine.

I fully agree. However, this same point should also be made to those who simply repeat the accusations against OUN that it perpetrated pogroms against Jews. Below is a letter I wrote in this regard. To date no one has challenged the veracity of its substance.

Borys Potapenko

To The Editor:

The spurious allegation that the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and its members in the Nachtigall Battalion carried-out pogroms in Lviv in the summer of 1941, continues to be dredged-up to defame the Ukrainian liberation struggle during WWII. In "Hero of Ukraine' Splits Nation, Inside and Out", NYT, March 1, 2010, Clifford Levy notes the allegation by certain Jewish and Polish circles that Bandera and his forces "ordered or condoned massacres of Jews and Poles".

Despite having been authoritatively exposed as a part of a Soviet disinformation campaign from 50 years ago, the allegation is again being forced on unwitting media outlets. This time it is being used to discredit Ukrainian President Yushchenko's decision to posthumously confer a medal "Hero of Ukraine" on Stepan Bandera, leader of OUN during and after WWII. Five separate and exhaustive investigations established that neither the OUN nor its members in the Nachtigall Battalion participated in the heinous war crimes/pogroms in Lviv in July 1941.

First, the investigation of the Extraordinary State Commission on German atrocities, created by the Soviet government in 1944, identified the specific individuals and the branches of the German security services, who perpetrated the killings. The findings contained no direct or indirect reference, much less accusations against members of the OUN or Nachtigall. Subsequently, the Nuremberg war crimes trials, again, exhaustively reviewed the evidence concerning the pogroms in Lviv and, again, made no mention of OUN or Nachtigall.

The conspiracy to discredit the OUN and Nachtigall was actually concocted in 1959, following the assassination of Stepan Bandera by a Soviet Russian KGB agent. The KGB plot was an elaborate attempt to compromise Theodor Oberländer the then Minister for Displaced Persons for West Germany and to delegitimize the OUN as a national liberation movement. The allegation was that Oberländer, as the commanding German officer of the Nachtigall Battalion in Lviv in 1941, launched the pogroms against the Jews and Poles.

However, the KGB intrigue was exposed when, after an extensive trial, the West German court concluded that there were no grounds for accusing Oberländer, Nachtigall, or OUN of any criminal acts against Jews or Poles in Lviv in July 1941. On the contrary, the court established that it was the German Security Service (SD), the Security Police, and the Einsatzkommando 5 that had perpetrated the mass murder of Jews and Poles.

The fourth investigation was conducted at the request of Oberländer, himself. An international commission of eminent and unimpeachable international jurists, none of whom were German, convened in The Hague from November 1959 to March 1960. They unanimously concluded "that the accusations against the Battalion Nachtigall and against the then Lieutenant and currently Federal Minister Oberländer have no foundation in fact". The commission further concluded that the KGB disinformation campaign was primarily designed to deflect attention away from itself for the assassination of Bandera by casting blame on Oberländer and the Germans.

Finally, at the request of Stepan Bandera's family in Canada, the Canadian Government's Commission of Inquiry on War Criminals in Canada conducted its own investigation and, in 1985, cleared Stepan Bandera of any direct or indirect involvement in war crimes. Let the record also show that recently uncovered and authenticated documents in the archives of the Ukrainian National Security Service confirm that the OUN leadership in Lviv in 1941 issued specific instructions to its members not to participate in any German actions against Jews and Poles.

Notwithstanding the exhaustive investigations and overwhelming evidence to the contrary, the campaign to delegitimize the national struggle for the independence of Ukraine, by demonizing the OUN and the Ukrainian Partisan Army (UPA), continues. The Kremlin rulers in Moscow and their fellow travelers abroad still cannot come to terms with their lost empire. Nor can they countenance a free, independent and democratic Ukraine, where its citizens of all religious and ethnic minorities, be they Jews, Poles or Russians, individually and collectively, enjoy more freedoms, greater security and opportunity than in any other country of the former Soviet Russian Empire.

Borys Potapenko
International Conference in Support of Ukraine

#11

From: Stephen Velychenko (velychen@chass.utoronto.ca)

Re: re: OUN-Bandera, the 1948 War in Israel, and Open Debate (UKL445)

In response to Prof. Arel's comments I should like to express my agreement with his call for open debate. I would also want to add a note about Jewish liberals from an article by Peter Beinert that appeared in the NYR after I had sent my original comments

<<http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2010/jun/10/failure-american-jewish-establishment/>>

I would like to draw attention to this article to all those concerned about dispassionate honest debate, because it draws attention to with whom such a debate can be conducted and with whom it cannot. I would hope that those more knowledgeable than I might also examine the relationship between Russian-speaking Ukrainian Jews, the Kremlin's anti-Ukrainian strategy, and anti-Arab pro Likud Orthodox and Zionist Jews.

