

#Ukraine

An Essential Source of Information and Analysis



No. 431
28 October 2008

List



Compiled by Dominique Arel
Chair of Ukrainian Studies, University of Ottawa
www.ukrainianstudies.uottawa.ca





Dominique Arel

The Ukraine List (UKL) was created in October 1998 by Dominique Arel, then an Assistant Professor (Research) at the Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown University (Providence, Rhode Island, US). UKL was initially modeled on Johnson's Russia List (JRL), in presenting a periodic compilation of news items, culled from the internet, and postings, submitted by list subscribers, in this case pertaining to Ukraine. The list's initial aim was to create a virtual sense of community among the growing number of scholars, worldwide, interested in contemporary Ukraine. It also made some inroads among Ukrainian diaspora communities and government/NGO circles. Working on a volunteer basis, Dominique Arel managed to send a weekly issue, on average, with some hiatuses related to his other commitments.

The Gongadze and Kuchmagate crises, in Fall 2000/Spring 2001, created a surge of interest in Ukrainian matters and the number of subscribers grew to achieve a plateau that remained relatively stable in the next three years.

The Orange Revolution changed everything. The mass mobilization on the Maidan generated intense interest from circles far beyond the Ukrainian studies and diaspora communities. Responding instantly to this extraordinary situation, UKL began coming out up to three to four times a day for forty consecutive days. In addition to providing a selection of the best news items, UKL transformed itself into a daily forum for exclusive contributions, and began offering translations from printed or web-only newspapers available in languages other than English (Ukrainian, Russian, French, German and Polish). Partner institutions in Ukrainian studies (the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute and the Kennan Institute, which has a Kyiv office) graciously made a financial contribution to help UKL develop the translation project. A selection of the best items from UKL will soon be made available on the Chair web site.

The Chair developed a network of a dozen students, on nine different campuses and cities of North America and Europe, to make UKL answer the "revolutionary" needs of the moment. Four students have stayed on as ongoing UKL assistants: Yulia Yarotska, a Law School Student at University of Ottawa, who has been with the Chair for more than one year as a student assistant; Natalia Patsiurko, a Graduate Student in Sociology at McGill University, who is assisting the Chair with statistical analysis of the electoral results; Olga Bogatyrenko, a Graduate Student in Political Science at the University of California, Davis, currently in Washington, DC, and the primary translator of Ukrainian-language and Russian-language items for UKL; and Lisa Koriouchkina, a Graduate Student in Anthropology at Brown University, a longtime research assistant for the Chair on the Census and Identity Project, who prepared annotated summaries of the Russian press on Ukraine for UKL. The dedication of these students at the height of Orange was outstanding.

With the Orange Revolution, the UKL subscription base has skyrocketed, not just in absolute figures, but also in the number of critical circles that it now reaches. Government/NGO officials around the world, international correspondents and scholars from Russian and post-Soviet studies, in addition to a constantly increasing list of new subscribers in Ukraine and the diaspora, are among the communities that have developed an abiding interest in Ukraine. By offering, on a regular basis, information that is either not readily available, or exclusive to the list, UKL acts as the forum where people can turn to in order to help them understand the complex political, economic, social, and identity issues that Ukraine is facing. UKL has become the calling card of the Chair of Ukrainian Studies.

For a free subscription, please email Dominique Arel at darel@uottawa.ca.

THE UKRAINE LIST

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


Photo: Aleksandr Zaitsev

Thanks to Marie-Eve Bélanger, Nykolai Bilaniuk, Serge Denis, Orest Deychakiwsky, Orest Dorosh, David Johnson, Andrej N. Lushnycky, Andriy Makuch, Tamara Nary, Andriy Portnov, Marie-Eve Reny, Blair Ruble (Kennan Institute), Manfred Sapper, Roman Senkus, Rachel Surkin, Joshua Tucker, Andreas Umland, and Roman Zurba

UKL Now Available in Interactive PDF

At the initiative of Orest Dorosh, a UKL subscriber from Toronto, UKL is now available in an interactive PDF format, with graphic design, a navigation bar, a full screen option, pictures and even video clips. UKL will continue to be sent in simple text over the e-mail, with the PDF of any given issue posted on the Chair of Ukrainian Studies' website (www.ukrainianstudies.uottawa.ca) within 24-48 hours. The interactive UKL, in any case, is much too large to be sent over the internet. Your comments and suggestions on this new format will be most welcome. The first issue of Interactive UKL (UKL430, 9 October 2008), is available at <http://www.ukrainianstudies.uottawa.ca/pdf/UKL431.pdf>

[The link is mistakenly numbered "431" but contains "430". This will be rectified shortly]

Please note that to be fully functional, the new UKL requires the version 9 of Adobe, freely downloadable from the web – *Dominique Arel* 

ASN 2009 Convention Call for Papers Deadline Reminder (5 November 2008)



The ASN Annual Convention, which gathers more than 500 scholars from 40 countries, and features by far the largest section on contemporary Ukrainian studies at any academic conference, will take place at Columbia University, New York, on 23-25 April 2009. The deadline for the Call for Papers – individual paper proposals, panel proposals, and film proposals – is Wednesday, November 5, 2008. Proposals must be sent to darel@uottawa.ca and darelasn2009@gmail.com.

Panels on Ukraine at the ASN 2008 Convention included:

Regionalism in Ukraine

Identity Formation among Ukrainians: Past and Present

Elections and Their Outcomes

Has the Orange Revolution Failed?

Ukrainian and Russian Jews

Ukraine and Belarus' Foreign Relations

Democratization and their Outcomes

Famine and Deportation

The Ukrainian Famine, 1932-1933: Was It a Genocide?

From Imperial to Soviet to Current Language Policies in Ukraine

Book Panel on Jessica Allina-Pisano's *The Post-Soviet Potemkin Village*

Book Panel on Gwendolyn Sasse's *The Crimea Question*

Book Panel on Omer Bartov's *Erased*

Film Screening of Paul Mazursky's *Yippee*

Film Screening of Areta Lloud's *Colour Me Free*

The Call for Papers can be downloaded at http://www.nationalities.org/convention/pdfs/ASN_2009_callforpapers.pdf 

Recent Sources on Ukraine:

Clem, Ralph S. and Peter R. Craumer. 2008 “Orange, Blue and White, and Blonde: The Electoral Geography of Ukraine’s 2006 and 2007 Rada Elections,” *Eurasian Geography and Economics*, Vol. 49, No. 2 (March–April), pp. 127–51.

Gould, John A. and Yaroslav Hetman. 2008. “Market Democracy Unleashed? Business Elites and the Crisis of Competitive Authoritarianism in Ukraine,” *Business and Politics*, Vol. 10, No. 2, pp. 1-33.

Lane, David. 2008. “The Orange Revolution: ‘People’s Revolution’ or Revolutionary Coup,” *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, Vol. 10, No. 4 (November), pp. 525-49. [URL](#)

Parliament Recognises Ukrainian Famine of 1930s as Crime against Humanity

European Parliament External Relations, 23 October 2008

In a resolution on the commemoration of the Holodomor, the artificial famine in Ukraine in 1932-1933, MEPs [Members of the European Parliament] describe it as “an appalling crime against the Ukrainian people, and against humanity”.

According to the resolution, the Holodomor famine of 1932-1933, which caused the deaths of millions of Ukrainians, “was cynically and cruelly planned by Stalin’s regime in order to force through the Soviet Union’s policy of collectivisation of agriculture against the will of the rural population in Ukraine”.

MEPs believe that “recalling crimes against humanity in European history should help to prevent similar crimes in the future” and they stress that “European integration has been based on a readiness to come to terms with the 20th century’s tragic history and that this reconciliation with a difficult history does not denote any sense of collective guilt, but forms a stable basis for the construction of a common European future founded on common values”.

The resolution therefore makes a “declaration to the people of Ukraine and in particular to the remaining survivors of the Holodomor and the families and relatives of the victims”.

It “recognises the Holodomor (the artificial famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine) as an appalling crime against the Ukrainian people, and against humanity”.

The text then “strongly condemns these acts, directed against the Ukrainian peasantry, and marked by mass annihilation and violations of human rights and freedoms”. It also “expresses its sympathy with the Ukrainian people, which suffered this tragedy, and pays its respects to those who died as a consequence of the artificial famine of 1932-1933”.

Lastly, the resolution “calls on the countries which emerged following the break-up of the Soviet Union to open up their archives on the Holodomor in Ukraine of 1932-1933 to comprehensive scrutiny so that all the causes and consequences can be revealed and fully investigated”. [URL](#)

International Conference on The Great Famine in Ukraine

From: Tamara Nary nary@fas.harvard.edu

ON-LINE REGISTRATION IS NOW AVAILABLE

www.huri.harvard.edu

International Conference
The Great Famine in Ukraine:
The Holodomor and Its Consequences, 1933 to the Present
Ukrainian Research Institute
Harvard University
17-18 November 2008

The year 2008 marks the 75th anniversary of the Great Famine of 1932-1933, now often referred to by its Ukrainian name Holodomor (extermination by hunger). This man-made affliction ravaged, most devastatingly, Soviet Ukraine and the areas primarily settled by Ukrainians in the North Caucasus (the Kuban region) at the height of forced collectivization in the USSR.

Earlier projects at the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute pioneered studies in the history of the Great Famine. It is the aim of this conference, however, to move beyond revisiting the background, course and analysis of the events of 1932-33. Instead, it aims to forge forward to investigate the momentous subsequent impact of the Holodomor in Ukraine, in a framework which will examine its short, mid and long-term consequences that reach, indeed, to our own day.


We are pleased to invite you to the conference which will be held at the Harvard Faculty Club, 20 Quincy St., Cambridge. For a full program with participants, on-line registration, travel information and information about related Famine events, please see HURI website: www.huri.harvard.edu <<http://www.huri.harvard.edu>> . The conference is open to the public and free of charge. However, seating is limited and pre-registration is strongly advised.

Related Events:

Concert: Monday, November 17 at 8:00 p.m. at Swedenborg Chapel, 50 Quincy Street, Cambridge
Premiere Performance of Selections from the Opera Red Earth (Hunger) by Virko Baley

Keynote Address: Tuesday, November 18 at 8:00 p.m. at the Harvard Faculty Club
Nicolas Werth, Research Director, National Center for Scientific Research, Paris.

Documentary Film: Wednesday, December 3 at 7:00 p.m. at the Tsai Auditorium of CGIS-South, Center for Government and International Studies, 1730 Cambridge St., Cambridge



The poster features a large, stylized circular graphic on the left with the word 'HOLODOMOR' written across it in a bold, black, sans-serif font. Below this, the text 'and its consequences, 1933 to the present' is written in a smaller, black, sans-serif font. The background of the poster is a solid red color. In the bottom right corner, there is a small, black silhouette of a wheat stalk. The entire poster is framed by a thick black border.


