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Ukraine's Orange Revolution: Causes and Consequences
by Taras Kuzio
George Washington University
Maria Palij Memorial Fund Annual Lecture
Department of History and Center for Russian and East and European Studies,
University of Kansas
28 April 2005
[Original
text]
Two problems arise when we analyse events such Ukraine's Orange Revolution
in November-December 2004. First, an inclination to only look at a limited
number of causal factors lying behind the Orange Revolution. Second, different
branches of the social sciences do not interact with one another.
First, the inclination to narrow the number of causal factors can be seen
in Adrian Karatnycky's discussion of the Orange Revolution in the March-April
2005 issue of Foreign Affairs. A strong emphasis is made upon civic factors
(i.e. civil society, NGO's, political parties) as the primary factors
leading to Ukraine's unprecedented civic mobilisation. While, undoubtedly
very important, civic factors on their own do not give us the full picture
of why, when and where the Orange Revolution happened.
Another example of narrowing causal factors lies in the realm of ascribing
the primary role to nationalism, a factor that Karatnycky ignores. In
his Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies annual lecture at Cambridge
University Dominique Arel writes that, "And yet, the orange revolution
owes its existence to a strong national movement in Ukraine. National
as in nationalism". Arel goes on to say that "nationalism produced
the orange revolution".
In Arel's view, the strength of civil society in Ukraine is "largely
due to the strength of nationalism". Galicians are given undue attention
and without them Arel seems to believe that the Orange Revolution could
"have a serious organizational problem".
Arel also sees little difference between the 1994 and 2004 presidential
elections as in both cases there was acute "polarized geography".
In the 2004 elections there was, he believes, far more polarization than
in 1994. Yet, he also believes that, "Ukrainian society had in fact
profoundly changed since independence".
Of course, if this indeed the case then Ukrainian nationalism is not a
"minority faith", the title of Andrew Wilson's PhD and 1997
Cambridge University book. But, the causes are far more complicated. Civic
factors and nationalism played important causal roles in Ukraine's Orange
Revolution but they were only two of many factors that came together at
the right time.
Second, scholars in different fields of social sciences do not often interact
in their scholarly pursuits. Scholars of nationalism and democratization
do not talk to each other. Indeed, one often has the impression that "nationalism"
is a taboo subject for American political science and comparative politics
journals. Scholarly journals devoted to the study of nationalism are published
in Britain, not the USA.
Another area were scholars fail to interact is security and democratization
studies. There is no clear recognition within democratization studies
of the importance of cooperation and integration. In Ukraine's case, for
example, is eleven year cooperation with NATO's Partnership for Peace
and bilaterally with the USA and Britain in the security dimension brought
dividends during the Orange Revolution.
Eight Necessary Factors for the Orange Revolution
1. Competitive Authoritarian Regime
All four revolutions in Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan took place
in semi-authoritarian regimes which Lucan Way describes as "competitive
authoritarian". These are hybrid regimes that combine elements of
both authoritarianism and a democracy and market economy. Lucan Way also
believes that these regimes are pluralistic but by "default".
The fact that these regimes are not fully authoritarian regimes has profound
implications for the likely success of the opposition in elections and
of a democratic revolution following fraudulent elections. Competitive
authoritarian regimes provide space for the opposition, civil society,
some media outlets, institutions (such as parliament) and international
organizations to operate. Ukraine's opposition controlled half of parliamentary
deputies since the 2002 elections with Viktor Yushchenko's Our Ukraine
the largest faction.
2. Preceding Political Crisis
If there had been no Kuchmagate crisis, when a tape was released showing
President Leonid Kuchma having authorized violence against opposition
journalist Heorhiy Gongadze, there would have not been an Orange Revolution.
The crisis began in November 2000 and culminated four years later during
the Orange Revolution.
The Kuchmagate crisis did not lead to Kuchma's downfall. Nevertheless,
it severely undermined the legitimacy of the ruling elites, discredited
Kuchma, created a hard core group of activists and awakened young people
from their political apathy. As one activist recalled, Kuchma remained
in power but he was from then finished inside most Ukrainians.