"Among American Jews today, there are a great many Zionists, especially in the Orthodox world, people deeply devoted to the State of Israel. And there are a great many liberals, especially in the secular Jewish world, people deeply devoted to human rights for all people, Palestinians included. But the two groups are increasingly distinct. Particularly in the younger generations, fewer and fewer American Jewish liberals are Zionists; fewer and fewer American Jewish Zionists are liberal. One reason is that the leading institutions of American Jewry have refused to foster—indeed, have actively opposed—a Zionism that challenges Israel's behavior in the West Bank and Gaza

Strip and toward its own Arab citizens. For several decades, the Jewish establishment has asked American Jews to check their liberalism at Zionism's door, and now, to their horror, they are finding that many young Jews have checked their Zionism instead."

"Morally, American Zionism is in a downward spiral. If the leaders of groups like AIPAC and the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations do not change course, they will wake up one day to find a younger, Orthodox-dominated, Zionist leadership whose naked hostility to Arabs and Palestinians scares even them, and a mass of secular American Jews who range from apathetic to appalled. Saving liberal Zionism in the United States—so that American Jews can help save liberal Zionism in Israel—is the great American Jewish challenge of our age." He then adds "But in Israel today, this humane, universalistic Zionism does not wield power"

and "Not only does the organized American Jewish community mostly avoid public criticism of the Israeli government, it tries to prevent others from leveling such criticism as well. In recent years, American Jewish organizations have waged a campaign to discredit the world's most respected international human rights groups."

The "campaigns" of course are based on accusations of "anti-semitism." The new allies of the old US Zionists are, ironically, Orthodox Jews who, historically, were anti-Zionist. "The 2006 AJC poll found that while 60 percent of non-Orthodox American Jews under the age of forty support a Palestinian state, that figure drops to 25 percent among the Orthodox."

In Israel meanwhile: "Israeli governments come and go, but the Netanyahu coalition is the product of frightening, long-term trends in Israeli society: an ultra-Orthodox population that is increasing dramatically, a settler movement that is growing more radical and more entrenched in the Israeli bureaucracy and army, and a Russian immigrant community that is particularly prone to anti-Arab racism. In 2009, a poll by the Israel Democracy Institute found that 53 percent of Jewish Israelis (and 77 percent of recent immigrants from the former USSR) support encouraging Arabs to leave the country. Attitudes are worst among Israel's young. When Israeli high schools held mock elections last year, Lieberman won. This March, a poll found that 56 percent of Jewish Israeli high school students—and more than 80 percent of religious Jewish high school students—would deny Israeli Arabs the right to be elected to the Knesset. An education ministry official called the survey "a huge warning signal in light of the strengthening trends of extremist views among the youth."

#12

From: Oleh Kotsyuba <kotsyuba@fas.harvard.edu>

Date: Monday, June 14, 2010 10:01 AM

Subject: Journal KRYTYKA: New issue (no. 3-4, 2010) now available

The new issue of the journal (no. 3-4, 2010) has recently appeared and is now available for purchase and online on www.krytyka.com!

Article from the new issue currently featured on the web-site:

"Discussion: Bandera as a Problem"

by Timothy Snyder, Zenon Kohut, John-Paul Himka, Volodymyr Kulyk, and Andriy Portnov

http://krytyka.com/cms/front_content.php?idart=208

[From UKL: the Kohut and Himka items are translated from the debate that appeared in UKL441 (16 February 2010) and the Snyder item is a translation of his NYRB February blog. The Kulyk and Portnov contributions are exclusive to Krytyka]

For discussion and comments, please visit our page on Facebook:

<http://www.facebook.com/pages/Casopis-KRITIKA-Journal-KRYTYKA/119305154758591>

#13

Deadline Reminder: 15 June 2010

**Sixth Annual Danyliw Research Seminar on Contemporary Ukraine
Chair of Ukrainian Studies, University of Ottawa, 28-30 October 2010**

CALL FOR PAPER PROPOSALS

The Chair of Ukrainian Studies, with the support of the Wolodymyr George Danyliw Foundation, will be holding its Sixth Annual Danyliw Research Seminar on Contemporary Ukraine at the University of Ottawa on 28-30 October 2009. The Seminar will feature research papers, touching on Ukraine, from the disciplines of political science, history, anthropology (ethnology), sociology, economics, religious studies, demography, geography, literature, cinema, folklore and other fields of social science and humanities. Papers with a theoretical and comparative focus are particularly solicited.

The Seminar is open to *all social science and humanities research topics, including topics in history and literature*, on topics that include Ukraine-Russia relations, Ukraine and the European Union, electoral politics, political regime and practices, constitutional politics, national identity, religion and society, gender, language, and more.

In addition, two of its sections will feature special themes:

The first will pursue the Seminar's ongoing exploration of the *politics of memory*, with papers touching on the Famine (Holodomor), the Holocaust (Shoah), the purges, deportations, forced labor and other cases of mass violence, committed on the territory of what is today Ukraine, in the 1930s, during World War II and the immediate post-War period, involving, among others, the NKVD, German military and paramilitary forces, the Soviet Army, Soviet partisans, the OUN, the UPA, and the Polish Home Army, police, and military forces. We are inviting paper proposals based on current research on social and political history for this period and/or on an analysis of contemporary political issues raised by the memorialization of these events, and are expanding the scope of social science and historical research to the representation of memory in literature, cinema, and the arts more generally.