Harvard Faculty Club • 20 Quincy Street • Cambridge MA 02138

Participants

Alexander Babgongshv, Karel Berkhoff, Brian Boeck, Hennadii Boriak, Volodymyr Dibrova, Michael S. Flier, George G. Grabowicz, Andrea Graziosi, Liudmyla Hrynewych, Lubomyr Hajda, Heorhii Kasianov, Oleg Khlevniuk, Mark Kramer, Stanislav Kulchyt'skyi, Hiroaki Kuromiya, Terry Martin, France Meslé, Serhii Plokhii, Roman Serbyn, Yuri Shapoval, Timothy Snyder, Roman Szporluk, Jacques Vallin, Valerii Vasylyev, Oleksandra Veselova, Felix Wemheuer, Nicolas Werth, Oleh Wolowyna, Roman Wysocki, Hennadii Yefimenko

Design by Louise Baptiste

Symposium

The Great Famine “Holodomor” in Ukraine (1932-1933), 75 Years Later
University of Fribourg, Switzerland
31 October 2008
Contact: Andrej N. Lushnycky andrej.lushnycky@unifr.ch 

Programme

8:30 Registration

9:00 Opening Remarks:
Andrej N. Lushnycky – President of the Ukrainian Society of Switzerland
Nicolas Hayoz - Director of the Interfaculty Institute for Central and Eastern Europe

Welcoming Remarks:
His Excellency Ihor Dir – Ambassador of Ukraine in Switzerland

9:30 Morning Session
Chair: Andrej N. Lushnycky
Discussant: Ulrich Schmid, Professor, University of St. Gallen, Switzerland
Roman Serbyn, Professor of History, University of Quebec in Montreal, Canada
“The Ukrainian Genocide Seen by Raphael Lemkin and in the Light of the UN Convention of 1948”

10:15 Coffee Break

10:30 **Mykola Riabchuk**, Senior Research Fellow, Ukrainian Center for Cultural Studies, Kyiv, Ukraine
“Politics of Memory in a Divided Country: The 1933 Famine-Genocide and a War of Discourses in Contemporary Ukraine.”
Andrij Portnov, Editor of the scholarly journal *Ukraina Moderna*, Kyiv, Ukraine
“Holodomor 1932-33 in Ukraine: Western Historiographical Debates and Their Ukrainian Echoes.”
Open discussion

12:30 Lunch



13:30 Afternoon Session
Chair: Nicolas Hayoz

Georgiy Kasianov, Institute of Ukrainian History, National Academy of Sciences, Kyiv, Ukraine
“The Great Famine of 1932 - 1933 in Ukraine: Scholarly and Political Debates, 1980s - 2000s”

Open discussion

14:45 Book Presentation:
Ukraine: On the Meandering Path to Democracy:
eds. Andrej N. Lushnycky, Mykola Riabchuk

15:00 Official Presentation of the Holodomor Exhibit
Hall d’Honneur, Miséricorde, University of Fribourg
Opening remarks:
Andrej N. Lushnycky, President, Ukrainian Society of Switzerland
Welcoming remarks:
Guido Vergauwen, Rector, University of Fribourg
Ihor Dir, Ambassador of Ukraine

16:00 Apéritif and musical program

17:00 The End

Annual Ukrainian Famine Lecture

Thursday, November 6, 6-8 pm

Genocide by Famine? The Cambodian and Ukrainian Cases Compared


Alex Hinton (Director of the Center for the Study of Genocide and Human Rights;

Associate Professor of Anthropology and Global Affairs and at Rutgers University, Newark),

Registration: <http://www.utoronto.ca/ceres/>

Room 208, North Building, Munk Centre for International Studies (1 Devonshire Place)

Co-sponsored by the Ukrainian Canadian Congress, Toronto Branch, the

Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, the Petro Jacyk Program for the Study of Ukraine, and the South East Asia Seminar Series. 

Great Famine: Either in a .ru Way or in No Way

by Oleh Snihur

Ukraina moloda, 10 October 2008

[translation posted on Johnson's Russia List]

The Kremlin's official response to the commemoration by Ukrainians living in Russia of the victims of the 1930s famine, a series of memorial events called The Inextinguishable Candle, has resulted in another row in Ukrainian-Russian relations. The events held by Ukraine in association with the Ukrainian World Congress throughout the world and including memorial services, mournful processions and requiems for those innocently killed during the terribly tragic period in the history of the Ukrainian nation faced state censorship in Russia.

First, the Russian authorities agreed to hold the memorial events, scheduled for 6 October, but, before the commemoration, the Ukrainian embassy in Moscow received a note from the Russian Foreign Ministry in which Russians, citing Ukraine's position on the 1932-33 famine and information coming from the Russian regions where The Inextinguishable Candle was to be held demanded that the events either be held in line with Russia's position or cancelled. Official Russian historians insist that the famine occurred all across the Soviet Union and was caused by "erroneous policies" and "droughty years of poor harvest".

The Ukrainian Foreign Ministry condemned these actions in an official statement: "Thus there is a suggestion to Ukrainian NGOs in Russia that they should not even remember the biggest humanitarian catastrophe in the history of Ukraine killing millions of Ukrainians."

According to the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry, Russia's federal authorities in the regions where the events were to be held exerted pressure on Ukrainian activists and intimidated them.

Oleh Voloshchuk, the press secretary of the Ukrainian embassy in Russia, has told Ukrayina Moloda, that the local officials held 'explanatory sessions' with Ukrainian activists in Orenburg and Ufa.

"The Russian authorities simply made it clear that they would not give permission to hold such events because not only do they regard as unacceptable the term genocide but also cannot stand the frequent use of the word Holodomor [Ukrainian for the 1930s famine]," Voloshchuk said. "So we had to give up plans to hold the events, which should have involved the ambassador, in the regions in a public and centralized way."

Russia's Ukrainians will be able to honour the victims of the famine in a fully-fledged way only on the grounds of the Ukrainian embassy on 13 October. Ukrainian diplomats cannot do more, since they have no powers.

"We support in all possible ways activists in the regions but they are Russian citizens, although of Ukrainian descent, and so we cannot tell the Russian authorities how to treat them," Voloshchuk said.

The Foreign Ministry only said that it viewed Russia's actions as "another unfriendly and planned act against Ukraine and Ukrainians in Russia".

We can only think now: if only the Ukrainian authorities were as firm towards some activists of the so-called Russian-speaking population whose chauvinistic statements Moscow defends with all possible diplomatic and nondiplomatic means. ❏❏

Ukraine President Postpones Elections Due to Financial Crisis

Agence France Presse, 21 October 2008



KIEV (AFP) - Ukraine's President Viktor Yushchenko said Monday that he is to delay legislative elections by a week to December 14, recalling parliament to enact emergency measures to fight the financial crisis.

"I am today signing a decree calling back parliament for several days," he told Ukrainian television, so that lawmakers can vote on "amendments to the budget and several dozen measures to combat the crisis.

The president's decision follows a call by Ukraine's Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, in open conflict with Yushchenko, for a coalition to be set up to save the country from the ravages of the world financial crisis.

"I call on the Ukrainian president, on all the political forces and leaders of parliamentary factions with a simple and clear proposal," Tymoshenko said Sunday, urging "a strict moratorium on quarrels" between political leaders.

Ukraine held crunch talks Friday on an emergency 14-billion-dollar loan from the IMF to prop up its fragile banking system, but moves to address the economic crisis were overshadowed by deepening political strains.

As the talks continued with the International Monetary Fund, global ratings agency Fitch downgraded Ukraine's credit rating and issued a stark warning about the ex-Soviet republic's economic outlook.

Ukraine stopped early withdrawals from savings accounts this month in a bid to halt a run on banks. The central bank has bailed out several banks and the Ukrainian stock market has lost more than 70 percent of its value this year.

The situation is further aggravated by a deep political crisis. Yushchenko dissolved the parliament on October 8 and announced early elections set for December 7, a decision Tymoshenko did not accept, reiterating Sunday that elections "would not take place." ❏❏

Poll: Six Political Forces Could Form the New Parliament

Zerkalo tyzhnia, 25-31 October 2008
[translated by Dominique Arel for UKL]

According to a sociological survey conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology in mid-October, if parliamentary elections had taken place next week, three parties—the Party of Regions, the Tymoshenko Bloc and the Communist Party of Ukraine—would be certain to be represented in the new parliament. Three more—the Lytvyn Bloc, the Yatseniuk Bloc and “Our Ukraine”—would have difficulty crossing the 3 percent barrier.


At the time of the survey, 25.8% of electors indicated that they did not intend to take part in the elections, while 16.9% remained undecided in their electoral choice.

When taking into account only the votes of those intending to vote during the elections, the following political forces would enter parliament: Party of Regions (30.5%), Tymoshenko Bloc (25.7%), Communist Party of Ukraine (8.1%), Lytvyn Bloc (4.1%), Bloc Arseniy Yatseniuk (4%) and the Bloc “Our Ukraine” headed by Viacheslav Kyrilenko (3.2%).

The All-Ukrainian Union “Svoboda”, with 1.9% of the votes, was also within the statistical margin of crossing the 3 percent barrier.

Moreover, the Socialist Party of Ukraine received 1.4% of the votes, the Progressive Socialist Party Ukraine and the Bloc “People’s Self-Defense” of Yuriy Lutsenko—0.7% each, the Leonid Chernovets’kyi Boc—0.3%, the party “Single Center” headed by Ihor Kril—0.2%. Other political forces were supported by 1.6% of respondents. 17.7% would vote against all parties.

The survey was conducted between 11-20 October 2008 in all regions of Ukraine with a representative sample of 2034 respondents. The statistical margin of error does not exceed 2.9%.

[Note from UKL: Yatseniuk has since announced that he will compete in a common Bloc with Our Ukraine. The combined support for Our Ukraine-Yatseniuk Bloc would thus appear to be in the 7 percent range. Meanwhile, Yuri Lutsenko has no chance of getting reelected on his own (he will, most likely, wind up on the Tymoshenko List), Baloha’s party (Single Center) is close to zero, and the Moroz Socialist Party’s attempted comeback remains a long shot. The Communists, however, have doubled their score. Note that, in addition to the 25.7% who said they will stay home, 17.7% want to vote “against all” – a huge proportion that is most unlikely to be maintained on election day, as several of them, if they remain opposed altogether, will not bother to vote. Their abstention – whether at home or at the voting booth – will boost the parliamentary representation of all parties, following the rules of proportional representation. This could have the effect of increasing the weight of Our Ukraine-Yatseniuk Bloc to close to ten percent, but a hypothetical Tymoshenko-Our Ukraine coalition would fall short, this time, by five or six percentage points. Regions and the Communists would have a chance to form a majority, but just barely. The Lytvyn Bloc could very well play the kingmaker’s role this time around, i.e. become the party whose support become necessary for any coalition –Dominique Arel] 

Tymoshenko Opposes Early Election in Ukraine

by Pavel Korduban
Eurasia Daily Monitor, 22 October 2008

On October 9 Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko disbanded parliament and scheduled an early parliamentary election for December 7. This was the result of the breakup of the ruling coalition of Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine-People’s Self-Defense bloc (NUNS) and the bloc of Prime



Minister Yulia Tymoshenko (BYT) in September (see EDM, September 8). Efforts to restore the coalition fell through, and no new coalition emerged. This legally entitled Yushchenko to disband parliament.

BYT, the only big party opposing an early election, has vowed to use all means to prevent the vote. It tried to override Yushchenko's election decree with the help of the courts, and the BYT-dominated government blocked the allocation of funds to organize the election. As a result, Yushchenko rescheduled the election for December 14. Given the BYT's determination, he may have to reschedule it again.

The majority of NUNS and the PRU, as well as two smaller parties represented in parliament—the Lytvyn Bloc and the Communists—welcomed Yushchenko's decision to call an election (Ukrainska Pravda, October 8). Tymoshenko, however, rejected it. "I am sure that there will be no early election, because this country does not need it," she said. Tymoshenko argued that a snap election would

prevent parliament from quickly passing the state budget for 2009, which would not be good amid the financial crisis. Her opponents, however, claim that she fears she will lose the post of prime minister if an election is held (Ukraine TV, October 10).

Electoral sympathies have hardly changed since the September 2007 early election, as a result of which Tymoshenko became prime minister. Her coalition with Yushchenko, however, had only one seat more in parliament than needed for a simple majority, so even a small change in voter preferences may have serious consequences. "If the PRU receives 2 to 3 percent more than last year and the BYT receives 2 to 3 percent less, the PRU should be able to set up a coalition with Lytvyn's Bloc and the Communists," said Volodymyr Fesenko of the Kyiv-based Penta think tank (www.for-ua.com, October 9).