Many of the activists from the Kuchmagate crisis went on to play key roles
in the 2002 and 2004 election campaigns of the opposition. They also played
strategic roles in the Orange Revolution. Many of them, such as Taras
Stetskiv (head of State Television, Channel 1) and Yuriy Lutsenko (Minister
of Interior) have high ranking government positions.
The preceding political crisis was also accompanied by a succession crisis
because Kuchma had come to the end of his two terms. Competitive authoritarian
regimes are extremely vulnerable during elections and succession crises
as it is during these events that the regime either tips towards democratic
or autocratic consolidation.
3. Charismatic Candidate
A charismatic candidate who has no corrupt past is vital both for the
opposition around which to unite and to give hope to voters that not all
politicians are "corrupt". In Ukraine public opinion polls pointed
to only two politicians with high moral standing: Yushchenko and Socialist
leader Oleksandr Moroz.
Yushchenko's appeal also came across as a new type of Western "metrosexual"
leader. His metrosexual image came across particularly to Western leaning
voters and young people. Unlike neo-Soviet centrists who looked down at
the narod and kept a qualified distance, Yushchenko (and his allies) were
able to interact with voters in a more approachable non-Soviet way.
Yushchenko's candidature was assisted by his opponent, Viktor Yanukovych,
being a very poor candidate for the authorities. His twice criminal record,
Donetsk background and intellectually challenged personality all haunted
him. Yanukovych was therefore a very good candidate, but for the opposition
rather than for the authorities. For young people he became an ideal candidate
to poke fun at through web sites, cartoons, political theatre, and jokes.
4. Sympathetic Capital City
Kyiv's Mayor Oleksandr Omelchenko had long been sympathetic to Yushchenko
while attempting to be on good terms with Kuchma. Omelchenko had blocked
one of the three clans, the Social Democratic United Party (SDPUo) led
by Viktor Medvedchuk, from establishing a secure home base. In 1999 Kyivites
rejected SDPUo high ranking member Heorhy Surkis as Mayor and in 2002
voted overwhelmingly for the opposition. For a United Ukraine failed to
cross the 4% threshold in 2002 in Kyiv and the SDPUo barely scraped through.
During the Orange Revolution this sympathy played an important role. Buildings
were opened up for visitors to the capitol who joined the Revolution,
refuse was collected from, portable toilets were provided, and firewood
and food was supplied to the tent city.
5. Disunited and Dispirited Ruling Elites
The ruling elites entered the 2004 elections disunited and unsure about
the post-Kuchma era. Many within the Kuchma camp were not sympathetic
to Yanukovych as a candidate. They either sat on the fence or quietly
backed the Yushchenko campaign. Parliamentary speaker Volodymyr Lytvyn,
head of the then Agrarian Party, was the atypical fence sitter who kept
parliament going throughout the elections. During the Orange Revolution
parliament issued a resolution refusing to recognize the official results
that had declared Yanukovych president and voted no confidence in his
government.
6. United Opposition
A united opposition showed voters that politicians could stand above narrow
personal interests and unite around a concrete platform. In Ukraine a
triangular opposition consisting of Yushchenko (Our Ukraine)-Yulia Tymoshenko
(eponymous bloc)-Moroz (Socialists) had existed since 2001 when Yushchenko
had gone into opposition after his government had been removed. This triangular
alliance re-emerged after round one of the 2004 elections and played a
vital role in creating a broad-based coalition. Anatoliy Kinakh (Union
of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs) added his support at that time to
this coalition because of his opposition to Yanukovych's candidature.
The only opposition group marginalized from this coalition was the Communist
Party which saw Yushchenko as a worse "evil" than the oligarchs.
7. New Generation
Since the 1980s a new generation has grown up in Ukraine which does not
have any Soviet political culture. The 2002 and 2004 elections were the
first occasion when this younger generation emerged as a serious actor
in Ukrainian politics. Some had already developed their political skills
during the Kuchmagate crisis. Many of them joined the myriad of NGO's
active during the Orange Revolution, such as PORA! (Its Time!) and Znayu!