The second theme will continue our presentation of new research on the *political economy* of Ukraine, particularly as it relates to the informal economy and informal politics, trans-border exchange and other practices, internal and international migration, economic "clans", corruption, oil and gas politics, the impact of global economic factors, the rule of law, rural political economy and related topics.

Scholars and doctoral students are invited to submit a 1000 word paper proposal and a 250 word biographical statement, by email attachment, to Dominique Arel, Chair of Ukrainian Studies, at darel@uottawa.ca AND chairukr@gmail.com. Please also include your full coordinates (institutional affiliation, preferred postal address, email, phone) and indicate your latest publication (or, in the case of doctoral applicants, the year when you entered a doctoral program, the [provisional] title of your dissertation and year of expected completion).

The proposal deadline is 15 June 2010. To be eligible, papers must not have been accepted for publication by the time of the Seminar. The Chair will cover the expenses of participants, including discussants, to the Seminar. An international selection committee will review the proposals and notify applicants shortly after the deadline.

The aim of the Seminar is to provide a unique forum for researchers from Canada, Ukraine, the United States, Europe and elsewhere to engage in fruitful inter-disciplinary dialogue, disseminate cutting-edge research papers on the Chair web site, encourage publications in various outlets, and stimulate collaborative research projects. Papers of the first four Annual Danyliw Research Seminars in Contemporary Ukrainian Studies can be downloaded at www.ukrainianstudies.uottawa.ca. The Seminar adopts the format of a Workshop, where each presentation is followed by group discussion, and is open to the public.

The Seminar is made possible by the commitment of the Wolodymyr George Danyliw Foundation to the pursuit of excellence in the study of contemporary Ukraine.

#14

From: Lubomyr Luciuk <luciuk-l@rmc.ca>

Date: Tue, Jun 8, 2010 at 1:38 PM

Subject: National Symposium on Internment

**National Symposium on Internment Operations Being Held at Queen's University
9 June 2010**

On 17-20 June 2010 the Canadian First World War Internment Recognition Fund's Endowment Council is sponsoring a weekend-long symposium in Kingston, Ontario at Queen's University (Donald Gordon Centre), bringing together some 50 community activists, scholars, archivists, museum curators, internee descendants and artists to develop initiatives that will commemorate and educate all Canadians about what happened during Canada's first national internment operations of 1914-1920. The event will conclude with a memorial service at Fort Henry, Canada's first permanent internment camp, on Sunday, 11h00, with wreaths being laid by conference participants and diplomats representing a number of the countries from where the internees came, including Austria, Ukraine, Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia and Hungary. The Speaker of the House of Commons, the Honourable Peter Milliken, MP (Kingston and the Islands), is also expected to present a memorial wreath hallowing the memory of the internees.

The symposium's local organizer, Professor Lubomyr Luciuk, said: " This meeting represents the culmination of many years of effort on the part of many of those attending. We hope the Kingston Symposium will lay the groundwork for helping the Endowment Council ensure that what happened to Ukrainians and other Europeans during this country's first national internment operations becomes part of the educational curricula of every province and is recalled through film, artwork and historical markers across Canada. Our fellow citizens need to become better aware of what the internees suffered - not because of anything they had done, but only because of who they were, where they came from. This violation of the civil liberties and human rights of thousands of innocents remains an historical episode in

Canadian history that is scarce known. We are beginning the process of recovering this historical memory to help ensure that, in future periods of domestic or international crisis, no other ethnic, religious or racial minorities in Canada suffer as needlessly as the "enemy aliens" of the First World War period did."

For more information on the CFWWIRF please go to www.internmentcanada.ca <<http://www.internmentcanada.ca>> (the Kingston Symposium schedule can be found under Media Releases) or phone 1-866-288-7931

To contact Professor Luciuk please email: luciuk@uccla.ca or phone (613) 546-8364

#15

Public Service Broadcasting: A German-Ukrainian Exchange of Opinions

June 22, 2010

DFJ Mediacenter, Kyiv-Mohyla School of Journalism
8/5 Voloska vul, Building 4, Kyiv, Ukraine

For registration and questions please contact Dariya Orlova at dasha.orlova@gmail.com

Kyiv-Mohyla School of Journalism at the National University "Kyiv-Mohyla Academy" (Kyiv, Ukraine) and the Institute for Broadcasting Economics at the University of Cologne (Cologne, Germany) are pleased to invite to the Conference Series "Public Service Broadcasting. A German-Ukrainian Exchange of Opinions". Conference series are supported financially by the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) (www.daad.de/hochschulen/w

[iederaufbau/demokratie/102](http://www.daad.de/iederaufbau/demokratie/102)

[44.de.html](http://www.daad.de/iederaufbau/demokratie/102)) within the project "Introduction of a Public Service Broadcasting as a Means of Supporting Democracy in Ukraine. A German-Ukrainian Exchange of Opinions".