Tymoshenko should not score less than in 2007, as the popularity of her bloc has not diminished; what is more, she has acquired new allies who defected from Yushchenko's camp. Interior Minister Yury Lutsenko's People's Self-Defense (NS), which has been the junior partner of Yushchenko's Our Ukraine (NU) NUNS, will not join Yushchenko again. Lutsenko has urged "all democrats" to unite with the BYT (Interfax-Ukraine, October 10). What is more, the NU itself is falling apart. The leaders of several small parties comprising the NU, including the People's Movement (Rukh), the Christian-Democratic Union, and the European Party, backed Tymoshenko in her opposition to the early election (Ukrainska Pravda, October 9).

Yushchenko's team may have a hard time campaigning. There is no unity even among Yushchenko's faithful allies—Our Ukraine People's Union (NSNU), of which Yushchenko is honorary chairman, and United Center (ETs), which is close to the head of his office, Viktor Baloha. NSNU head Vyacheslav Kyrylenko ruled out a bloc with ETs, saying that ETs had no particular ideology (Ukrainska Pravda, October 12).

The PRU also has serious problems. It is torn by internal differences. A recent expulsion of National Security and Defense Council Secretary Raisa Bohatryyova from the PRU prompted rumors of an imminent split in the party. The PRU shows no unity even on the key issue of the language. Many people in eastern Ukraine vote for the PRU only because it promises to raise the status of their native Russian language. Borys Kolesnykov, one of the PRU leaders, recently suggested that the PRU should not insist on giving Russian the status of a second official language (Interfax-Ukraine, October 11). PRU head Viktor Yanukovych, however, pledged to do his utmost to upgrade the status of Russian (Ukrainska Pravda, October 13).

The BYT appealed against Yushchenko's election decree, and a regional court in Kyiv overrode the decree on October 10. Yushchenko fired the judge and disbanded the court, arguing that only the Constitutional Court could rule on national election matters. The BYT accused Yushchenko of exceeding his authority (UNIAN, October 11). Ukrainian Supreme Court Chairman Vasyl Onopenko, a long-time ally of Tymoshenko, expressed

his disagreement with Yushchenko's actions (Ukrainska Pravda, October 14). BYT members physically blockaded several courts in Kyiv in order to prevent them from passing a verdict on the election in favor of Yushchenko (Channel 5, October 13-14). Also, Tymoshenko's ministers refused to finance the election from the state budget (Channel 5, October 14).

In this situation, the Central Electoral Commission failed to start timely preparations for the vote. The BYT's actions forced Yushchenko to suspend his dissolution decree in order to allow parliament to amend the state budget to provide for funds for the election. At the same time, Yushchenko rescheduled the election for December 14. When parliament reconvened on October 21, BYT deputies physically blocked the rostrum, preventing a vote on election financing (Channel 5, October 21). Yushchenko may have to postpone the election again, so it may coincide with the Christmas holidays. If that happens, fewer than 50 percent of voters may turn up to cast their ballots, so the election might be invalidated, which may be exactly what Tymoshenko wants. [\[1\]](#)

Political Leaders Should Stop Using Court as Political Tool

Human Rights Watch, 21 October 2008

Moscow – Ukrainian leaders should respect the independence of the judiciary, Human Rights Watch said today. Human Rights Watch said that President Viktor Yushchenko has improperly interfered with the judiciary as his political rivalry with Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko has grown increasingly acute. Members of Tymoshenko's political party have also taken steps that seem designed to intimidate the judiciary.

“Both groups are using the judiciary in a tug-of-war, and an independent judiciary will be the biggest loser,” said Allison Gill, Moscow office director at Human Rights Watch. “Both sides should stop interfering immediately.”

On October 9, 2008, after his coalition with Tymoshenko's bloc collapsed, Yushchenko dissolved parliament and issued a decree calling for early elections, on December 7. Tymoshenko appealed to the District Administrative Court of Kyiv to block election preparations. On October 10, the court ruled in her favor, and issued an injunction the next day staying Yushchenko's decree, effectively crippling the government.

On October 14, Yushchenko annulled his appointment of the administrative court judge and abolished the court. He then reorganized the court into two new courts, requiring new judicial appointments.

But then, on the morning of October 17, Yushchenko reversed his October 14 decree abolishing the court. An hour later, he reversed that decree, thus creating the two new courts – Central Administrative Court of Kyiv and Left Shore Court (Livoberezhny Sud).

The newly created Central Administrative Court of Kyiv annulled the October 10 injunction by the District Administrative Court.

“As president of a democratic country, Yushchenko should observe and respect the independence of the judiciary, and not interfere with courts when they issue rulings he doesn't like,” said Gill.

Yushchenko also appealed the District Administrative Court ruling to the Administrative Appeals Court. The chief of the appeals court requested protection from the Ukrainian security service. But the security service was present in the judge's chamber during the deliberations on the appeal, according to a report by a Kyiv-based nongovernmental organization, the Political and Legal Reforms Center.

“It's one thing for the security services to provide protection for judges,” said Gill. “But it's quite another when they're actually in chambers during deliberations. At a minimum, this creates the appearance of potential intimidation or even interference with a pending decision.”

The Political and Legal Reforms Center also reported that members of parliament from the Tymoshenko Bloc (ByuT) physically blocked the

appeals court judges from leaving their chambers, making it impossible to hold the hearing.

BYuT said it had dispatched its members to the District Administrative Court of Kyiv and the Supreme Administrative Court to “protect” judges from “provocations.”

Yushchenko’s presidential secretariat said that the Administrative Appeals Court had to postpone the hearing on his appeal due to “unprecedented pressure from executive bodies and Ukrainian lawmakers.” On October 13, the press service of the Supreme Administrative Court complained that BYuT deputies had been “hampering the work of the head of the court.”

President Yushchenko and his opponents, including Prime Minister Tymoshenko, have recently engaged in a heated political struggle over various domestic and foreign policy issues ranging from the war in Georgia, relations with Russia, the financial crisis and new legislation limiting the president’s powers.

This is the second time in two years that Yushchenko has interfered with the judiciary during a struggle with his political rivals. On April 2, 2007, Yushchenko dissolved parliament and called for new elections after dozens of politicians from pro-presidential parties defected to a coalition headed by Yushchenko’s political rival, then-Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovich. Yanukovich and his supporters challenged Yushchenko’s decision in the Constitutional Court.

Yushchenko subsequently dismissed three of 18 Constitutional Court judges, including the chief justice. The political crisis abated when Yushchenko and Yanukovich agreed on May 27 to hold parliamentary elections on September 30. [UKI](#)

Three Rivals

Editorial

New York Times, 17 October 2008

Ukraine’s president, Viktor Yushchenko, has called another parliamentary election -- the third in as many years -- in an attempt to resolve his never-ending political struggle with his rivals, Yulia Tymoshenko and Viktor Yanukovich, the current and former prime ministers.

We sympathize with Mr. Yushchenko’s vision of anchoring his country in the West. And if new elections help clear up the political mess, well and good. The main thing is to make sure these are elections by and for Ukraine, without meddling from Russia or the West.

Mr. Yushchenko and Ms. Tymoshenko were allies and favorites of Europe and the United States in the so-called Orange Revolution of 2004. Thousands of Ukrainians went into the streets to overturn the rigged -- with lots of Russian help -- presidential election of Mr. Yanukovich. The Orange allies quickly fell out. And Mr. Yanukovich was soon back in the Parliament -- and, for a spell, Mr. Yushchenko’s prime minister. Ms. Tymoshenko now has that job, much to Mr. Yushchenko’s dismay.

While it sounds like a soap opera, the endless wrangling among the three has become a serious obstacle to Ukraine’s hopes for political and economic reform. Ukraine’s geographical division -- and deep-seated differences of identity and loyalty -- has made it even harder to build consensus. Mr. Yushchenko is supported by West-leaning Ukrainian nationalists in the country’s west, Mr. Yanukovich by Russia-leaning eastern Ukrainians and Ms. Tymoshenko is seeking allies and advantage anywhere she can.

Ukrainians must be allowed to sort out their own problems. Russia’s meddling in the name of a specious sphere of influence is unacceptable. Countering it with American pressures to join NATO will only stoke internal divisions, so long as Ukrainians are far from agreed about the alliance.

The better course at this stage is to encourage Ukraine's hopes of joining the European Union. Fearful of provoking Russia, the Europeans resisted American efforts to start moving Ukraine toward NATO membership. They should not drag their feet on European Union membership.

All three of Ukraine's rival leaders have declared support for European Union membership. Letting them know that their country's chances will increase if they can work together might even help break the stalemate. [UKL]

Excerpts from "Presse Kiev", a Daily Press Monitoring from the French Embassy in Kyiv

22-28 October 2008

[translated by Dominique Arel for UKL]

MPs were unable to find a compromise on the financial crisis on the basis of the seven proposed draft laws, notes Kommersant. Ukraina moloda finds it completely incomprehensible. Parliament is supposed to examine, during Tuesday's plenary session, a package of anti-crisis laws that the working group should have prepared on the basis of projects submitted to the Rada by various political forces. The synthesis of these projects was not done. The Party of Regions even ignored the material of the working group by pushing its own project (28 October). [UKL: no decision was taken on Tuesday]

Segodnia anticipates the costs of the IMF loan. According to the newspaper, the IMF will demand an increase in taxes and a freeze on social welfare payments and on salaries. The newspaper thinks that the IMF has granted a loan to Ukraine to allow foreign investors from withdrawing the market with minimal losses. With this new credit, the value of the hryvnia will stabilize and it will become possible to buy dollars at a rate more advantageous than the current one (28 October).

Hazeta po-kievski, Kommersant. Russia threatens Ukraine with visas. Russian politicians want to punish Ukraine for its Euro-Atlantic aspirations. The introduction does benefit neither Russia, nor Ukraine. The examples of commercial wars waged by Russia against Georgia and Estonia show that the Kremlin is able to neglect the economy. For the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, the introduction of a visa regime with Ukraine would be an attempt to exercise political pressure on Ukraine (28 October).

Den "hopes that next Tuesday (28 October) MPs will find a compromise and come up with a unique anti-crisis draft law, based on the six documents submitted to the Rada". "The Tymoshenko Plan" has traction and it is clear that there will be elections neither on December 14, and neither on December 21. The date of December 28 is up in the air" (27 October).

Delo. "Rescue Plan Tymoshenko Style". The newspaper analyzes the "anti-crisis" draft laws elaborated by the government. "Half of the texts are questionable, being in the interest of big business. Thus, the government offers to increase taxes by 25% on the import of cars, contrary to its commitments vis-à-vis the WTO. The government also wants to amend the Labor Code to allow layoffs without cause. In the context of the crisis, it is advantageous for enterprises who have begun to fire workers" (22 October). [UKL]

IMF Offers Ukraine \$16.5 Billion Rescue

by Gren Manuel

Wall Street Journal, 27 October 2008

The International Monetary Fund unveiled Sunday its second national rescue plan in a matter of days, saying it would offer to lend a larger-than-expected \$16.5 billion to Ukraine. The announcement follows Friday's \$2.1 billion loan to Iceland and underlines how the IMF, after years in the shadows, has come to the forefront of helping weaker nations hit by the financial crisis.

The IMF board will consider final approval of Ukraine's \$16.5 billion, 24-month standby facility once Ukraine passes some financial overhaul legislation, it said.

Separately, IMF Managing Director Dominique Strauss-Kahn said the IMF was ready to approve a "substantial financing package" for Hungary after reaching broad agreement on a reform package that the country will implement as a condition for the emergency loans, the Associated Press reported. He didn't say how large the loan would be. Pakistan is also talking to the IMF.

Mr. Strauss-Kahn said Ukraine had signed up to a comprehensive policy package designed to shore up its balance-of-payments position, noting that on top of the financial crisis Ukraine had been hit by the fall in the price of steel, a major industry in the country.

But the deal means Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko will have to implement harsh economic austerity measures in the run-up to an election in December amid the political turmoil that has plagued the country since the Orange Revolution in 2004. Ukraine government officials weren't available to comment.