(I Know!).
8. Civic Nationalism
Civic nationalism played a role in mobilizing participants in the Orange
Revolution, particularly young people. Yushchenko's political platform
supported a pro-European orientation for Ukraine that intersected with
national identity and regional factors. The Orange Revolution confirmed
that national identity and civil society are, as Mykola Ryabchuk and Stephen
Shulman have written, closely bound up in Ukraine.
Civic nationalism was prevalent in Orange Revolution music and in Yushchenko's
campaign statements. The music called upon Ukrainians to take back "Nasha
Ukrayina" from the small band of corrupt officials who cared nothing
for the country or its inhabitants.
Five Contributing Factors
Economic
Ukraine was different to the Serbia or Georgia during their revolutions
in that it had a functioning state and robust economy. Yet, the crucial
factor was that the Yanukovych government was not being credited for growth
and living standards were not increasing. Much of the additional funds
entering the budget were being stolen through widespread corruption and
used as election slosh funds for the Yanukovych camp.
Another factor that made Ukraine different was that the robust economy
was evident in small and medium businessmen backing Yushchenko. They provided
much of the finances - not international organizations or governments
- to the Yushchenko camp.
Modern Communications
The Orange Revolution was the world's first internet revolution. Modern
communications tools such as the internet (e-mail, a source of news, discussion
forums), cell phones (communications, texting, camera telephones) and
cable domestic and international television played a crucial role in breaking
the state's monopoly on information and in mobilising voters.
Public Mood
The mood changed during the six month long elections from despondency
to a belief in Yushchenko's potential victory. In the early part of the
campaign voters believed that Yushchenko would win but - as in the April
2004 Mukachevo mayoral elections - the authorities candidate would be
declared winner. Through a combination of active electioneering in the
provinces, sympathy for Yushchenko after his poisoning and his victory
in round one this despondency changed.
There was a particularly strong change in public mood between rounds one
and two when voters not only became more optimistic about Yushchenko's
chances of victory. But, the public mood also changed away from the refrain
that politics has nothing to do with me and I should therefore stay out
of it. In Ukrainian this was often described as "Moya khata z krayu".
The second round was more decisive than the first and many voters understood
that if they remained passive then they would only have themselves to
blame when Yanukovych was elected.
Security Forces
In the Serbian, Georgian and Ukrainian elections the security forces defected
or stayed neutral. In Ukraine the Security Service (SBU) and military
were sympathetic to Yushchenko while the Interior Ministry was divided.
In the elections the SBU illicitly taped illegal activities in the Yanukovych
elections headquarters and these tapes were given to Yushchenko after
round two.
During the Orange Revolution the only attempt to suppress the participants
occurred on the 28 November after a stormy National Security and Defence
Council meeting. Interior Ministry troops were dispatched to Kyiv on Kuchma's
orders after intense lobbying by Yanukovych and Medvedchuk.
They never fulfilled their order to suppress the Orange Revolution because
the military intervened and warned the Interior Ministry that it would
defend the protestors. A decade long cooperation with NATO's PfP and the
USA had paid its dividends.
International
Assistance provided by Western governments and international organizations
was not crucial to the success of the Orange Revolution. Most of the financial
support to the Orange Revolution came from domestic sources. PORA!, for
example, was not funded by the USA (unlike Serbia's OTPOR).
At the same time, diplomatic support was crucial in undermining the intended
aim of the authorities in forcing Yanukovych's candidacy upon Ukrainians
as the election victor. President George Bush sent Senator Richard Lugar
as his personal representative in round two. Then US Secretary of State
Colin Powell issued a strong declaration three days after round two where
the USA refused to recognise the official results released that day proclaiming
Yanukovych to be elected president. This statement jolted the EU into
following suit, meaning Yanukovych would not be recognized by the entire
Euro-Atlantic community.
In the two days following Powell's statement, Ukrainians officials sitting
on the fence began to wholesale defect to the Yushchenko camp. Three days
later parliament denounced the results. Powell could very well be written
up by future historians as the one of the unlikely hero's of the Orange
Revolution.
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