Conference Languages: English, Ukrainian

Program:

9.00 Welcome Remarks

Part 1: The Situation of the Media in Ukraine. Public Service Broadcasting Wanted?

9.15 - 9.45 The Present Situation of the Media in Ukraine
Dr. Yevhen Fedchenko, Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, Ukraine

9.45 - 9.55 Discussion

9.55 - 10.25 The Ghost of Public Broadcasting Service in Ukraine
Prof. Dr. Sergiy Kvit, Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, Ukraine

10.25 - 10.35 Discussion

Part 2: Public Service Broadcasting in Germany – a Theoretical Approach

11.00 - 11.30 Public Service Broadcasting – an Economic Definition

Dr. Manfred Kops, Institute for Broadcasting Economics, Cologne, Germany

11.30 - 11.40 Discussion

11.40 - 12.10 Public Service Broadcasting – a Legal Definition

Prof. Dr. Peter Schiwy, German University of Administration Sciences Speyer (Germany)

12.10 - 12.20 Discussion

12.20 - 12.50 Public Service Broadcasting – a Political Definition

Prof. Dr. Hans Kleinsteuber, University of Hamburg, Germany

12.50 - 13.00 Discussion

Part 3: Challenges for Public Service Broadcasting - in Germany and worldwide

14.00 - 14.30 Protecting Public Service Broadcasting from State Intervention, Dr. Olexiy Khabyuk, Institute for Broadcasting Economics, Cologne, Germany

14.30 - 14.40 Discussion

14.40 - 15.10 Non-governmental and Non-market Control of Public Service Broadcasting. Norm and Reality of the German Broadcasting Boards

("Rundfunkräte"), Prof. Dr. Hans Kleinsteuber, University of Hamburg, Germany

15.10 - 15.20 Discussion

15.45 - 16.15 Adjusting the Remits and Resources of Public Service Broadcasting within the German Dual Media Order

Dr. Manfred Kops, University of Cologne, Germany

16.15 - 16.45 Final Discussion and Prospects for the Follow-up Conference in Cologne on October 28, 2010

16.45 Final Remarks

#16

The conference "Religion, Nation und Säkularismus in der ruthenischen bzw. ukrainischen und weißrussischen Kultur der Neuzeit" will take place on June 25-26 in Munich at the Historisches Kolleg and the Ukrainian Free University of Munich.

The conference is organized by Martin Schulze Wessel, of the Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, and Frank Sysyn, of the Petro Jacyk Centre for Ukrainian Historical Research at the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies.

The presentations will be in German and in English.

For information, Manina Ott, 089-2180-5544, manina.ott@lrz.uni-muenchen.de

Programm (in German)

Freitag, 25. Juni 2010

Historisches Kolleg, Kaulbachstraße 15 (Lageplan)

09.00-09.15 Begrüßung

Martin Schulze Wessel (München), Frank Sysyn (Alberta)

09.15-10.45 Panel I — Klerus

Moderation: Yaroslav Hrytsak (L'viv)

Frank Sysyn (Alberta):

Religion within the Populist Credo: The Ideal Pastor, Mykhailo Zubryts'kyi

Alfons Brüning (Nijmegen):

„Eine Kirche für das Volk? –

Geistliche und Gemeinden in der ukrainischen nationalen Romantik“

10.45-11.30 Kaffeepause

11.30-13.30 Panel II —Klerus (Fortsetzung)

Moderation: Michael Brenner (München)

Tobias Grill (München):

Rabbis as Agents of Modernization in the Lands of the Ukraine

Martin Schulze Wessel (München):

Reformierte Geistlichkeit im östlichen Europa in den Revolutionsjahren 1917/18

Oleh Turij (L'viv):

Auf der Suche nach der Tradition: das Problem der Identität bei den „traditionellen“ Kirchen in der heutigen Ukraine

13.30-15.30 Mittagspause

15.30-17.30 Panel III —Säkularisierung und Säkularismus

Moderation: Martin Baumeister (München)

Martha Bohachevsky-Chomiak (Washington):

Shadow Boxing: the Ukrainian Catholic Church and the Ukrainian intelligentsia

Oleh Pavlyshyn (L'viv):

Religious Calendar in the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church in the 20th century

Yaroslav Hrytsak (L'viv):

Making Marriages, Breaking Marriages: the Ukrainian Left and secular matrimonial practices

19.30-21.00 Öffentlicher Abendvortrag

José Casanova (Georgetown):
Poland, Ukraine and Western Paradigms of Secularization

21.00-22.00 Empfang

Samstag, 26. Juni 2010

Ukrainische Freie Universität, Barellistraße 9a (Lageplan)

09.00-11.00 Panel IV - Sprache

Moderation: Oleh Turij (L'viv)

Michael Moser (Wien/München):
Clerics and Laymen in the History of the Modern Standard Ukrainian Language