Ratings agency Standard & Poor's late Friday cut its currency rating on Ukraine even though it believed an IMF loan would be offered, saying a lack of internal political agreement could mean the country wouldn't be able to implement the IMF's program to fix the economy.

The loan -- higher than earlier estimates of between \$11 billion and \$15 billion -- is small in comparison to the country's external debt, which analysts at Capital Economics in London estimate at \$55 billion due this year.

Mr. Strauss-Kahn said the program to be implemented by Ukraine will aim to restore financial stability, help make the banking sector liquid and solvent and cut inflation, while trying to insulate companies and households from a deep output decline.

One additional problem for Ukraine is that its balance of payments is heavily influenced by the price Russia sets for the country's vital imports of natural gas. ☐☐☐

Ukraine's IMF Loan Endangered by Feud

by Philip P. Pan

Washington Post, 28 October 2008

Ukraine's feuding president and prime minister welcomed a proposed emergency bailout by the International Monetary Fund on Monday, but a fresh round of finger-pointing by their aides left it unclear whether the two could agree on legislation needed to win the \$16.5 billion loan. As Ukraine's currency fell to a historic low and its critical steel industry urged global action to stop a devastating slide in prices, Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko scheduled a vote on the legislation for Tuesday and called on the nation's fractured political leadership to unite in the face of "global financial Armageddon."

Her former ally, President Viktor Yushchenko, also endorsed quick action on a legislative package that officials say includes unpopular spending cuts and other measures intended to strengthen Ukraine's wobbly banking sector.

But the outcome of the vote was uncertain Monday night, as each camp accused the other of trying to use the economic crisis to get its way in an extended political standoff over whether the country should hold early parliamentary elections.

Yushchenko and Tymoshenko were allies in the 2004 street protests known as the Orange Revolution, which brought Yushchenko to the presidency. He dissolved parliament this month after the collapse of his coalition with Tymoshenko and has called for elections in December that could oust her as prime minister. Tymoshenko opposes the elections and has blocked legislation needed to finance them.

In a statement Monday, Andriy Goncharuk, deputy chief of the president's secretariat, accused Tymoshenko of trying to use the economic crisis to "pursue an alternative foreign policy" and the IMF legislation to thwart the elections.

"Unfortunately, the position of the prime minister's office reduces the chances for the country to receive" the IMF loan, he said, adding that "mass unemployment" could result. He argued that elections were necessary to resolve the political stalemate in Kiev, which has increased investors' anxiety over the economy.

But Hryhoriy Nemyria, deputy prime minister for European integration, said it was Yushchenko who was putting the IMF bailout in jeopardy, accusing the president's allies of demanding a vote on funding for elections before they will consider the financial package.

"We cannot accept that," he said by telephone from Kiev. "It's a matter of priorities, and what can be a higher priority than dealing with the economic crisis?"

Nemyria added that it would be irresponsible for the government to spend \$80 million on early elections during the crisis, especially given that Ukraine has had parliamentary elections in each of the past two years and that a presidential vote is scheduled for next year.

Elections would also make it more difficult for the government to implement the painful reforms requested by the IMF and needed to rescue the Ukrainian economy, he said. "There would be pressure on lawmakers to be populist, and they would criticize the government for agreeing with the IMF on policies that are very difficult and sensitive."

The largest party in the legislature, the opposition Party of Regions, has already come out against the IMF proposal, arguing that it is unnecessary and could further damage the economy. Its position makes it unlikely that the legislation would pass without some kind of truce between Yushchenko and Tymoshenko.

Ukraine's currency, the hryvna, has plunged more than 20 percent against the dollar, amid a run on banks that has drained more than \$1 billion from deposits and a collapse in the price of steel, the nation's main export.

About 500,000 people are employed in Ukraine's steel industry, and layoffs of tens of thousands have already been announced. The government said Monday it was appealing to world metal producers to cut production and bolster prices.

Many analysts say the economy is fundamentally sound. But most of Ukraine's leaders agree that it makes sense to adopt the IMF legislation and get access to the loan in case it is needed, said Igor Borakovsky, director of the independent Institute for Economic Research and Policy Consulting. "The situation is not a full-fledged crisis, but everyone understands that externally and internally, the situation could radically worsen."

"In principle, the politicians are more or less very close in terms of the economics," he added. "But when it comes to the politics of the decision, it becomes very difficult. There is a very specific competition among them to take credit for the rescue, to be seen as the savior of the country, and right now, this competition is extremely detrimental." □□

Ukraine In For Tough Times Amid Global Crisis

Associated Press, 23 October 2008

KIEV, Ukraine (AP) - Construction cranes have stopped swinging and thousands of steel workers face layoffs as Ukraine braces for a severe economic downturn.

Lacking the large foreign currency reserves of China and Russia, more integrated into the world economy than some smaller countries, Ukraine is being hit harder than other former Soviet states by the global financial crisis.

“Ukraine has been exposed as the most vulnerable,” said Jan Randolph, an emerging markets analyst at Global Insight.

On Thursday, the Ukrainian currency plunged against the dollar to a historic low amid a run on banks and a frantic rush to convert savings into U.S. currency. Ukraine’s hryvna plummeted to 6.01 hryvna per U.S dollar in trading at Ukraine’s currency exchange.

Jittery customers lined up to buy dollars at exchange offices across the capital, some of which ran out of cash. The country was already short on foreign currency, as demand for steel, its main export commodity plunged. The Ukrainian currency has lost over 20 percent since September.

Four years of robust economic growth left Kiev clogged with shiny imported automobiles and dotted with upscale fashion outlets. Real estate prices exceeded those of Rome for a time, and the stock market gained an astonishing 130 percent in 2007. But today, experts agree, Ukraine is in for tough times.

Falling demand for steel has widening the external trade deficit to a hefty US\$12.5 billion so far this year, compared to US\$ 5.9 billion last year. After excessive reliance on foreign credit to feed its vast consumer boom, which sent Ukrainians rushing to buy mobile phones, cars and apartments on credit, the economy was hit hard when panicked foreign investors abandoned emerging markets and European banks slashed lending, crippled by their own liquidity crunch. Inflation soared to 31 percent in May, year over year, and cooled to 16 percent in September.

The government spent US\$2.9 billion buying hryvnas to support the currency this month alone, bringing its reserves down to US\$34.2 billion, according to the central bank. One global rating agency after another has downgraded Ukraine’s creditworthiness.

Today Ukraine is pinning its hopes on a loan of up to \$14 billion from the International Monetary Fund. But unlike Hungary which has also turned to the IMF for money, Ukraine does not benefit from EU aid.

Plans to receive the much needed loan were threatened by a marathon political struggle between President Viktor Yushchenko and Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, as the IMF negotiating team could not be certain if the next government would stick to the commitments of the current one.

A standoff over early elections, which Tymoshenko wants to avoid to retain her job, has further soured the investment climate as Ukrainian stocks lost over 70 percent of their value this year.

“This will hurt,” said Olena Bilan, a microeconomic analyst with Dragon Capital investment bank. «It will be painful in any case. The question (is) how painful it will be. The effects of the financial crisis have been quick to trickle down into the real economy. Banks have hiked interest rates and slashed lending, for example, bringing the car boom to an abrupt end.

Output in the construction industry, which is highly depended on loans, was down 7.2 compared to last year’s figures, according to Dragon Capital. The real estate market has seized up and many realtors have been forced to look for new jobs. Investment banks in Kiev have also slashed jobs.

Anna Kiptenko, whose firm services cash registers for retail traders, was promised a 500,000 hryvna (\$100,000) loan for her business, but the bank froze the money. Now she can't afford to pay for her son's law studies in Kiev.

"The government is assuring us that there is no crisis, but I can see that it is already here," said Kiptenko, 42, as she emerged from an office of Pravex bank in downtown Kiev.

Experts say the expected IMF loan will save the country from all-out collapse. "They want to cool the economy in general to avoid a crash landing," said Randolph.

But a deep economic slowdown appears inevitable.

Ukraine exports steel and cast iron to the Middle East, Europe and former Soviet Union countries, where they are used in housing, construction, machine and ship building. But production by the country's metal industry, which represents 6 percent of the GDP and accounts for 40 percent of the country's exports, was down by 30 percent.

Steel magnate Serhyi Taruta, chairman of the Industrial Union of Donbas, told the newspaper Kommerstant Ukraine that his company plans to lay off as many as 20,000 people.

Dragan Capital's Bilan predicted the economy, which grew at an average 7.4 percent over the past four years, will slow to 4.8 percent this year.

Tymoshenko urged Ukrainians to "tighten their belts" and proposed to raise taxes for the rich. Yushchenko, meanwhile, called for the laying off of every fifth state bureaucrat, promising to start with some in his own office.

Ukraine faces further stress from a likely hike in the cost of its natural gas, almost all supplied by Russia. That could mean a drastic increase in utilities bills.

"There will be a lot of angry people," said independent financial analyst Geoffrey Smith. ☐☐

Ukraine's Friends: Forget NATO Now

By Yulia Melnik

Kyiv Post, 23 October 2008

<http://www.kyivpost.com/nation/30548>



WASHINGTON, D.C. Even Ukraine's friends in the West are telling the nation, and President Victor Yushchenko, to forget about getting into the NATO military alliance until the country's political house is in order.

"Kyiv is divided and Moscow is united," Steven Pifer, America's former ambassador to Ukraine, told participants of a two-day forum in America's national capital. "Ukraine must first have a coherent unified government position in order to be successful in joining NATO." Pifer's remarks came at the Roundtable IX Ukrainian Regional Commitments, held in the Library of Congress on Oct. 15-16.

The message from a French participant was the same. Francois Rivasseau, France's deputy ambassador to the United States, said that Ukraine squandered the European Union's renewed interest in the nation following the five-day August war between Russia and Georgia

“We can consider Ukraine [for NATO membership] if it has stability. Ukraine must first fix its internal problems,” Rivasseau said.

But it was Yuriy Shcherbak, a former Ukrainian ambassador to the United States, who had some of harshest words for his own country. Shcherbak contrasted neighboring Poland’s success in joining both the European Union and NATO with Ukraine’s failure to do either. Theoretically, Ukraine has another shot at moving a step closer to NATO when a summit in December will consider granting the nation a membership action plan. But almost no one thinks that will happen.

Referring to neighboring Poland as a nation whose “people are united in their desire to build their country,” Shcherbak described Ukraine’s current political situation a “mess.” He also talked of the dangers of rising federalism in the nation’s regions because of lack of support from the national government in Kyiv.

Shcherbak said Ukraine is losing foreign investments and support of Western countries because “corruption consumes all resources.” He added: “Foreign investors do not want to deal with Ukraine.”

While Germany’s dependence on Russian natural gas plays a role in that nation’s refusal to lobby for Ukraine’s EU and NATO aspirations, Ukraine’s internal divisions again are ultimately to blame. “Ukraine must become more useful to Germany and German investors. In the situation of ubiquitous corruption and this political mess, European countries are less interested in such a new member,” Shcherbak added.

Nico Lange, a German representative, said that Ukraine is losing the information war to Russia. Most information about Ukraine comes from Russian news agencies – complete with the Kremlin slant on events. Lange said it is important for Ukraine to “to speak to Germans directly.”

Investors are not the only ones needing information. Ukrainians themselves need to know what NATO is. Since polls show most Ukrainians are opposed to joining NATO, Latvian ambassador to the United States, Andrejs Pildegovics, said a public-information campaign should be started.

“It is necessary to persuade your own people and show them the perspectives of new opportunities,” Pildegovics said.

Ukrainian Iryna Bekeshkina, research director of the Democratic Initiatives Foundation, agreed. “Ukrainians cannot even answer very simple questions about NATO policies,” Bekeshkina told the Kyiv Post. “They are just afraid to tease the neighbors because of the recent events in Georgia.”

The big neighbor to the north, Russia, is seen as the only nation posing a threat to Ukraine, said Nadia Diuk of the National Endowment for Democracy.

“We considered Georgia and South Ossetia as a frozen conflict zone a year ago, but we see a completely different situation now,” Diuk said. “We have no idea what Russian intentions are concerning Ukraine.” Shcherbak also complained that Russian officials have issued 80,000 Russian passports in Crimea and threaten to exploit internal divisions as Ukrainian politicians fight over power.

But Kostyantyn Gryshchenko, the Ukrainian ambassador to Moscow, cautioned that “it is necessary to take into account not only the Russian point of view of Crimea, but also the big traditional trade cooperation with Russia and millions of Ukrainians working there and sending remittances to Ukraine.”

A similar position was conveyed by the Ukrainian ambassador to the United Nations, Yuriy Serheyev, who said: “We do not have a basis for ethnic conflicts in Ukraine. We have some ideological conflicts but not ethnic. I do not see any danger from Russia.”

It seems Ukraine does not need to look beyond its borders to find the real threat. “The internal factor in Ukraine is the main one,” France’s Rivasseau said. ☐☐

Next Stop, Ukraine?

What McCain's Interest in Crimea Suggests about his Worldview

by Joshua A. Tucker

The New Republic, 13 October 2008

Joshua A. Tucker is an associate professor of politics in the Wilf Family Department of Politics at New York University and a National Security Fellow at the Truman National Security Project.

With Senator John McCain's increasing propensity to drop new policy proposals into debates with little explanation, it is worth asking what he meant when he urged viewers to "watch Ukraine." As it turns out, Ukraine is once again in the middle of a nasty domestic political crisis, this time pitting two former allies from the Orange Revolution--Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko and President Viktor Yushchenko--against one another, with the most likely outcome being yet another early parliamentary election. But as much as I personally would applaud either of the U.S. presidential candidates for encouraging Americans to pay more attention to domestic politics in Ukraine (or any post-communist country for that matter), I don't think this is exactly what Senator McCain had in mind.

Instead, Senator McCain was likely advancing a line of reasoning that has become popular in the press following this summer's Russian-Georgian conflict. Simply put, there is a growing tendency to invoke the Munich analogy from World War II in reference to Russia's invasion of Georgia. The argument here is that, like Germany in the 1930s, Russia is in the beginning stages of attempting to expand (or in this case reestablish) its empire by invading, dismembering, and eventually annexing territory from their neighbors. If the invasion of Georgia was a first step in this regard, then it is logical to ask what the next step will be.

This is where Ukraine, and in particular the Ukrainian province of Crimea (which McCain name-dropped during the debate), enters the picture. Crimea has three characteristics that make it a particularly attractive option as a next step for Russian aggression. First, the Russian Black Sea Fleet is still located in the Crimean city of Sevastopol, based on a lease that currently runs through 2017. Second, ethnic Russians make up a majority of the population of Crimea. Finally, and somewhat ominously, there are rumors that Russians have been increasing the rate at which they have been giving Russian passports to ethnic Russians in Crimea, a tactic that was employed previously in the Georgian case. Thus, one posited scenario is for an "atrocious" event against ethnic Russians in Crimea to be manufactured, requiring Russian armed intervention in response.

These points notwithstanding, an invasion of Ukraine by Russia remains very unlikely in the near future for a whole host of reasons. First and foremost, an armed conflict between Russia and Ukraine would likely be a different affair from the one between Russia and Georgia by orders of magnitude; one expert on the Russian military responded to my query by estimating that if the Georgian military was a 1 and the Russian military a 10 on a 1-10 scale, the Ukrainian military would be about a 5 or a 6. Second, Russia has plenty of its own troubles to deal with at the moment in the wake of the global financial crisis. This particular factor will be greatly exacerbated if the price of oil--which has provided a great deal of the backbone to Russia's newly aggressive foreign policy tactics--continues to fall. Third, Russia paid a heavy price for its invasion of Georgia, including international condemnation, the flight of foreign capital from Russian markets, and even encouragement of separatists within its own borders. Finally, Russia still hopes to extend the lease of the Black Sea fleet in Sevastopol beyond 2017, and any armed conflict with Ukraine that did not result in a complete annexation of Crimea would essentially end that possibility.

Moreover, the Munich analogy is not the only way to interpret the Russian-Georgian conflict. Another way to see the Russian incursion into Georgia was as an attempt to send a signal to both its neighbors and the West that there would be serious consequences for countries that Russia considered to be in its sphere of influence should they continue to pursue pro-Western policies and, probably most seriously, NATO membership. While this does not in any way make the invasion of Georgia more justifiable, it does suggest that the Georgian invasion may have accomplished a goal of Russian foreign policy in and of itself, and is not necessarily part of a broader policy of territorial expansion fueled by military conflict.

The speed at which Russia rebuffed the suggestion by South Ossetian president Eduard Kokoity that South Ossetia (one of the two Georgian breakaway republics) ought to join Russia is certainly consistent with this vision of the invasion. Before anyone accuses me of being naïve, I want to be clear that it is of course much too early to know whether the Munich analogy is correct. It is, however, important to realize that there are alternative explanations for the invasion of Georgia that do not immediately give rise to a forthcoming invasion of Ukraine. (It is also worth noting that if one accepts this kind of a signaling perspective as a good explanation for the Russian-Georgian conflict, then extending NATO membership to Ukraine would probably have the effect of making a potential Russian-Ukrainian conflict more likely.)

The bottom line is that, while we certainly cannot rule out any future actions on the part of the Russian armed forces, by far the most likely outlet for this use of force was in Georgia--and this has already occurred. While our government should of course be preparing contingency plans in case any such conflict might break out, it remains highly unlikely in the near to medium future. This is not any way to suggest that Russia is not currently trying--and will not in the future try--to meddle in the domestic politics of Ukraine in an effort to influence developments there in its favor. But at a time when the United States has many pressing foreign policy concerns--including the global economic crisis, the war in Iraq, and the ongoing struggle with Al Qaeda--preparing for a Russian invasion of Ukraine is probably not one that most voters should feel compelled at the moment to "watch."

Is there anything useful then to learn about Senator McCain from his decision to give Ukraine prime-time attention? While on the surface this is probably just a small part of an overall strategy to seem ready and willing to stand up to the bad guys out there in the world, it does suggest that he subscribes to the Munich analogy in terms of his understanding of the Russian-Georgian conflict, which may or may not be a desired characteristic in a presidential candidate. As a result, despite some of his claims to want to foster cooperation with Russia, he will most likely approach future interactions with Russia through a world-view that stresses the importance of standing up to Russia, which in many cases may mean conflict. Whether avoiding conflict with Russia in future years is possible (or even desirable) in any case remains an open question, but a McCain presidency would certainly seem to make it less likely. ☐☐☐

Ukraine's Security Vacuum

by Taras Kuzio

Ukraine Analyst, Vol. 1, No. 3 (14 October 2008)

Ukraine Analyst is a new bimonthly 8-page publication launched in September 2008 to fill a niche in the supply of timely analysis on contemporary Ukraine. Ukraine Analyst is the only English-language publication to cover current Ukrainian affairs on a systematic basis. For subscription information, write to editor_ukraineanalyst@kuzioassociates.com.

Looking at your country's immediate geopolitical environment from one of Kyiv's many hills does not give you much self-confidence. In the aftermath of three recent developments – Russia's invasion of Georgia, the West's (NATO, EU) closed doors and the collapse of the orange coalition – Ukraine is perilously exposed in a security vacuum that has important ramifications for European security.

Russia's invasion of Georgia has re-shaped the geopolitical region and its domestic politics. Ukraine has watched how Russia has de facto gotten away with the annexation of two Georgian territories without any major repercussions.

The EU believes it can already begin to resume normal relations with Russia after it withdrew its troops to pre-conflict lines in October. A majority of EU members now want to re-launch negotiations next month for a new 'Partnership and Cooperation Agreement' with Russia. This would be 'as if the Georgian war had never happened', The Economist (16 October) quipped.

Three lessons that Kyiv has taken in from the EU's reaction to Russia's invasion have been sobering.

Firstly, the EU has still not learnt its lessons from the 1990s when it failed to halt the carnage in former Yugoslavia. Secondly, the EU is more concerned with appeasing than in opposing Russia. Thirdly, the much touted European Security and Defence Policy is vacuous.

An invasion and occupation of the port of Sevastopol by units of the Black Sea Fleet based there would be relatively easy to accomplish. Such an occupation could be justified – as in South Ossetia – by coming to the 'defence' of Russian passport holders. Estimates of Russian passport holders in the Crimea range from a low of 6,000 to as high as 100,000. The Crimean parliament voted last month in support of the recognition of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

The Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) estimates that possibly fifty percent of Black Sea Fleet personnel illegally possess Ukrainian passports. Ukraine does not recognise dual citizenship. If the entire Fleet receives Ukrainian passports by 2017, when the twenty-year basing agreement expires, Moscow could argue that a fleet staffed by Ukrainian citizens would no longer need to withdraw from Sevastopol.

NATO and EU Remain Closed

NATO and the EU remain closed to Ukrainian membership. The September EU-Ukraine summit again sidestepped the issue of Ukrainian membership. The EU's closed-door position is at least consistent over the last two decades in its refusal to not enlarge into the European region of the CIS. Ukraine has not been offered membership prospects unlike the Western Balkans and Turkey who have been. Ukraine remains the only country seeking EU membership that still faces a closed door from Brussels.

NATO's open door policy always stood in contrast to that of the EU and Ukraine, one of the most active countries over eighteen years within NATO's Partnership for Peace programme. Ukraine was repeatedly told by NATO during the Leonid Kuchma era that it would be admitted if it embarked on a path of democratic reforms. This position has now been unilaterally changed by Germany to include additional demands that were never made to aspirant countries during earlier rounds of NATO enlargement.

From Kyiv's vantage point both the EU and NATO have adopted double standards. Ukraine is today a democracy and a market economy and therefore far more advanced than either Bulgaria or Romania in the late 1990s when the EU placed them on membership tracks.

NATO's oft-touted open door policy has become a closed-door policy at the insistence of Western Europeans eager to not offend Russia through NATO's enlargement into what Berlin and Paris recognise as Russia's 'backyard'. New demands, such as 'political stability', given to Ukraine before it could be admitted into a Membership Action Plan (MAP), were not used elsewhere, most notably in Macedonia which entered a MAP immediately following a civil war.

Not content to block Ukraine and Georgia's NATO membership, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands and Belgium add insult to injury by also keeping the door to the EU firmly closed.

Neither Russia's opposition or energy dependency explains Western Europe's obstructive policy as, after all, Russia has never opposed Ukraine's EU membership. In addition, energy reliance is a red herring as France, Italy and Germany are only reliant for 26-40 percent of their gas imports from Russia. Meanwhile, Poland, Lithuania, Bulgaria and Slovakia, who support NATO and EU enlargement to Ukraine, import between 61-100 percent of their gas from Russia.

Yushchenko Undermines His Own Foreign Policy Goals

President Yushchenko was warned by a Western Ambassador that he could not have it both ways: undermining the orange coalition and progress towards a NATO MAP. He chose the former and thereby placed personal interests above those of national interests.

President Viktor Yushchenko, the staunchest supporter of Ukraine's integration into NATO and the EU, has done the most to undermine it within Ukraine. On three occasions over the last four years President Yushchenko has elevated his personal dislike of Yulia Tymoshenko above that of creating a unified orange coalition and government. Political stability and unity of pro-reform forces has been a Western demand throughout Yushchenko's administration as the precursor for integration into NATO and the EU.

In 2005 and again this year the Tymoshenko government was removed or undermined after being in place for only eight months, not by the 'pro-Russian' Party of Regions opposition but by its own ostensible partner, President Yushchenko. In 2006 Yushchenko's unwillingness to see Tymoshenko return as prime minister destroyed the orange coalition before it was even able to take power.