Veronika Wendland (Marburg):
Sakrales und politisches Sprechen im Übergang von der ruthenischen zur ukrainischen Nation: Galizien 1800-1900

Liliya Berezhnaya (Münster):
Die Rolle der Sprache und Inszenierungen in den interkonfessionellen Konflikten in der Westukraine Anfang der 1990er Jahre

11.00-11.45 Kaffeepause

11.45-13.45 Panel V — Geschichts- und Identitätskonzepte

Moderation: Martin Schulze Wessel (München)

Martin Aust (Kiel):
Ogniem i mieczem vs. Taras Bul'ba:
The Polish-Russian Struggle for Ukraine at the Movies

Burkhard Wöller (Wien):
Die Union von Brest — (k)ein nationales Ereignis?
Ukrainische und polnische historiographische Bewertungen der Kirchenunion im Kontext der Nationsbildungsprozesse im österreichischen Galizien

Leonid Heretz (Bridgewater):
"Temnota" and "Svidomist"? Tradition and Modernity as Articulated by the Interwar Generation of Galician Ukrainians

13.45-15.00 Mittagsimbiss

15.00-16.30 Panel VI - Komparative und internationale Aspekte

Moderation: Franz Xaver Bischof (München)

Nicolas Szafowal (München):
Zwischen Himmel und Hölle ?

Denken und Wirken des Seligen Petro Werhun in Deutschland:1927-1945

Kerstin Jobst (Leipzig):

Transnational und transkonfessionell?

Überlegungen zum Jozafat-Kuncevy?-Kult (19./20. Jahrhundert)

16.30-17.00 Kaffeepause

17.00-19.00 Panel VII — Politik und Religion

Moderation: Klaus Buchenau (München)

Kathrin Boeckh (Regensburg/München):

Strategien der Religionsverfolgung unter Stalin: Fallstudie Westukraine

Liliana Hentosh (L'viv):

The Vatican's Approach to the Ukrainian-Polish War in Eastern Galicia (1918-1923)
as an Example of Modern Response of the Church to National Conflicts

Serhii Plokhi (Harvard):

The Echoes of Yalta: Roosevelt, Stalin and the Liquidation of the Greek Catholic Church

#17

Ukraine Between Russia and NATO: New Misunderstandings for Old

by Ira Straus

Ira Straus is U.S. coordinator of the Committee on Eastern Europe and Russia in NATO

Viktor Yanukovych, Ukraine's new president, has taken rapid steps to reverse his predecessor's Western orientation. This is unpleasant for us Westerners, but we should avoid exaggeration. His stated goal is to remove Ukraine as a bone of contention between Russia and the West and turn it instead into a bridge between them. We should do what we can to encourage this goal.

His one-way steps toward Russia make it harder to reach that goal -- that is, an East-West bridge solidly anchored on both sides. However, speculation is that he may soon be looking for ways to compensate for these steps. We should not leap to exclude our chances.

Two of Yanukovych's steps have already been exaggerated and misinterpreted in this way. It has been widely written in the West that they eliminate the possibility of Ukraine joining NATO. Actually they do something quite different.

The steps in question are:

1. Renewing Russia's naval base lease at Sevastopol for another 25 years, in return for gas price reductions.

2. Declaring NATO membership off the table in this period, on grounds that the Ukrainian population does not support it.

Contrary to popular interpretations, neither step makes a real difference, whether formally or practically, to the issue of NATO membership.

Step 2 simply states a reality that has been present for years: that the Ukrainian public is against joining NATO. It is like declaring a pre-existing medical condition.

Ukraine's parliament followed up Yanykovich's declaration on this with a resolution to remain a neutral bridge between Russia and Europe and reject joining either of the opposing blocs -- the NATO one or the Russian (CSTO) one -- in its region. This has been misreported in the West as simply a vote against NATO. Actually it underlines the fact that Ukraine, with its internal division between its east and its west, could get its people to accept joining either bloc only if it joined both at the same time. Which in turn would be possible only if the two blocs were to merge into a Greater NATO. Which in turn comes down to Russia joining NATO. Which NATO is not prepared to accept, at least not in this period.

All this is, in turn, the underlying reason why Merkel and Sarkozy got NATO to take Ukrainian membership de facto off the table. Yanukovich's formalization of the matter changes nothing except the atmospherics.

In the atmospherics, paradoxically, it might actually help the West: It creates space for cumulatively improving Russia-NATO relations, by removing the Ukrainian question that for years has disrupted the relation and stymied its progress. Such a cumulative improvement between Russia and NATO is the only thing that could make Ukrainian membership in NATO a possibility. In such a roundabout way, it really could affect the question of NATO membership -- positively.

Step 1 -- the naval base agreement -- is more serious than Step 2. It is indeed a blow to the West, as it deprives the West of a bargaining chip in the Russia-Ukraine-West triangle. But it does not in itself affect NATO membership, either.