Ukraine's path to NATO is now de facto on hold until after the January 2010 presidential elections. Pre-term elections in December are to be held on the same weekend as NATO's review meeting of Ukraine and Georgia's progress towards receiving MAP's. Obviously, Ukraine will not be invited into a NATO MAP.

A second opportunity for Ukraine would be NATO's 60th anniversary summit in April 2009. Unfortunately, Ukraine is also unlikely to receive a MAP as a new coalition and government will only be created in March, at the earliest, following pre-term elections. 2009 will also be presidential election year during which candidates who are supporters of NATO membership will traditionally remain silent on NATO because of its unpopularity among Ukrainian voters.

Are Ukraine's 'Security Assurances' Worthless?

With NATO and EU membership not on the cards Ukraine's security for the foreseeable future is in its own hands. In return for giving up the world's third largest nuclear weapons a decade ago Ukraine received 'security assurances' from five nuclear powers, one of whom was Russia that undermined Georgia's territorial integrity.

In an interview for German television Prime Minister Vladimir Putin ruled out Russia making territorial claims upon the Crimea. Looked at from Kyiv such reassurances remain hollow in the aftermath of the Russian parliament's repeated support for annexing the Crimea, the latest being in May, and Russia's invasion of Georgia. Ukraine is faced by the fact that one of the country's that gave it 'security assurances' in return for de-nuclearisation is also the major threat to its territorial integrity.

Senior US officials, including Vice President Dick Cheney during his September visit to Ukraine, have expressed their support for Ukraine's territorial integrity if it were to come under threat. But, looked at from Kyiv in the aftermath of the EU's appeasement of Russia's annexation of Georgian territory, the West's 'security assurances' look empty.

In the event of Russia's occupation of Sevastopol or the Crimea Ukrainians now understand that no one – including the US - would act on these 'assurances' and come to Ukraine's defence. In autumn 2003 Ukraine appealed to NATO when Russia began territorial claims against the island of Tuzla to which it was building a dam from the Northern Caucasus. NATO advised Kyiv that it should deal with the issue itself. Kuchma returned earlier from an overseas visit and sent military reinforcements to Tuzla.

Russia's annexation of Ukrainian territory would be eventually accepted – as it will be in the case of Russia's annexation of Georgian territories – by the EU. Relations with Russia are a priority for France and Germany than supporting Ukraine's (and Georgia's) territorial integrity.

Ukraine's Three Security Options

Firstly, Ukraine can increase military spending above its current 1 percent of GDP by focusing on rapid reaction special forces and reviving the disbanded National Guard that could deter a Russian provocation in the Crimea.

Secondly, Ukraine could seek security assistance from NATO in lieu of membership which is unlikely in the foreseeable future. This will be the subject of a NATO-Ukraine meeting in a Baltic capitol next month.

Thirdly, Ukraine could downplay NATO membership so as to improve relations with Russia that is Ukraine's major energy supplier. In effect, Ukraine would be returning to the much maligned multi-vector foreign policy under Kuchma or a position of neutrality favoured by parliament's largest faction, the Party of Regions, and by a large body of Ukrainian public opinion. Ukraine could focus on achieving EU membership rather than on following other post-communist states in seeing NATO membership as a stepping stone to EU membership. Such advice (i.e. focusing on the EU and shelving NATO) is increasingly being proposed by Western policy makers and government officials.

In conclusion, Ukraine's security options remain poor by virtue of three factors. Firstly, the West's weak response to Russia's invasion of Georgia. Secondly, NATO closed door as a consequence of new demands made by Germany and France and the EU's perennially closed doors. Thirdly, domestic in-fighting among pro-Western forces that has led to the collapse of the orange alliance, probably for good. ☐☐

Our Ukraine Demands to Start a Criminal Case Against Separatist Ruthenians

Interfax-Ukraine, 27 October 2008



Pro-presidential Our Ukraine party has condemned the holding of the second European congress of Prykarpattia Ruthenian, a decision taken by them “on the Ruthenian state system” and demanded that the law enforcement organs of Ukraine open a criminal case against the organizers of the congress, Our Ukraine Leader Vyacheslav Kyrylenko said.

“Such decisions and actions are a crime under Article 110 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine – infringement of the territorial integrity and the inviolability of Ukraine,” reads the statement of Kyrylenko.

The Congress demanded on Oct. 24 autonomy for the Ruthenians, a small ethnos living in Ukraine's Trans-Carpathian region and other countries west of Ukraine. Kyrylenko said “the separatist provocation on October 25 wouldn't have been possible without support from abroad, and assistance from individual officials from Zakarpattia, which purposefully support the Ruthenian political movement.”

Our Ukraine demands “a decisive rebuff to separatists”, and in particular demanded that the Security Service of Ukraine, the Prosecutor General's Office of Ukraine and the Interior Ministry to open a criminal case on the organizers of “the separatist meeting.”

Earlier another political party, Svoboda, came out with a statement condemning the Ruthenian separatist movement and demanding that a criminal case should be started.

New Russian Book Says Stalin's Deportation of Nationalities Was Justified

By Paul Goble

Window on Eurasia, 14 October 2008

<http://windowoneurasia.blogspot.com/2008/10/window-on-eurasia-new-russian-book-says.html>

Vienna, October 14 – Today is the 44th anniversary of the overthrow of Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev, an event that deserves to be recalled not only for what he did to shed light on the crimes of his predecessor Joseph Stalin but also because of extent to which some Russian historians are now seeking to reverse Khrushchev's judgment and rehabilitate the tyrant.

In Stalin's times, the Soviet powers that be sought to present their system in the best possible light both by not reporting its worst features or by outright lies, but now, after so many of Stalin's actions have been documented, Russian writers are celebrating them as appropriate and even a model for the behavior of others.

This past summer, a new teacher-training textbook argued that the Great Terror as not wrong but an appropriate strategy for mobilizing the Soviet people so that they could build a powerful state. Now, a book published this month takes the next step, chronicling Stalin's deportation of nationalities and arguing that it was entirely justified. The new book, entitled "Why Did Stalin Resettle Whole Peoples? – Criminal Arbitrariness or a Just Revenge" (in Russian, St. Petersburg: Yauza-Press), was written by Igor Pykhalov, who is identified in a review by Leonid Panteleyev in the journal "Spetsnaz" as a St. Petersburg specialist on the Soviet past.

According to Panteleyev, "from the time of Khrushchev," most people have believed that the deportations and special resettlements of peoples from the Caucasus and other parts of the Soviet Union "did not have any rational basis but were carried out exclusively according to the whim of Stalin."

That view, he says, is reflected in two widely used books. In a teacher training textbook published in 1997, O.A. Polivanov and B.G. Rozhkov argue that it "remains unclear" why Soviet security agencies used railways and soldiers to deport whole peoples when the country was locked in a war with Germany.

And they conclude, Panteleyev continues, that these actions either reflect Stalin's willingness to believe NKVD reports that "certain representatives of the nationalities" turned to the German occupiers with requests for autonomy or because Stalin wanted to force "small peoples" to stop "striving for independence" and thus allow him "to strengthen his empire."

The second book, V.N. Zemskov's "Special Settlers in the USSR, 1930-1960" (Moscow, 2003), argues that "by all indications, the national diversity of the state which they ran irritated I.V. Stalin and his entourage. The deportation of a number of small peoples thus clearly served the goals of accelerating assimilationist processes in Soviet society."

"This was," Zemskov continues, "an intentional policy of the liquidation over time of [numerically] small peoples through their assimilation into larger ethnic communities [with] their [forcible] resettlement from their historical Motherland" a step clearly intended "to accelerate this process."

According to Panteleyev's review, Pykhalov challenges all these conclusions, ones that are largely shared by Western historians. One cannot, he says, say Stalin "dreamed" of liquidating small peoples given his creation of national republics, support for native language instruction, and the provision of alphabets to groups that had not had them. And how can one speak, Pykhalov continues, about some kind of consistent Stalinist idea of the destruction of small groups when the Soviet authorities under his direction "resettled the Balkars but left the Kabardinians in place, deported the Chechens and Ingushetians, but did not touch the Ossetians?"

Instead, Pykhalov says, Stalin had "weighty reasons" for doing what he did, including the support some of these communities gave to the German invaders, banditry by members of these communities who were not serving in the Soviet army, and "mass desertion" by those who had been

drafted into it. In support of these notions, the St. Petersburg writer says, for example, that “almost the entire Crimean population” capable of bearing arms “served Hitler” in one way or another, actions that under Soviet law should have led to sentences of death. Had that happened, Pykhalov continues, “this people would have ceased to exist.”

The book’s author also takes aim at arguments that during the deportations, a third to a half of those being resettled died. “This does not correspond to reality.” In fact, according to the NKVD – a source Pykhalov trusts, only 1272 Chechens and Ingush died on the way, and only 191 of 151,720 Crimean Tatars did.

Assertions by Russian or Western writers that these numbers are too low – and no previous author in post-1956 Russia or the West gives such figures – on the basis that officials did not register those whose bodies were thrown from the train are “simply unserious,” Panteleyev says. “Put yourself,” he writes, “in the place of the chief of a train who has received at the start of the journey one quantity of those to be resettled and brought to the assigned place a different number. He would immediately be asked: And where are the missing people? They died, you say? But perhaps, they ran away? Or they were freed for a bribe?”

And then Pykhalov puts forward two other justifications for what Stalin did. On the one hand, he points out, the United States confined Japanese Americans in camps after Tokyo’s attack on Pearl Harbor. And on the other, the tsarist authorities deported 200,000 ethnic Germans during World War I.

The specific claims Pykhalov advances are easy to counter, but what makes his book and others like it so disturbing is this: First, authors like him aren’t hiding what Stalin did; they are describing it in detail and then praising him for it. Second, they clearly believe that they have an audience and that what they are saying has the support of many in the government.

And third, they appear confident that their views will not be subject to the kind of intense challenges that those who held such ideas faced at the end of USSR and in the first years of the Russian Federation either from independent minded historians there or from authors abroad who used to focus on such outrages but now appear in many cases to be less concerned. ❏❏❏

War in Monuments and War of Monuments in Post-Soviet Ukraine

by *Andrij Portnov*

Osteuropa, No. 6, 2008 [translated by *Nykolai Bilaniuk* for UKL]



This article originally appeared in the German monthly “*Osteuropa*” (6/2008). The whole issue was devoted to the theme of “The Politics of History and Conflicting Memories. War, Force, and Trauma in Europe’s East”, with 456 pages, 435 illustrations, and can be purchased for 24 Euros. ISBN 978-3-8305-1494-7. Translated and posted with the permission of the editor and the author.

Post-Soviet Ukraine is to a large extent a creation of the Second World War. As a result of that war, eastern Galicia, Volyn, northern Bukovyna, and Transcarpathia became part of Ukraine (at that time the Ukrainian SSR). During the interwar period they had been part of Poland, Romania, and Czechoslovakia. It was during the war and the early postwar years that eastern Galicia and Volyn became practically monoethnic territories. This was a result of the Nazi Holocaust directed against Jews, the anti-Polish activities of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (in Ukrainian, *Ukrainska Povstan’s’ka Armia*, or UPA), and the Soviet-Polish “population exchange”. All the territories that are now part of Ukraine underwent a Nazi occupation of several years, then the traumatic renewal of Soviet rule, and Soviet political and social practices on the former occupied territories. Thus it is completely understandable that the war should have become and did become one of the central issues of post-Soviet Ukrainian debates over identity.

For the time being the dominant conceptual scheme for describing these debates remains the stereotypical metaphor of “Two Ukraines”, which acquired great popularity during the “Orange Revolution” at the end of 2004, and which became an almost universal explanatory mechanism. Foreign mass media often and eagerly wrote about the “deep divide” in the civilization of the country, in which the “pro European” west was battling with the “pro-Russian, anti-market” east. The explaining of regional variations in Ukraine in terms of values or civilizational characteristics led particularly to the spread of deeply flawed and superficial identification of russophony among part of the Ukrainian population with “pro-Russianness” or “anti-market” tendencies.