The Western media and analytical community have said, or assumed, that it precludes NATO membership, on the ground that a NATO member cannot have a "foreign base" on its soil. This has been described as if it were a legal fact; but there is nothing in the North Atlantic Treaty that precludes foreign bases on NATO soil. It is just a political assertion. Plenty of NATO members have "foreign" American bases on their soil.

Nor would it be accurate to say that a NATO member cannot have on its soil a base from a non-NATO country. NATO would welcome bases on its soil from, say, Japan or Australia. It is entirely at the discretion of the NATO Council to decide whether to welcome or exclude Ukraine because of its Russian base.

There were plenty of people in NATO who had advocated quick Ukrainian membership in NATO in the Yushchenko years, despite the fact that Russia had its base at Sevastopol and had legal rights to stay there until 2017. Curiously, some of those same people now write that the Russian base deal precludes Ukrainian membership in NATO.

One wonders how Western commentators can get this so wrong. Is it that they do not know enough about NATO to comment accurately on it? Or is it that their comments are shaped by anti-Russian sentiment? Logically, it would seem that they would like only an anti-Russian Ukraine to join NATO, not a Ukraine that has good relations with Russia; and from many of them, one gets a strong impression that this is indeed the case. It puts them, it should be noted, in diametrical opposition to one of NATO's most important informal membership criteria, which is, to establish good relations with neighboring countries.

For NATO, it is a practical question to decide whether to admit a country hosting a "foreign to NATO base" -- and to determine what it will consider "foreign to NATO". A Japanese base on NATO soil would not be viewed as deeply foreign to NATO; if anything, it would be seen as useful, helping to bring this informal Pacific ally into a more closely integrated relation with NATO. Could a Russian base on NATO soil be viewed the same way? No; not until the NATO-Russia relation becomes much better. For now, the base would be viewed as mostly foreign, partly useful.

Does such a "mostly foreign" base preclude NATO membership for Ukraine? Only if NATO wants it to preclude it. The U.S. base in Guantanamo did not preclude the intimate integration of Cuba with the Soviet bloc. Cuba could have even been brought into the Warsaw Pact, if the Soviets had wanted this.

The truth is, it is not the Russian base in Ukraine that is seen as contradictory to Ukraine joining NATO, but the close Ukraine-Russia relation. And this will remain the case as long as Russia itself is perceived as contradictory to NATO. For a close Ukraine-Russia relation is inevitable, given the facts of language, religion, ethnicity, geography, and economy. It is the very nature of Ukrainian society that contradicts joining NATO against Russia.

In other words: As long as Russia "contradicts" NATO, so will political reality inside Ukraine. Ukraine could get a majority of its population to support joining NATO -- one of NATO's informal criteria for membership, and an essential one for getting a member that is more good than harm to the Alliance -- only if Russia supported the move. For practical purposes this will happen only if Russia is also on the way into NATO.

This has always been the reality. It was evident from the start in 1991. Ukraine's first Ambassador to Washington, Oleh Bilorus, told me that "Ukraine should join NATO alongside Russia". The same point was made just after the Orange Revolution by Yulia Tymoshenko: that Ukraine cannot be a member of a different alliance than Russia, much less an opposite one; that it would tear apart the country to join NATO as long as half the country regards it as salvation, half as ruin. This has always been the line of skillful Ukrainian politicians. They have understood their country must of necessity have close relations in both directions, and must build those relations in mutually compatible form.

This was confirmed, decisively one would think, by the failure of Yushchenko's opposite approach -- pushing hard for joining NATO against Russia; with the result of turning Ukrainians further against NATO, and the present bitter swing of the pendulum against NATO.

"If people have not learned this much, then they have not learned anything at all." So Trotsky was wont to say in such situations. His language is harsh, but one can

understand the frustration when otherwise intelligent people are refusing to see the obvious.

It is, to say the least, disappointing when people fail to learn from such a searing experience as the last five years. There are more than a few people in whom to be disappointed in this regard. To begin with, there the numerous adherents, in the West as well as Ukraine, of the Western Ukrainian brand of nationalism. They invariably refuse to learn anything when their policies backfire, and blame it all instead on Russia, and on Westerners who are insufficiently anti-Russian.

What is more disappointing, even stunning, is to look at the recent comments of such a thoughtful writer as James Sherr, usually one of the best NATO-linked analysts of Ukraine. He argues that Ukraine simply needs to choose the West not Russia, and the West should simply get itself ready to integrate Ukraine when Ukraine swings back its way. This is the very line that wrecked the Yushchenko presidency: the Tarasyuk line of making a "consistent", "decisive" choice for the West, scuttling the bi-directional or "multivector" policy that Ukraine had followed ever since independence, believing in a right to join the EU and NATO based on formal criteria that ignore Russia. In Sherr's words: "The issue is Ukraine's orientation... Ukraine's orientation is profoundly unclear. Ukraine has to choose. It cannot be part of two contradictory schemes of integration at the same time... It can orientate itself to the West... I also hope, by then, we will finally be in a position to present Ukraine with a real perspective of integration and with our conditions for realizing it... But it cannot orientate itself to Russia and remain independent." (Interviews with James Sherr, *Den'*, 26 May 2010, and *Kyiv Post*, 30 May 2010, circulated in the West in *The Ukraine List* 444, 1 June 2010.)

To his credit, Sherr added a few other words that could have led him to a more reasonable conclusion: "These (hard choices) are historical realities, and they will remain political realities as long as Russia continues to define its interests and identity in the way that it does." In other words, it depends, not on eternal ontological realities, but on whether Russia continues to define itself in substantial part against the NATO-West (and, he should have added, on whether the NATO-West continues to define itself partly against Russia). In still other words, what he notes, *en passant*, is the conditionality of the premise. Unfortunately forgets this conditionality in his conclusion. But this very same conditionality should lead one to recognize that the realities not only do not require a "decisive choice of orientation", they positively preclude it.

The real realities are that Ukraine cannot stabilize democratically in a single-directional choice at the expense of the other direction. That the bi-directional orientation, shaky though it is, provides the only foundation for stability in Ukraine. That Ukraine is doomed to continue, in its sober moments, to seek integration in both directions, i.e. try to be a part of what Sherr, in an unconscious echo of Dugin, calls the "two contradictory schemes of integration". And this unavoidable choice will indeed remain self-contradictory, that is, incapable of consistent consolidation, as long as Russia and NATO continue to define themselves in substantial part against each other.

The practical conclusion seems obvious: the only possible solution to the Ukrainian problem is for Russia and the West to develop a joint orientation in the world, secured by a substantial measure of mutual integration. Otherwise the Ukrainian problem will continue to fester.

I speak here of "the Ukrainian problem" deliberately. It is time for us to learn to think of this simultaneous series of problems -- Ukraine's domestic divide between East and West, its wedged international location, links, and identities, its chronic instability -- as "the Ukrainian problem". It is a problem that is not solely Ukrainian but has an international dimension and international consequences: it is a problem that does damage to the global relations between Russia and the West. As such it requires a measure of international status. And international status implies international responsibilities. Indeed, the problem can be "solved", that is, resolved in an enduring fashion, only if Russia and the West take up the responsibility, alongside Ukrainians, to work out a joint solution to it.

Many Ukrainians, fortunately, have learned the lesson of the Yushchenko experience. That is why polls showed more and more West-Central Ukrainians joining, reluctantly but as good citizens, with Eastern Ukrainians to oppose NATO membership as the Yushchenko years wore on: they saw it would divide their country.

The underlying fear among civic Ukrainians was articulated by Vasyl' Samokhavlov and Yaroslav Vedmyd' in *Korrespondent*, 21 May 2010. They write that the pendulum has been swinging between West and East since 1991 with ever greater amplitude, from election to election, and will keep swinging back and forth, until Ukraine divides or falls into civil war. "The pendulum does not care: the harder it gets hit, the more power it comes back with. And when it comes back, it is not merciful... The victory of the West or the East inevitably leads to the euphoria of one principle and the neglect of the other. This is a strategy of mutual destruction... [How] to get out of the vicious circle, when one part of population celebrates a victory at the expense of the other. In the United States, similar differences were solved by the Civil War."

This is a logical conclusion, but only given a hidden assumption: that Russia and the West will keep tugging on Ukraine from opposite sides. This assumption is an unexamined premise. It is a realistic probability, to be sure, but it is not necessary or inevitable. It is contingent on what is done by Russians and Westerners. Its conditional nature is perhaps the one thing the authors have not yet learned.

It is an empirical probability, because there is a lot of inertia -- a lot of people who have not learned, who do not try to find a way out of the vicious circle of East-West opposition, but just keep running around it, racking up scores of "victories" of East versus West. It can be turned into an unalterable certainty, however, only if one fails to examine it empirically; or if one believes in a supra-empirical metaphysics of an eternal Eurasia locked in an eternal conflict with an eternal Atlantic. Such is indeed the faith of Russia's main anti-Western ideologue, Alexander Dugin, the theorists of a metaphysical Eurasianist geopolitics; he deduces from it that Ukraine is an amalgam of two incompatible geopolitical projects, and must be divided between the Easterners who adhere to the Eurasian project and the Westerners who adhere to the Atlantic one. It amounts to sacrificing Ukraine for the sake of a vendetta -- an overtime continuation of the Cold War. Presumably Westerners would not deliberately wish to join in such a process.

We can now come back to the Sevastopol base agreement. Why do we say that this agreement, despite not really affecting NATO membership, is a blow to the West? Because it means the West has lost its chance to get a joint Russia-West base in

Sevastopol. It gives Russia a stronger position in Ukraine than was natural or necessary.

A joint NATO-Russia base in Sevastopol would have almost certainly been welcomed by Russians in the Yushchenko years. It would have been only way of ensuring the perpetuation of their own base, then due to be kicked out by 2017. But now Russia has gained what feels like permanence for its base in Sevastopol anyway, until 2042; the West no longer has a bargaining chip.