The politically motivated thesis about “Two Ukraines” reduced the repertoire of possible political choices and identifications to a simplified scheme, which invokes exclusive imaginings about the norm and deviations from it. The popularization of this thesis replaced any serious discussion about regionalism, and rendered seemingly invisible the truly interesting fact that all sides in the political battles of 2004 legitimized the blue and yellow flag as a symbol that rose above partisanship. In other words, the flag was accepted as “ours” by groupings within the population which earlier had associated it with “nationalism”. The historization and ontologization of the “Two Ukraines”, and with positive and negative valuations no less, leaves such symbolic confluences unexamined. The myth of “Two Ukraines”, of a nationally conscious Ukraine and a “creole” Ukraine, was first formulated in intellectual circles back in the mid-1990’s.

According to the apt observation by Volodymyr Kulyk, this turns russophone Ukrainians into outsiders, and at the same time fails to adequately control the discriminatoryness of language and denying the variability within the normatively defined groups.

Yaroslav Hrytsak appropriately drew attention to the fact that it is normal for regional variations to arise in such a large country as Ukraine, and to the possibility of distinguishing many more different Ukraines than just two. At the same time, he emphasized the impropriety of drawing conclusions about the depth of divisions on the basis of just two geographical and political extremes, Lviv and Donetsk. Even more significantly, while specially analyzing the latter dichotomy, he noted that the political anti-Sovietism of the bulk of the Lviv population can peacefully coexist with widespread Soviet paternalistic social and economic values. In particular, sociological surveys conducted in 2004 and 2006 demonstrated that in general, respondents in Lviv and Donetsk favoured a redistribution of income with the aim of reducing inequality in society, and had unrealistically high expectations concerning state support for social rights. In this regard the following conclusion is important: “Sovietness” (regardless of whether we consider it positive or negative) is not a prerogative of any one region of Ukraine (besides which, Soviet policy was different in various regions).

Therefore, although the «Two Ukraines» metaphor assisted in illuminating certain realities, its active and instrumental use by certain politicians and mass media made its scholarly application very difficult. Furthermore, whenever it is being used to describe two fully formed, well defined, closed, and mutually antagonistic groups in the midst of Ukraine, it thereby ignores numerous transitional forms and phenomena in the general Ukrainian self-identification with respect to external or internal threats. The framework for describing reality under the «Two Ukraines» metaphor is overly normative and inadequate.

For precisely this reason this article examines not two, but five war memorials. It is understood that the selection of these particular five is very subjective and only in a limited sense representative. I was not concerned with the a detailed illustration of the problems of memory or memorialization in contemporary Ukraine, but with sketches that would capture at least a modest part of the complex and contradictory phenomena of post-Soviet Ukrainian reality.

The Monument to Soviet Soldiers in Slavske, Subcarpathia

The mountain resort town of Slavske has a population below four thousand, and is located a few hours drive from Lviv. The town centre consists of the railway station (where often there is no one to be seen), a few small streets covered with Soviet pavement which has long since settled from the rain and groans underfoot.



Among the few monuments of this centre is a modest gray monument to Soviet soldiers, which draws attention to a sculpture of the Mother of God added in the 1990's who is lamenting the deaths of the fallen. This sort of "modernization" or more accurately "appropriation" (prisvoennia) or "domestication" (odomashnennia) of monuments to Soviet soldiers is not unique to Slavske, although it happened in a completely decentralized way.

Typologically and intuitively this approach correlates with rhetorical efforts on the highest levels to integrate the war into a post-Soviet historical schema. Even in the speeches of President Kuchma there was noticeable weight given to the thesis of Ukrainians' "unity" during the war. In the official speeches of President Yushchenko, that same notion about the "unity of the nation" during the war coexists with the de facto acknowledgement that there was no such unity, and with a call to peace among the veterans. In both cases the concern is with the humanization of the war, a shift of attention to the private history, efforts, and suffering of "ordinary people", while simultaneously accenting the mistakes and cruelty of Soviet political and military leaders.

In the 1990's, throughout eastern Galicia and Volyn there appeared monuments to soldiers of the UPA. Memory of the armed resistance against the Soviets, which lasted until the beginning of the 1950's, is truly remains alive in this region. In other western Ukrainian regions - Bukovyna and Transcarpathia - the situation

is different, and there memorials to UPA are rather rare. However, throughout western Ukraine, monuments to fallen Soviet soldiers were not removed or neglected. The addition of a Mother of God statue seemingly "desovietized" them thoroughly enough, and gave sanction to their peaceful co-existence with memorials to UPA soldiers. In Slavske, the graves of UPA soldiers were restored a few hundred metres from the monument to Soviet soldiers.

The monument to Stepan Bandera in Lviv



Back at the beginning of the 1990's the municipal government of Lviv carried out a massive renaming of streets. The large artery that leads from the railway station to the centre was given the name of Stepan Bandera, the leader of the more radical wing of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, who spent most of the war under German arrest and was killed by a Soviet agent in 1959 in Munich. Bandera was a symbol. He had great fame, and his name became synonymous with Ukrainian nationalism ("banderites", "banderas"). The post-Soviet canonization of Bandera, which is most noticeable in western Galicia, is a characteristic symbol of parting with the Soviet ideological canon (in which Bandera was perhaps the greatest anti-hero) and an affirmation of Ukrainian statehood. The problem became more acute in the context of the UPA's non-recognition on a countrywide scale as a warring side, and of its soldiers as war veterans. Both demands periodically crop up in political rhetoric, but are not decided in the affirmative at the parliamentary level. Perhaps most importantly, the canonization of Bandera does not anticipate reflection, and does not call to account terrorist practices by the Organization

of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) against Poles, and the participation of its members in anti-Jewish and anti-Polish acts during the war. An additional irritant is the non-recognition of the UPA on a countrywide level.

During the 1990s monuments to Bandera were built in many Galician cities. For example, in Drohobych he showed up in a park which is located on the site of the Jewish ghetto (about which there is no mention). However, he did not appear in Lviv for a long time. Possibly, one of the reasons was that the highest priority task was building a monument to Taras Shevchenko, the 19th century poet who is considered the "father" of the Ukrainian nation. Lviv was perhaps the only large city in Ukraine in which a monument to Shevchenko did not appear during Soviet times, who was then integrated into the canon of "eternal friendship with Russia". A bronze of Shevchenko appeared in Lviv in 1992 and was placed in



approximately the same location where earlier there had stood the Polish king Jan Sobiecki, Adolf Hitler, and Vladimir Lenin. The monument to Sobiecki now stands near the railway station in Gdansk. There was talk of a Bandera monument in Lviv a long time ago, and long ago a site was designated - at Kropyvnytskyj Square - which is not far from the railway station and next to a neogothic Roman Catholic church from the beginning of the 20th century. In 2002, in keeping with the results of a competition, a design for the architectural composition was selected, with a Bandera monument in the centre and an arch that is supposed to symbolize the four eras of Ukrainians' struggle for statehood: Kyivan Rus, the Cossacks, the Ukrainian and West Ukrainian National Republics of 1918-1921, and the OUN and UPA.

The monument itself was to be unveiled in 2004, but funds were lacking then. The chair of the Lviv regional council even turned to the heads of the village councils with a request that they collect 100 hryven' (1 hryvna is worth about 15 eurocents) from each village. In the end the lion's share of the costs (2 million hryven') were covered by the Lviv regional council. The seven metre statue of Bandera was unveiled on October 13, 2007. This date was dedicated to the

65th anniversary of the founding of UPA, which was officially on October 14, and which in turn symbolized continuity with Cossack traditions, since October 14 was the Cossack Holy Day of the Mother of God Protectress (Pokrova). The highest Lviv dignitaries took part in the unveiling of the monument. Below the feet of the statue, capsules were sealed containing soil from Bandera's native village, and from his tomb in Munich. Speaking at the unveiling of the monument, the chair of the Lviv Regional Council Myroslav Senyk said that this is "a people's monument to a people's hero".

The very fact the monument was created, and its entire stylistic expression, are ideological to the core. The posture is high, heroic, decisive, unwavering, and his fame is unquestionable. Other themes are freedom, and resoluteness in the battle for independence. Other monuments to Bandera subscribe to the same norms, which are familiar from Soviet monuments of revolutionary activists. At first glance, the paradoxical comparison of the monumental depictions of Stepan Bandera and Ostap Bender will lead to interesting observations.

In Soviet times, there were no monuments either to Bandera or to Bender. Everybody heard about Bandera as the "leader of the bourgeois nationalists". Everybody read about Bender, because he was one of the most popular literary heroes in the USSR and appeared in one of the most popular Soviet books "Twelve Tables". The incredibly compelling, accessible and aphoristic character Bender was created at the end of the 1920's by the writers Il'ya Il'f and Yevgeniy Petrov.

From the middle of the 1990s, there is a noticeable tendency to search for alternatives to ideological memorials and to find new forms of symbolic relations. From this time we see monuments in eastern and southern Ukraine where Ostap Bender and other heroes of his adventures are triumphantly depicted. The first memorial plaque at the location where "before the Great October Socialist Revolution there worked Mikhail Samuelevich Panikovskiy" appeared in Kyiv in 1992. At this same spot just a few steps from Khreshchatyk Street, in 1998 there was to appear a monument to the "pretend blindman" Panikovskiy. Soon there appeared monuments to the fictional heroes in Kharkiv, Odessa, Zhmernytsi, and Berdyansk, and always at precisely those sites that are mentioned on the pages of the novel. In August 2005 the Kharkiv regional government administration even linked the unveiling of the Ostap Bender sculpture to the day of the liberation of Kharkiv from the fascists and to Ukraine's independence day.



The boom in monuments to the heroes of Il'f and Petrov has not encompassed Galicia, where monuments to Shevchenko and Bandera were built en masse. But the paradox lay in the fact that the style of the nonideological monuments was much less Soviet than the style of the ideological monuments, although those have a radically anti-Soviet sensibility.

The “Motherland” statue in Kyiv



In the capital of Ukraine the Soviet presence is very noticeable. The central street - Khreshchatyk - is lined with Stalinist buildings built after the war. On account of a much more restrained policy concerning renaming than in western Ukraine, many Kyiv streets have kept their Soviet names. The Lenin statue disappeared from Independence Square, but another has remained quietly at the Bessarabian Market. But perhaps the most visible reminder of the Soviet past is the gigantic statue to Victory Day, which competes with the ancient cupolas of the Kyiv Monastery of the Caves.

The “Motherland Statue” towers above Kyiv only from 1981, when on May 9th it was festively unveiled by Leonid Brezhnev. The overall height of this, one of the tallest monuments in the world, is 102 metres. In one hand the “Motherland” holds a sword that weighs 9 tons, and in the other, a 13-ton shield with the emblem of the USSR. The statue is part of a museum complex dedicated to the Great Patriotic War and its very monumentalism seemingly underscores the immutable face of the war and its fundamental meaning.

It is known that in Soviet times the representation of the war itself evolved. Only on May 9, 1965 did this become an official holiday. It was then that a number of cities of the USSR received high designations as “hero cities”, and everywhere there arose new large memorial complexes, books and films about the war were released, which together actually created a new fundamental myth for the USSR. From Brezhnev’s time, the Great Patriotic War replaced the Great October Revolution of 1917 as the most important event of Soviet history. The regime acknowledged (and to a large extent appropriately so) that the USSR of the 1970’s was more the product of 1945 than 1917.

The overly obvious emphasis on massive scale and permanence (in 1981 the “Motherland” was the largest statue ever built in the USSR) evoked an ironic reaction among at least a part of the population. The popular name for the statue, “Granny with sword” is firmly entrenched. Although integrating it (if only on account of its size) into the post-Soviet version of history is not easy, the complex next to the Kyiv Monastery of the Caves remains to this day the site of official government events connected with Victory Day.