The chance for a joint base bargain under Yushchenko was a golden opportunity for the West. It would have brought the West huge benefits -- a major naval base in the region, a dynamic of cooperation from Russia, economic satisfaction for Crimea and for Ukraine's military-related industries, and political salvation for Yushchenko (who instead drove himself into a small western corner of the country politically, and had to keep giving unconvincing reassurances that he didn't intend to violate the Constitution and allow a NATO base in Sevastopol after throwing out Russia). But the West stood pat, not bothering to think up a way to make use of the opportunity. It was an unrealistic lack of creativity: failure to use the opportunity meant losing it. For most Westerners this was a matter of passive unawareness; for an active anti-Russian minority, it was a matter of hoping to win Ukraine 100% against Russia -- Ukraine in NATO, Russia out of Sevastopol. The anti-Russian minority got its way in Western policy, thanks to the passivity of the majority. If anyone "lost Ukraine" for the West, it was they.

Under present conditions, the maximum that the West could conceivably hope to bargain for is to get a cooperative use of Russia's and NATO's naval assets in the Black Sea region. This could be presented as expanding on NATO's recent formulations about the NATO-Russia and NATO-Ukraine Councils as meant among other things for regional cooperation. It has been advocated by the East-West Institute, and inserted into the discussions on engaging with Russia on its proposals for a new Euro-Atlantic security agreement; it was pioneered by Prof. Hall Gardner of the American University of Paris, who proposes overlapping military command arrangements on a regional level. Even to get this much, the West would have to accept a hard realistic bargain under present conditions; with our reduced leverage, we would have to be willing to accept less favorable terms than just a few months ago, and offer new incentives for Russia. The Western interest still mandates it, if only in a negative sense: the alternatives are worse. One wonders whether they have matured to the point of realizing this; attitudes have, to be sure, grown more realistic under NATO's new Secretary General, and under the current U.S. President.

The West could of course continue following the line of the Western Ukrainian nationalists -- those who supported Yushchenko's worst mistakes and learned nothing -- and wait for Yanukovich to be gone, hoping for a different deal under his successor. It would be a disastrous approach. No one knows if it would be a short wait or a long one; it could be very long, since Yanukovich, unlike Yushchenko, has shown an instinct for consolidating power. And if Ukraine did eventually elect another western-enthusiast as president, would the West finally be ready to think up, propose, and accept a realistic, innovative compromise deal on such matters as basing? Or to work out a viable process for bringing Russia and Ukraine together into NATO? A West that simply waited for "its turn" in the pendulum swing, never figuring out what it did wrong, would not be prepared to do any better the next time around. We would be back to our unrealistically uncreative approach of waiting for Ukraine to just drop into our lap. Nor would the Ukrainian population be any readier to throw

itself into our lap and approve NATO membership; rather, it would punish any new Ukrainian leader who pushed for this, as it punished Yushchenko. Eastern Ukraine is not going to go away. Until there is new thinking, new opportunities will be blown like the last one.

The old misunderstanding was that a Yushchenko could simply drop Ukraine into the lap of the West on one-way anti-Russian terms.

The new misunderstanding is that any drawing back from this one-way posture means abandonment of the West and subservience to Russia.

The West could, to be sure, turn this new misunderstanding into a self-fulfilling prophecy. To avoid such a catastrophe, it needs to start looking out for its own interest in relations with Ukraine, which is very different from the partisan domestic interest of Western Ukrainian nationalists.

What is to be done

Is there a way to end this compendium of errors on a constructive note? Is there anything useful that can be done?

Yes, NATO and the U.S. could pursue a cumulative rapprochement with Russia. This is in fact happening. It could yet become a realistic idea to continue with the rapprochement to the full logical conclusion some years down the road. In that case, Ukraine really will be able and willing to join NATO, when Russia is. And yes, meanwhile the West could also pursue the Gardner plan and try to engage the Sevastopol base in regional cooperation.

But perhaps people need a more immediate, dramatic hope? In that case they will have to look a few thousand kilometers farther east, over in Kyrgyzstan. There an American base still exists. Alongside a Russian one. And a chance for a joint Russia-West base, the same kind of chance we have lost in Ukraine.

The joint base solution had been proposed by Kyrgyzstan's former President, Akayev. It was another of those golden opportunities we have had, one that was offered explicitly to the West. It could still bring great benefits -- practical benefits, efficiencies, stronger logistics, a better dynamic with Russia. It would set a good precedent for positive-sum relations elsewhere in the CIS. And, if we think just a moment about our own interest, we will realize it is the only thing that could give our base in Kyrgyzstan a permanent, non-controversial status.

The West still has a decent bargaining position for a joint Kyrgyz base. The U.S. base has not yet been thrown out, despite some close calls. Kyrgyzstan has not yet been "lost", so to speak.

The U.S. has been sitting out its Kyrgyz chance, too. It too will not last forever.

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