Memorial to the Victims of the Holocaust in Dnipropetrovske

In Soviet times the word “Holocaust” was used very reluctantly, and Jewish victims were not distinguished from the rest of the victims of fascism. In keeping with this view, memorials established at the sites of large massacres described the victims as “Soviet citizens”, “peaceful residents”, and so on.

The same was done in Dnipropetrovsk, a city with a population of over a million and a rocketry industry (because of this last circumstance Dnipropetrovske was a city closed to foreigners until the end of the 1980’s). Back in the 1970’s, on the grounds of Gagarin Park (formerly the botanical gardens) in the ravine of which in October 1941 the Nazis shot 10 thousand Jews, there appeared a modest gray monument with a vague inscription in Russian “to peaceful citizens - victims of fascism”. This completely nonmonumental monument actually did not serve as a place of remembrance, although every year on May 9th flowers would appear beside it, brought there by students from the nearest school. (It was customary that every school maintained a particular memorial.) However, memory about the largest act of liquidation (during the occupation of Dnipropetrovsk the Nazis killed 16 to 17 thousand Jews, which constituted about 60% of all civilian victims in the city) endured in the Jewish

community. The first government sanctioned event to commemorate the victims took place in Gagarin Park on May 2, 1989. On April 14, 2001, not far from the Soviet monument there appeared a new memorial (Figure 6) which was built with funding from the Jewish community with inscriptions in Hebrew and Ukrainian: “In this soil lie the remains of 10,000 peaceful Jews of Dnipropetrovsk, cruelly killed 13-14 October 1941, and many additional among our blessed brothers and sisters, murdered and shot by the fascists in 1941-1943”, and with a quote from the prayer “Father of mercy”: “May our Lord remember us in his grace, and all the righteous of the world, and take revenge for the spilled blood of his servants.”



The coexistence of two neighbouring monuments dedicated to the same event is completely non-conflicting. Beside the Soviet monument each year there ritually appear spring flowers, and beside the monument established by the Jewish community each year there take place commemorative meetings. In that way, the history of the Holocaust is living history for this community, but not for the whole city.

Every day hundreds of students of Dnipropetrovsk University come by both monuments, because since the 1970's new lecture buildings, the library, the sports field, and dormitories have been built around the former botanical gardens. In other words, the place where tens of thousands perished has now become the epicentre of student life. The present author followed these paths almost every day for five years, but in the process not once did he hear at lectures or beyond them about the events of 13-14 October 1941, which took place literally a few tens of metres from contemporary lecture halls. We were told about the Holocaust as if it were a part of world (i.e. foreign) history, and it had a place, but not among US, not outside the windows of OUR university.

It so happens that this situation reflects not only the imprint of a Soviet approach to the subject of the Holocaust on post-Soviet efforts to create an ethnonational historical narrative, but also as is typical for this region, the coexistence of various cultures as concentric circles. In Katerynoslav (the then name of Dnipropetrovsk) at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries there stood along the main street and in the sidestreets adjoining it a Lutheran church, a Roman Catholic church, a Karaim kenas, a choral synagogue and an Orthodox church, but this does not allow one to speak of a “multicultural” environment.

At the beginning of the 20th century in Katerynoslav there lived about 70 thousand Jews (about 40% of the general population), and they were served by 44 synagogues and houses of prayer. The first synagogue, a wooden one, was built in 1800 (in a city that itself was founded only in the fourth quarter of the 18th century). This synagogue soon burned down (in that time, construction in the city was almost entirely of wood, and fires were a common occurrence). The choral synagogue “Golden Rose” was built in its place in 1852. In 1929 this was transformed into the Jewish workers’ club, and eventually into the cultural centre of a clothing factory.

In 1996 the synagogue was returned to the Jewish community, and in 1999 it was opened after a grand renovation. In general, the Jewish community in Dnipropetrovsk is one of the most prosperous and most highly developed, and not only in comparison to others in Ukraine. It leads an active and busy life: there is a day care and kindergarten, a secondary school, a girls’ home, a medical center, an old age home, a choir, childrens’ and womens’ clubs, a newspaper, a magazine, a television program, and the community regularly holds festivals and scholarly conferences. Thanks to this community’s efforts, memorials to Holocaust victims have been placed at the sites of mass killings in other populated centres of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, notably the city of Nikopol’ (2001) and in the village of Mykolaivka in Sofia region (September 2007). The community has plans to create a Holocaust museum in Dnipropetrovsk.

Memorial Plaque to the UPA in Kharkiv

Thanks to its proximity to the Russian border, during 1919 Kharkiv was the capital of Soviet Ukraine. Even before this, Kharkiv was the place where the first university in Ukraine was founded (1805) and a sort of “capital” of the Ukrainian cultural and national movements.

During the 1990's, like most of the large cities of the east and south of Ukraine, Kharkiv lived through a monument boom, with the result that the variety of monuments was notably increased, in contrast to the uniformity of the Soviet monuments and the isolated monuments of pre-revolutionary times. Among the new monuments, the majority were varied but nonideological. In particular, there were monuments to the soccer ball, The Fiddler on the Roof, an equestrian statue of the mythical founder of the city, Cossack Kharko (which happened to look similar to the figure of a Georgian warrior) and which was donated to Kharkiv by the Moscow sculptor Zurab Tsereteli.

Against this background of creativity in monuments, in the Youth Park there was built a small, hardly attention-grabbing memorial stone in honour of the UPA, and its unveiling in 1992 went by almost unnoticed. More to the point, one might suppose that many Kharkiv residents would not even have suspected that such a monument existed, if in the context of the political struggles of 2006 the city government had not turned to history as an instrument of political technology.



In response to President Viktor Yushchenko's call for peace among veterans who took part in the war on different sides of the front, there was a decision adopted in October 2006 by the Kharkiv Oblast council, controlled at that time by the main opponents of the president, the Party of Regions, to remove all memorial signs associated with OUN and UPA. The will of the Oblast council was carried out by persons unknown, but on the night of December 20 of that year someone removed the memorial stone to the UPA. The next day the city newspapers received an anonymous e-mail letter, on the basis of information from which the memorial stone was found in a ditch not far from the place where it was removed. It was restored. From that time, this memorial is periodically guarded by activists from right-of-centre political forces.

While in Kharkiv they aimed to remove already existing monuments, the City Council of Simferopol, the capital of Crimean autonomy, decided to put up a new one: on June 21, 2007 it supported the initiative of the Communist Party to establish on the central square of the city - Soviet Square - a monument to the "victims of the Soviet people, who fell at the hands of the assistants of the fascists" from UPA, a "Shot in the Back". The initiators of the new monument explained their motives as follows: "This monument will be a worthy response of Crimeans to all those "mrakobisy" who today thirst to rewrite and blacken the history of the Soviet nation, to disrupt the chronicle of the Great Patriotic War, to forget its heroes, bring shame, and call for a peace with the assistants of the fascists, the soldiers of OUN-UPA". On September 14, 2007 the monument was unveiled with the participation of the leader of the Communist Party of Ukraine, Petro Symonenko.

On July 5, 2007 the Kharkiv Oblast council supported their Simferopol colleagues and again called for a "halt to the heroization of the soldiers of UPA". The day before in Kharkiv's Victory Square, deputies on the Oblast Council from the Progressive Socialist Party of Natalia Vitrenko blew up ten blue pine saplings, in so doing creating a "boulevard in remembrance of the victims of the Ukrainian people, who died at the hands of the OUN, UPA, and other assistants of Hitlerite fascism."

Future intensification or waning of such monument-building activities is directly related to the developing political situation in the country. The very quality of the theatrics employed in these events betrays the cynicism and deep lack of concern of their initiators to history as such and to public proposals in post-Soviet Ukraine.

Conclusions

The simultaneous existence of monuments that are ideologically opposed and incompatible in practice, and which reflect various different visions of Ukrainian history (most of all Soviet and ethnonationalist), is one of the characteristic features of contemporary Ukraine. At that, the monuments described in this paper are only examples and expose only a fragment of the overall picture. For example, besides the "Motherland" statue,

Kyiv also has a monument complex in Babi Yar, in Lviv a monument to Yaroslav Hashek's fictional hero Soldier Shveik was recently unveiled, in Dnipropetrovsk there exist dozens of monuments to Soviet soldiers, and so on.

The most obvious conclusion from the above given examples is that regional institutions of government, which have very limited authority in other spheres because Ukraine is a unitary state with very strong centralization of power, have the opportunity to express themselves in full measure in the sphere of monument creation. Although there are often indications of personal or group motivations, in general one gets the impression that the absence of a central government policy on memorials in Ukraine serves to preserve social stability.

Even more significantly, the existence of several different regional centres with their own versions of history fosters the preservation of pluralism in the public sphere and ensures that no version of history becomes the sole version dominant throughout all territories of Ukraine. This situational pluralism is born through the interaction of different views of the past, each one of which, taken separately, is fairly one-sided and authoritarian. The concept often ascribed to Ukraine that it is a "nationalizing state" emerges as rather problematic, insofar as the national policy throughout all these years of independence is characterised by its deep regionality and multivectorhood. The most complete national scheme was introduced into school history textbooks (but even there attempts to completely avoid the term "Great Patriotic War" were not successful). Even the most "correctly" written textbook found itself in a mindspace in the post-Soviet schools that was pluralistic in principle, since had to compete with mass media, family, and even the personal convictions of individual teachers. Popular culture plays an important role also, and for it the symbols of war had long become familiar palettes for the formation of new ideas. I will mention just one widespread (and for more than one year) advertisement concerning measures to be taken against the Colorado beetle which ruins potatoes on private plots. The ad makes use of a Soviet propaganda poster from the war years.

At the same time, it is far from simple to define the self-identification of Ukrainians, who do not accept an ethnonational narrative, if only because of the dynamics of the process of self-education. At the present time, the rather amorphous alternatives to the national scheme are disparate elements of Soviet mythology, populism, and nostalgia, which with a lot of qualifications can be termed a "post-Soviet" identity following John-Paul Himka. This is an unclearly articulated collection of beliefs, dominant among which is a weak interest in the national question, but alongside it, a principled opposition to exclusive ethnic nationalism. ☐☐

Muskie 2009 Program Announcement

From: Rachel Surkin rsurkin@irex.org <<mailto:rsurkin@irex.org>>

Date: Monday, October 13, 2008 10:35 AM

The Government of the United States of America is pleased to announce the 2009 Edmund S. Muskie Graduate Fellowship Program (Muskie). The deadline to submit the application for this program is October 31, 2008.

Established by the US Congress in 1992 to encourage economic and democratic growth in Eurasia, the Edmund S. Muskie Graduate Fellowship Program is a program of the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs of the United States Department of State, and administered by IREX. The program provides opportunities for graduate students and professionals from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan for one-year non-degree, one-year degree or two-year degree study in the United States.

All fellows will attend classes full-time for one to two years and will be required to create and implement a project related to their professional interests that benefits the local community. Fellows will also be required to participate in a full-time summer internship after their first academic year.

The fellowship provides J-1 visa support, round-trip travel from fellows' home cities to their US host institutions, university tuition and mandatory university fees, accident and sickness coverage, monthly allowance for living expenses, limited book allowance, limited allowance for professional enrichment activities, pre-academic English-language training (if necessary), and a wide variety of alumni networking and training opportunities.

The Muskie Program selects outstanding citizens from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan (herein referred to as Eurasia) to receive fellowships for Master's level study in the United States in the fields of business administration, economics, law, public administration, and public policy. Candidates from countries other than Russia and Ukraine will also be considered in additional fields of education, environmental management, international affairs, library and information science, journalism/mass communications, and public health.

Applications for the Muskie program are available at http://www.irex.org/programs/muskie/muskie_info.asp
http://www.irex.org/programs/muskie/muskie_info.asp

Applications can also be obtained and submitted by contacting IREX field offices and representatives in Eurasia
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See application for eligibility requirements. ☐☐☐



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